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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

IMAGINATION BOUND: A THEORETICAL IMPERATIVE
Kant’s theory of productive imagination falls at the center of the critical project. This is
evident in the 1781 Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant claims that the productive
imagination is a “fundamental faculty of the human soul” and indispensable for the
construction of experience. And yet, in the second edition of 1787 Kant seemingly
demotes this imagination as a mere “effect of the understanding on sensibility” and all
but withdraws its place from the Transcendental Deduction.
In his 1929 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Martin Heidegger provided an
explanation for the revisions between 1781 and 1787. Heidegger suggested that the
Critique was supposed to be a foundation for Kant’s metaphysics of morals, which holds
that practical reason is freely bound by a categorical imperative. Yet after 1781 Kant
recognized that the Critique implicates the productive imagination as the “unknown root”
of the faculties of understanding and sensibility. If the 1781 Critique reveals this
imagination to be the source of theoretical rules and practical imperatives, then,
according to Heidegger, Kant could not but “shrink back” from this shocking discovery.
A faculty so intimately tied to sensibility, and hence contingency and particularity, is a
poor progenitor of freedom and universal rules.
I think there is some truth to Heidegger’s explanation. But I also think there is something
more important to draw from the revisions between 1781 and 1787. In this dissertation, I
assume that something about the productive imagination did frighten Kant. But, pace
Heidegger, I do not think that Kant shrank back from his initial position. Rather, I argue
that the revisions clarify a theory that was implicit in 1781 but made explicit by 1787. If
the imagination is a power for representation, which is at times a dream and at times a
veridical experience, then the difference lies in the rule according to which the
construction of the representation is bound. Furthermore, I argue that Kant’s revisions
reveal a duty to bind the reproductive imagination according to a common concept, what
Kant sometimes refers to as common sense. This is what I call the theoretical imperative.
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1,

Introduction

In contrast to the methods of historical philology, which has its own agenda, a thoughtful
dialogue is bound by other laws—laws which are more easily violated. In a dialogue the
possibility of going astray is more threatening, the shortcomings are more frequent.
—Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Preface to the Second Edition

1,1

The Problem

What is Kant’s theory of the power of imagination (Einbildungskraft) in the Critique of
Pure Reason? It is not, I suggest, a theory of will-o’-the-wisp flights of fancy, anymore
than it is a theory of memory, reproduction, and association. It is rather, and this will
have to suffice for now, a faculty of original representation bound by a priori rules for
the sake of a possible experience or, what is the same for Kant, empirical thinking. In this
sense, Einbildungskraft plays a central role in Kant’s critical philosophy. One might even
call it the keystone, without which the project would crumble under its own weight.
But then, if Einbildungskraft is the keystone to the critical project, a “fundamental
faculty of the human soul that grounds all cognition a priori”1 according to the first
edition of the Critique, why does Kant seemingly back-peddle from this position in 1781?
Why does he revise passages, claiming that Einbildungskraft is a “function of the
understanding” or an “effect of the understanding on sensibility”? And why is

1

Kant (1998), A124. Most citations of Kant are referenced first according to the Cambridge Edition of the
Works of Immanuel Kant and followed by the German Academy Edition, Akademie Ausgabe (AA)—Kants
gesammelte Schriften. All paginations from the Critique of Pure Reason are referenced according to the
original paginations of the first edition (A-ed.) and second edition (B-ed.).
1

Einbildungskraft all but absent in the Transcendental Deduction of 1787, making its only
appearance in section 24, more than halfway through the Deduction proper?
These are the questions Martin Heidegger raises in his 1929 Kant and the
Problem of Metaphysics. In this seminal text, Heidegger claims that Kant’s argument of
1781 implicates Einbildungskraft as the “unknown root” of the faculties of sensibility and
understanding.2 Given this, Heidegger asks,
How is the baser faculty of sensibility also to be able to constitute the essence of reason?
Does not everything fall into confusion if the lowest takes the place of the highest? What
is to happen with the venerable tradition, according to which Ratio and Logos have
claimed the central function in the history of metaphysics? Can the primacy of Logic fall?
Can the architectonic of the laying of the ground for metaphysics in general, the division
into Transcendental Aesthetic and Logic, still be upheld if what it has for its theme is
basically to be the transcendental power of imagination (Einbildungskraft)?3

Heidegger’s answer is that the venerable tradition ends, the primacy of logic falls, and
Kant’s beloved architectonic crumbles.
According to Heidegger, Kant’s transcendental philosophy undermines traditional
western metaphysics. But as Heidegger further notes, Kant did not take this entirely in
stride: he “did not carry through with the more original interpretation of the
transcendental power of imagination (Einbildungskraft).”4 Rather, he “shrank back
(zurückgewichen) from this unknown root.”5 For he was not only “frightened” but also
aware that his desire to repair the “indeterminate, empirical universality of popular

2

Kant famously claims in the Critique’s introduction that “all that seems necessary for an introduction or
preliminary is that there are two stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a common but to
us unknown root, namely sensibility and understanding, through the first of which objects are given to us,
but through the second of which they are thought.” See Kant (1998), A15/B29, my emphasis. See
Heidegger (1997a), 97; 3: 138–9.
3
Heidegger (1997a), 117; 3: 167. All citations of Heidegger are referenced first according to the Indiana
University Press edition and followed by the Heidegger Gesamtausgabe edited by Vittorio Klostermann.
4
Heidegger (1997a), 112; 3: 160.
5
Heidegger (1997a), 112; 3: 160.
2

philosophical doctrines concerning morals”6 was in jeopardy. As Heidegger sees it, Kant
thus had no choice but to revise the Critique.
There are a few questions that arise from Heidegger’s interpretation. First, was
Kant really frightened? Second, did Kant shrink back from his original position? Or does
Heidegger misinterpret the relation of the faculties and the function of Einbildungskraft?

1,2

The Thesis in Two Parts

I think Kant recognized Einbildungskraft as indispensable for transcendental philosophy
while also being influenced by, both directly and indirectly, a tradition that associates a
wild, unbound imagination with irrationality and immorality. The awareness that
irrationality could hinge upon the same mental power as rationality is perhaps what
frightened Kant, for then the question is, at least in the first Critique, What right does
rationality have to judge irrationality? What right does reason have to play both judge and
party to its own dispute? As Montaigne says in the Essays:
Reason has taught me that to condemn a thing thus, dogmatically, as false and
impossible, is to assume the advantage of knowing the bounds and limits of God’s will
and of the power of our mother Nature; and that there is no more notable folly in the
world than to reduce these things to the measure of our capacity and competence.7

In spite of Kant’s greatest efforts, perhaps he too harbored the thought that reason had no
right to judge according to its own concepts; that it had “no clear legal ground for an
entitlement to their use either from experience or from [itself].”8
Heidegger’s claim is that Kant was frightened by the implications of the 1781
Critique and therefore willfully obscured his original insight. I think Heidegger is right to
6

Heidegger (1997a), 118; 3: 168.
Montaigne (1957), 132.
8
Kant (1998), A84–5/B117.
7

3

charge Einbildungskraft as a source of fear for Kant. But I do not agree that this fear had
the precise effect that Heidegger thinks it did. Fear did not cause Kant to turn away from
his original position. Rather, fear caused Kant to clarify his central tenets and overall
doctrine and to emphasize, in particular, an a priori act of the mind: the preconceptual
synthesis of Einbildungskraft must be bound by universal and necessary rules. This claim
is implicit in 1781, but it becomes explicit by 1787. The latter constitutes the first part of
my thesis.
This condition for the possibility of objectivity, the a priori binding of
Einbildungskraft, has an implication for empirical thinking, and this constitutes the
second part of my thesis. I am going to argue in this dissertation that the transcendental
condition for the possibility of objectivity implies an imperative to bind the reproductive
imagination according to common concepts. For Kant, this is a further condition for
objectivity, and it is what I call the theoretical imperative.
This thesis rests on a claim Kant makes in section 27 of the B-Deduction. In an
example of what he means by necessity, he writes,
For, e.g., the concept of cause, which asserts the necessity of a consequent under a
presupposed condition, would be false if it rested only on a subjective necessity,
arbitrarily implanted in us, of combining certain empirical representations according to
such a rule of relation. I would not be able to say that the effect is combined with the
cause in the object (i.e., necessarily), but only that I am so constituted that I cannot think
of this representation otherwise than as so connected.9

The concept of causation—or any concept as an objectively necessary rule of
combination—is not only being so constituted that I cannot think otherwise. It rests on
speaking as well. I must judge or “say” something. The implication is that I can always

9

Kant (1998), B168.
4

remain silent, but I ought not to. This is the theoretical imperative that I want to stress lies
behind Kant’s transcendental philosophy.
Kant’s Transcendental Deduction shows us that there is purposiveness, a telos,
behind the construction of experience. The mind is predisposed toward thinking.10 But I
note here that from the natural standpoint or, as one of Kant’s successors will put it, the
standpoint of life, the construction of experience is unconscious. And it is not a matter of
making this unconscious conscious. It is a fact, for Kant, that I cannot help perceiving
objects in spatio-temporal relations. And yet, one implication to draw from Kant’s project
is that I can help perceiving empirical representations as something. That is, the critical
analysis and employment of our concepts affect our perceptual experience, for these
concepts necessitate subsequent associations of our imagination. It follows that we have a
duty and responsibility, an imperative, to judge empirical representations according to
clear and distinct concepts, lest we become dreamers in waking life. So, although we
cannot control the a priori syntheses of Einbildungskraft, we ought to control our
judgment, for this in turn affects subsequent a posteriori associations.
Thinking is not natural. It is not that I cannot but reflect representations under
concepts. What is natural is the mere association of representations, an affect of the
imagination that Hume so persuasively describes. For Kant, thinking is a further step. It is
imaginative association according to common, shared concepts, which enable us to
discourse. In what follows, I show many instances of the imagination haphazardly
associating sensations and representations. These instances, so common in life, are what
frightened Kant, for they not only indicate intellectual laziness but may also lead to the

10

I will discuss this below. See, for instance, chapter two, section three.
5

madhouse. And yet, despite these ominous consequences, Kant did not suppress or
abandon Einbildungskraft. Pace Heidegger, I do not think Kant shrank back from this
power. I think he tamed it.

1,3

The Method

Heidegger claims that Kant was frightened. But he offers no proof. Yet I think we can
begin to substantiate this hypothesis by rearticulating arguments concerning the
imagination in the western canon. The success of this rearticulation depends upon
whether the story that unfolds is capable of providing a reason for Kant’s otherwise
erratic behavior between 1781 and 1787. If the imagination turns out to be a
coconspirator in immoral and irrational behavior, exemplified through arguments and
myths that both delineate and signify a rebellious, unlawful, and illegitimate nature, then
that can provide a reason for Kant’s partial maintenance and reproduction as well as
reinterpretation and radical revision of Einbildungskraft. In other words, we can test
Heidegger’s hypothesis by looking back into the conceptual history of the imagination,
thereby rationalizing Kant’s seemly irrational behavior.11
But merely considering historical arguments, anecdotes, and myths surrounding
the concept will not lend enough support to the claim that Kant was frightened. We need
to consider Kant’s own thoughts on the subject. This is why the precritical works from
the 1760s and 1770s are so important. We can provide further support if these early
works suggest apprehension and distrust toward Einbildungskraft.

11

This is an interpretative strategy employed in both hermeneutics and psychoanalysis. This method can be
found, for instance, in Robert A. Paul’s Moses and Civilization. See Paul (1996).
6

To be sure, this method will only substantiate Heidegger’s hypothesis. It will not
prove that Kant shrank back from his original position in 1781. What it will suggest,
however, is that Kant had good reasons to think that Einbildungskraft is indispensable for
thinking only if it is bound by rules. For Kant’s earliest publications describe human
beings as naturally imaginative but unbound by rules, laws, maxims, and principles.
These early texts describe human beings as often caught up in their own dreams, from
which some never wake up. They offer, then, strong evidence for my claim that if
Einbildungkraft is to be useful for thinking, it must be guided by rules.
I do not think the function of Einbildungskraft changes from 1781 to 1787. These
revisions drive home the point that the mind is required to bind this power according to a
priori rules of the understanding, which rules are derived from the nature of the
understanding (and not, as Heidegger’s conclusion would suggest, Einbildungskraft). If
this is correct, what follows is the theoretical imperative of section 27 and its empirical
implications, which Kant did not say but, as Heidegger would put it, “wanted to say.” A
successful historical and precritical exegesis should bear this out. Einbildungskraft, as we
shall see, represents many things, both illusory and veridical. Such an unpredictable,
protean power, if it is to be harnessed for the sake of thinking, must be bound.

1,4

Caveat Lector

I must make two final remarks before I end this introduction. First, I am aware that there
are other reasons, which scholarship bears out, for Kant’s revisions between 1781 and
1787. The so-called Göttingen Review of 1782, for instance, which appeared
anonymously in the Zugabe zu den Göttinger gelehrte Anzeigen but which we know was

7

composed partially by Christian Garve and partially by J. G. Feder, painted Kant’s
transcendental idealism as Berkeleyianism. The reviewers claimed that Kant reduced
everything (the world and the subject) to mere representations. The charge was egoism,
and there are thus numerous points in the second edition of 1787 that seek to distinguish
Berkeley’s dogmatic idealism from Kant’s transcendental idealism.12
There is the also the matter of Descartes’s problematic idealism. In the second
edition Kant adds a section titled “The Refutation of Idealism.” He seems to think that his
initial refutation of Cartesian skepticism was weak. For he initially thought that he simply
needed to show that by having a representation of an object it is possible to prove the
reality of that object. But as Kant comes to see after 1781, the Cartesian never doubted
the representations of objects. Rather, he doubted the correspondence between the
representation and the object-in-itself. In the second edition, Kant therefore emphasizes
the criterion of truth as internal to the mind.13
Finally, with respect to the transcendental deductions themselves, there is the
charge of psychologism against the 1781 Transcendental Deduction. This charge states
that Kant’s method is introspective. It observes the operations of the mind and determines
facts about our mental operations—that there are three synthetic acts of the mind that
yield empirical cognition or experience in the rich Kantian sense. But the problem here is

12

See Kant’s emendations to the Transcendental Aesthetic at B56–7 and B70–1. See also Kant’s letter to
Garve on 7 August 1783 in Kant (1967), 98–105; AA, 10: 336–43. In this letter, Kant admits to Garve that
his presentation of the Transcendental Deduction is difficult for his readers. But he also claims that he sees
no other way to present a deduction of the categories and challenges those who charge him of
“impenetrable obscurity” to write a deduction in a more popular fashion. But most important, he reasserts
his position that the deduction is of the highest importance and that he is certain that a deduction of the
categories from any other source other than reason itself is impossible. What this suggests is that the
Göttingen Review did not change Kant’s fundamental premises concerning a transcendental deduction
from 1781 to 1787.
13
For a fuller elucidation of these charges against Kant and his subsequent revisions, see, for instance,
Beiser (2002), 88–127.
8

that Hume clearly shows in his Treatise of Human Nature how introspection is an
empirical method and can only yield contingent premises. “Matters of fact” are not
necessarily true. There may therefore be other explanations for the possibility of
empirical cognition, an explanation other than the categories of the understanding. In the
second edition of 1787, subsequently aware of his misstep, Kant therefore substantially
revises his method and adopts a logical approach.
I do not doubt that the problems of problematic and dogmatic idealism motivate
Kant to delete, revise, and supplement sections of the 1781 Critique. But I also do not
think I have to contend with these interpretations in the course of this dissertation. In fact,
the reasons that I offer here can be seen as consistent with previous scholarship, for what
I offer is a probable reason for the revisions within the Transcendental Deduction,
reasons which, as far as I can tell, are internally coherent with Berkeleyian, Cartesian,
Lockean, or Leibnizian concerns.
With respect to psychologism, we might admit that Kant reconsiders the
psychological method of Hume and Tetens and revises his deduction of the categories in
order to preclude a conflation of his method with the latters’. But this seems uncharitable
to Kant. Kant’s close reading of Tetens in the late 1770s made him acutely aware of the
problems of psychological arguments. Kant knew that introspection and observation on
the facts of consciousness could only yield empirical claims. So to think that he would
employ such a method in the 1781 Deduction, the purpose of which is to prove the

9

necessity and university of the categories of the understanding, is to think that Kant
would, like the neurotic, employ the same method expecting different results.14
The second remark is not so much an interpretative concern as it is linguistic. This
dissertation focuses on the imagination. “Imagination” is Latin in etymology, and some
philosophers below employ this term, including Kant himself—for instance in his
Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view. But Kant also uses the German
“Phantasie,” “Dichtungsvermögen,” “Bildungsvermögen,” “bildende Kraft,”
“Bildungskraft,” and “Einbildungskraft,” among others, for the numerous operations of
imagination—reproduction, production, foresight, memory, etc. In what follows, I
employ “imagination” in the most general sense, but when I refer to a particular
philosopher, I use the word in his language, in order to capture the rich meaning for him
and his philosophical doctrine. When I turn to Kant in particular I treat
Bildungsvermögen in the most general sense, unless otherwise specified. If Kant uses a
different term for the imagination, I indicate this and provide an explanation as to Kant’s
meaning in that context.15 Overall, I attempt throughout this dissertation to avoid the
English term, since I think it conflates different meanings for different philosophers.
Copyright © Robert M. Guerin 2016

14

What sets Kant’s method apart from his predecessors is that he thinks that knowledge must be grounded
in an a priori synthesis. It is a matter of fact that the mind apprehends and reproduces representations, but
the key premise of the 1781 deduction is that these facts presuppose an a priori rule that guides them. Kant
seems to have this in mind when he wrote to J. S. Beck in 16 October 1792 that “in my judgment
everything depends on the following: Since in the empirical concept of a composite the synthesis cannot be
given or represented in intuition by means of the mere intuition and its apprehension but only through the
spontaneous connection of the manifold—that is, it can be presented in a consciousness in general (which is
not empirical)—this connection, and its functioning, must stand a priori in the mind, under rules that
constitute pure thought of an object in general (the pure concept of the understanding).” See Kant (1967),
194; AA, 11: 376. See, for comparison, Paul Guyer’s essay on the charge of psychologism against the
Transcendental Deduction in the collection of essays in Eckart Förster’s Kant’s Transcendental
Deductions: Guyer (1989).
15
For a quick reference, see the figures listed above.
10

2,

Produktive Einbildungskraft

Einbildungskraft is therefore also a faculty of a synthesis a priori, on account of which we give it
the name of produktiven Einbildungskraft, and, insofar as its aim in regard to all the manifold of
appearances is nothing further than the necessary unity in their synthesis, this can be called the
transcendental function of the imagination.
—Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A123
The transcendental Einbildungskraft is homeless.
—Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 3: 136

2,1

Problem and Task of the A-Deduction

In a letter to Marcus Herz of 21 February 1772 Kant notes the following shortcoming,
which he has discovered through his musings over a treatise preliminarily titled “The
Limits of Sense and Reason”:
As I thought through the theoretical part, considering its whole scope and the reciprocal
relations of all its parts, I noticed that I still lacked something essential, something that in
my long metaphysical studies I, as well as others, had failed to pay attention to and that,
in fact, constitutes the key to the whole secret of hitherto still obscure metaphysics. I
asked myself: What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call
“representation” to the object?1

Kant goes on to elaborate that it is easy to determine the ground “if a representation is
only a way in which the subject is affected by the object.” For in this case, it is simply a
matter of “an effect in accord with its cause.” Likewise, this ground is understood “if the
object itself were created by the representation (as when divine cognitions are conceived

1

Kant (1967), 71; AA, 10: 129–35.
11

as the archetypes of all things).”2 In the case of both an intellectus archetypi and an
intellectus ectypi, the relation between representations and objects is easily conceivable.
So what is the problem? Why does Kant think he, as well as everyone else, has failed to
comprehend the ground between representations and objects?
The real issue here concerns the human understanding and its categories. As Kant
notes in the 1770 Inaugural Dissertation and as he repeats to Herz, our understanding
contains a number of categories which are neither “the cause of the object…nor is the
object the cause of the intellectual representations in the mind.”3 That is, the human
understanding fits neither an intellectus archetypi nor an intellectus ectypi.
Therefore the pure concepts of the understanding must not be abstracted from sense
perceptions, nor must they express the reception of representations through the senses;
but though they must have their origin in the nature of the soul, they are neither caused by
the object nor bring the object itself into being.4

The question before Kant, then, is the following: How do pure concepts of the
understanding refer to or represent objects veridically?5
In 1781 Kant revisits the alternatives he mentioned to Herz in 1772, but now his
language has changed.6 Here is Kant’s new formulation of the alternatives in section 14
of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the Critique:
There are only two possible cases in which synthetic representation and its objects can
come together, necessarily relate to each other, and, as it were, meet each other: either if

2

Cf. Kant (1998), B135: “An understanding, in which through self-consciousness all of the manifold
would at the same time be given, would intuit.” This is what Kant calls in the first Critique intellectual
intuition.
3
Kant (1967), 71; AA, 10: 129–35.
4
Kant (1967), 72; AA, 10: 129–35.
5
Cf. Kant (1967), 72; AA, 10: 129–35: “If…intellectual representations depend on our inner activity,
whence comes the agreement that they are supposed to have with objects—objects that are nevertheless not
possibly produced thereby? And the axioms of pure reason concerning these objects—how do they agree
with these objects, since the agreement has not been reached with the aid of experience?”
6
See Longuenesse (1998), 20–6. Norman Kemp Smith makes the same remark in his classic commentary
to the first Critique. See Kemp Smith (1984), 222.
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the object alone makes the representation possible, or if the representation alone makes
the object possible [Entweder wenn der Gegenstand die Vorstellung, oder diese den
Gegenstand allein möglich macht]. If it is the first, then this relation is only empirical,
and the representation is never possible a priori. And this is the case with appearances in
respect of that in it which belongs to sensation. But if it is the second, then since
representation in itself (for we are not here talking about its causality by means of the
will) does not produce its object as far as its existence is concerned, the representation is
still determinant of the object a priori if it is possible through it alone to cognize
something as an object.7

There are two points to be made here. First, Kant has dropped talk of causality between
objects and representations. He now tells us that either the object or the representation
“makes possible” the other, which is to say that they function as necessary conditions for
the possibility of the other. Second, Kant now makes a distinction not between objects
and representations, but between objects, appearances, and cognized objects or, as he
calls them in the Dissertation, phenomena. What, then, is the upshot to this new
discrimination?
Kant now understands “object” in three different senses. First, an object is what
makes possible a representation, as in the case of “appearances in respect of that in it
which belongs to sensations.” This sense of object is reminiscent of the Transcendental
Aesthetic, where Kant defines sensation as “the effect of an object on the capacity for
representation.”8 Here object is understood in the traditional sense of things in themselves
or mind-independent entities, the correlate of sensations. But second, object is an
appearance. For when Kant notes that “the representation is still determinant of the object
a priori,” this also recalls a remark from the Aesthetic, where he writes that an
appearance is an “undetermined object of an empirical intuition,” i.e., a preconceptual

7

Kant (1998), A92/B124–5.
Kant (1998), A19–20/B34. Cf. Kant (2002a), 384; AA, 2: 392: “Sensibility is the receptivity of a subject
in virtue of which it is possible for the subject’s own representative state to be affected in a definite way by
the presence of some object.”
8
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object or intuition. As we will see from the Dissertation,9 and as Kant repeats in the
Aesthetic, the conditions for the possibility of the object as appearance are the a priori
forms of space and time. But if the object as appearance is preconceptual, the synthetic
representation or concept is “determinant of the object [as appearance],” such that “it is
possible through it alone to cognize something as an object.”10 This third sense, a
conceptualized appearance, is the object as phenomenon. So it is not that synthetic
representations creates the existence of the object, like an act of will, but that the
representation is necessary to know objects as objects.11
Let us return to the question. In 1772 Kant wants to know the ground of the
relation between a representation and an external object. The question is answered in the
case of both an intellectus archetypi and an intellectus ectypi. The problem, however, is
that the real use of the understanding and its pure categories fit neither of these species of
intellect. The pure categories are neither abstracted from experience nor do they create
objects.12 Yet in 1781 the question looks different. Indeed, the question is now

9

See chapter five, section one.
Cf. Heidegger (1997), 22; 3: 31–2: “Kant uses the expression ‘appearance’ in a narrower and in a wider
sense. Appearances in the wider sense (phenomena) are a kind of ‘object,’ namely, the being itself which
finite knowing, as thinking intuition that takes things in stride, makes apparent. Appearances in the
narrower sense means that which (in the appearance in the wider sense) is the exclusive correlate of the
affection that is stripped of thinking (determining) and that belongs to finite intuition: the content of
empirical intuition.”
11
Kant (1998), A20/B34. Cf. Kant (2002a), 386; AA, 2: 394: “But in the case of sensible things and
phenomena (phaenomenis), that which precedes the logical use of the understanding is called appearance
(apparentia), while the reflective cognition, which arises when several appearances are compared by the
understanding, is called experience. Thus, there is no way from appearance to experience except by
reflection in accordance with the logical use of the understanding. The common concepts of experience are
called empirical, and the objects of experience are called phenomena (phaenomena), while the laws both of
experience and generally of all sensitive cognition are called the laws of phenomena.” Cf. Longuenesse
(1998), 23–5.
12
In the same 1772 letter to Herz, Kant writes, “In my Dissertation I was content to explain the nature of
intellectual representations in a merely negative way, namely, to state that they were not modifications of
the mind brought about by the object. However, I silently passed over the further question of how a
10
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formulated as follows: What is the ground between two species of representation—
intuitions and concepts?13 From this perspective, it is a matter of understanding the nature
of these two representations, such that the representation as indeterminate is conditioned
by (internal to) determinate representations. (The precise nature of this relation will be
presented below, but we can already begin to see the isomorphism forming between
empirical determination (empirical judgment) or the act of subsuming singular and
immediate intuitions under concepts and a priori determination (a priori judgment), the
act of subsuming pure intuitions (space and time) under pure concepts).
The solution to the relation between pure concepts (universal representations) and
sensible intuitions (singular representations),14 and thereby the key to the problem of
metaphysics, is the goal of the Critique’s Transcendental Deduction. In section 14 or the
“Transition to the transcendental deduction of the categories,” Kant describes this
solution in the following manner:
The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts therefore has a principle toward
which the entire investigation must be directed, namely this: that they must be recognized
as a priori conditions of the possibility of experiences (whether of the intuition that is
encountered in them, or of the thinking). Concepts that supply the objective ground of the
possibility of experience are necessary just for that reason.15

The path to this solution takes two forms. On the one hand, the deduction focuses on the
objects of the pure understanding, a proof of the objective validity of the concepts a
priori. This is what Kant calls the Objective Deduction and notes that it “belongs

representation that refers to an object without being in any way affected by it can be possible,” see Kant
(1967), 72; AA, 10: 129–35.
13
Cf. Allison (2004), 160.
14
Cf. Kant (1992), 589; AA, 9: 91: “All cognitions, that is, all representations related with consciousness
to an object, are either intuitions or concepts. An intuition is a singular representation (repraesentatio
singularis), a concept a universal (repraesentatio per notas communes) or reflected representation
(repraesentatio discursiva).”
15
Kant (1998), A94/B126.
15

essentially to my ends.”16 I turn to this path in chapter six.17 On the other hand, the
second form, what Kant calls the Subjective Deduction, concentrates on the pure
understanding itself, “concerning its possibility and the powers of cognition on which it
itself rests.”18 Its chief question is, “How is the faculty of thinking itself possible?”19
As we shall see in the course of this dissertation, perceptual experiences are
similar to, if not indistinguishable from, thinking, which Kant makes explicit in the
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Kant (1998), Axvi.
There is an old debate concerning which deduction is preferable, successful, or logically prior. On one
side of the debate Cohen and his neo-Kantian followers of the Marburg school favor the Objective
Deduction over the Subjective. See Cohen, (1885), 315–6. More recently in the 20th century Strawson and
the analytic tradition have favored the Objective over the Subjective, given the latter’s, as Strawson put it,
“imaginary subject of transcendental psychology.” See Strawson, (1966), 31–2. On the other side of the
debate, Norman Kemp Smith, Heidegger, and Longuenesse see the Subjective Deduction as an
indispensable supplement to the Objective. Kemp Smith writes, “In the definition above given of the
objective deduction, I have intentionally indicated Kant’s unquestioning conviction that a priori originates
independently of the objects to which it is applied. This independent origin is only describable in mental or
psychological terms. The a priori originates from within; it is due to the specific conditions upon which
human thinking rests. Now this interpretation of the a priori renders the teaching contained in the
subjective deduction much more essential than Kant is himself willing to recognize. The conclusions
arrived at may be highly schematic in conception, and extremely conjectural in detail; they are none the
less required to supplement the results of the more purely logical analysis,” Kemp Smith (1984), 237. Cf.
Heidegger (1997a), 116; 3: 166: “The Transcendental Deduction is in itself necessarily objective-subjective
at the same time.” Cf. also Heidegger (1997a), 120; 3: 171: “The apparently superficial questions as to
whether, in the interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason, the second edition deserves priority in
principle over the first or the reverse, is merely the pale reflection of the decisive question for the Kantian
laying of the ground for metaphysics and the interpretation thereof: Is the transcendental power of
imagination, as a previously laid ground, solid enough to determine originally, i.e., cohesively and as a
whole, precisely the finite essence of the subjectivity of the human subject?” Cf. also Longuenesse (1998),
9: “However, to acknowledge the superiority of the B Deduction argument is not to say that the argument
in the A edition should be dismissed as superfluous. On the contrary, I think the latter is the indispensable
prerequisite of the former. In particular, the exposition of the ‘threefold synthesis’ that opens the A
Deduction is an indispensable via negativa by which Kant attempts to establish that a Humean
empiricopsychological genesis of our perceptions and their combinations cannot provide an account of our
capacity to subsume singular intuitions under general concepts.” Finally, even Kant himself suggests that
the Subjective Deduction is a helpful supplement to the Objective Deduction. At A96–97, he writes, “Now
these concepts, which contain a priori the pure thinking in every experience, we find in the categories, and
it is already a sufficient deduction of them and justification of their objective validity if we can prove that
by means of them alone an object can be thought. But since in such a thought there is more at work than the
single faculty of thinking, namely the understanding, and the understanding itself, as a faculty of cognition
that is to be related to objects, also requires an elucidation of the possibility of this relation, we must first
assess not the empirical but the transcendental constitution of the subjective sources that comprise the a
priori foundations for the possibility of experience.”
18
Kant (1998), Axvi.
19
Kant (1998), Axvii.
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Dissertation: “Reflective cognition, which arises when several appearances are compared
by the understanding, is called experience.”20 It follows that thinking presupposes, at the
very least, a coordination of appearances prior to their reflection under concepts. I
therefore understand the Subjective Deduction as revealing the mental acts that thinking
presupposes, such as, for instance, a Bildungsvermögen.
Given this goal of the Subjective Deduction, it is no surprise that Kant expresses
reservations concerning its success. In order to uncover the conditions for thinking, we
have to postulate mental actions outside the realm of representation. This is why Kant
says in the A Preface that “since the latter question [the possibility of the faculty of
thinking] is something like the search for the cause of a given effect, and is therefore
something like a hypothesis…it appears as if I am taking the liberty in this case of
expressing an opinion, and that the reader might therefore be free to hold another
opinion.”21 We may gesture toward or allude to this act, but it seems that each time we
attempt to posit this act, represent it, it slips our grasp.
The problem with this method is that it is susceptible to gainsay.22 Moreover, and
what is perhaps a more serious charge, the cause of these representations will look no
different than a thing-in-itself, something we cannot know in principle according to
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Kant (2002a), 386; AA, 2: 394.
Kant (1998), Axvii.
22
It is not entirely fair to say that the method of the Subjective Deduction is hypothetical, at least as Kant
sees it: “Since the latter question is something like the search for the cause of a given effect, and is
therefore something like an hypothesis (although, as I will elsewhere take the opportunity to show, this is
not in fact how matters stand), it appears as if I am taking the liberty in this case of expressing an opinion,
and that the reader might therefore be free to hold another opinion,” Kant (1998), Axvii, my emphasis in
italics. I think that if the B-Deduction is successful, it would vindicate the hypothesis of the A-Deduction,
for the successful results of the B-Deduction, as a further deduction from the first principle as a postulate,
would demonstrate the first principle’s consistency and thereby shore up the initial hypothesis. If this is
correct, then Heidegger should have carried his analysis further than he did.
21
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Kant’s own strictures.23 But there are a few reasons why the Subjective Deduction is
important not just for the transcendental philosophy as a whole but also for our specific
purposes here. First, the a priori categories, though immanent within experience,
originate within the mind. This genesis calls for an explanation, which is why the
Subjective Deduction appears all the more indispensable and indeed why commentators
such as Heidegger, Kemp Smith, and Longuenesse argue that the B Deduction even
presupposes it. Second, there is something particularly revealing about the results of the
Subjective Deduction, that is, it points to a new, radical view of Bildungsvermögen, a
power that does not simply associate representations but constructs them according to
specific rules of the mind: an Einbildungskraft bound.

2,2

Synthesis in General

Let us begin with section 10. There Kant writes,
Now space and time contain a manifold of pure a priori intuition, but belong nevertheless
among the conditions of the receptivity of our mind, under which alone it can receive
representations of objects, and thus they must always also affect the concept of these
objects. Only the spontaneity of our thought requires that this manifold first be gone
through [durchgegangen], taken up [aufgenommen], and combined [verbunden] in a
certain way in order for a cognition to be made out of it. I call this action synthesis.24

23

cf. Kant (1998), A345–6/B404: “At the ground of this [transcendental] doctrine we can place nothing but
the simple and in content for itself wholly empty representation I, of which one cannot even say that it is a
concept, but a mere consciousness that accompanies every concept. Through this I, or He, or It (the thing),
which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts = X, which is
recognized only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and about which, in abstraction, we can never
have even the least concept,” my emphasis in italics. In 1970, Wilfrid Sellars delivered the Presidential
Address to the American Philosophical Association titled “…this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks…”
exploring the practical implications of this rather perplexing statement located in the Paralogisms of Pure
Reason. See Sellars (1970–1971). Günter Zöller also has written an interesting article comparing the
implications of this statement with similar observations in the writings of the Göttingen physicist Georg
Christoph Lichtenberg. See Zöller (1992).
24
Kant (1998), A77/B102–3.
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In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant argues that space and time are a priori conditions
of the capacity to receive or be affected by objects. What he does not note in the
Aesthetic, however, is that the manifold contained within space and time is a
consequence of a synthetic act required by the spontaneity of thinking, an act which he
now describes in section 10 as a “going through,” “taking up,” and “combining”.
Section 10 of the Analytic is not the first occurrence of “synthesis.” The term first
arises in Kant’s 1764 Preisschrift: Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles
of Natural Theology and Morality.25 There Kant argues that mathematics constructs its
concepts by means of synthesis. And as we shall see, the term also arises time and again
in the Blomberg Logic where Kant calls our attention to how we cognize concepts
analytically and synthetically:
In synthesis we produce and create a concept, as it were, which simply was not there
before, [one that is] completely new both quoad materiam and also quoad formam [;] and
at the same time we make it distinct. All concepts of the mathematicians are of this kind,
e.g., the concepts of triangle, square, circle, etc.26

Kant’s point is that a synthetic procedure both adds predicates to a subject, adhering to
logical consistency and thus demonstrating its logical possibility (the form of a concept)
and constructs the concept into an object, demonstrating its real possibility (the matter of
a concept).27
So Kant is not speaking of synthesis for the first time in section 10. But he is
discussing it in a different context, i.e., a transcendental one. Here Kant writes, “By this
synthesis, however, I understand that which rests on a ground of synthetic unity a
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See Longuenesse (1998), 30.
Kant (1992), 102; AA, 24: 130.
27
Cf. Young (1994), 344–5. Cf. also Kant (1992), 569: AA, 9: 64: “To synthesis pertains the making
distinct of objects, to analysis the making distinct of concepts.”
26
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priori.”28 Moreover, Kant is explicit for the first time in his published works about the
faculty of this synthesis:
Synthesis in general is, as we shall subsequently see, the mere effect of the imagination
(die bloße Wirkung der Einbildungskraft), of a blind though indispensable function of the
soul, without which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even
conscious.29

(But even with respect to the unpublished lectures on metaphysics and the reflections,
Kant is breaking new ground. As we shall see in the Pölitz Lectures, Kant does not there
claim that Einbildungskraft is a faculty of synthesis in general. He concedes that
Einbildungskraft is a power of synthesis, but only as a specific species. There is another
species of synthesis in the late 1770s, namely, a Verstandes-Dichtungsvermögen. This
inventive or creative power of understanding is the proper source of construction of
appearances in accordance with laws of the mind, which, when reflected, yield a priori
categories. But in 1781 Kant suggests that Einbildungskraft, a power to form one image,
is the source of all synthesis.30)
Now one might argue that imaginative syntheses, even those discussed in section
10, are not qualitatively different from the logic lectures, that they are merely
unconscious and contingent associations or conjunctions between concepts. For the claim
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Kant (1998), A78/B104.
Kant (1998), A78/B103.
30
This is at least with respect to Kant’s published remarks. We have evidence that he was never quite sure
of this claim even in 1781, for in his personal copy of the first edition, Kant replaces “a blind though
indispensable function of the soul” with “of a function of the understanding,” thereby eliminating the
imagination as a basic, autonomous faculty. See Kant (1900–), AA, 23: 45. Furthermore, he omits the
following remark from the second edition of 1787: “There are, however, three original sources (capacities
or faculties of the soul), which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and cannot
themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely sense, imagination, and apperception.
On these are grounded 1) the synopsis of the manifold a priori through sense; 2) the synthesis of this
manifold through the imagination; finally 3) the unity of this synthesis through original apperception,”
Kant (1998), A94. This suggests again that he did not think, or was not certain whether, the imagination is
an original power of the soul.
29
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that Einbildungskraft is “blind” and “seldom even conscious” seems to suggest as much.
After all, and as we shall see in the case of Hume and Baumgarten, one is hardly aware of
the associations that an imagination makes between similar and repetitive perceptual
experiences. What is more, we often employ empirical concepts, though we are not
entirely conscious of the partial concepts contained therein.31 But that this is not what
Kant has in mind is evident from a conclusion in the A-Deduction:
We therefore have a pure imagination [reine Einbildungskraft], as a fundamental faculty
of the human soul, that grounds all cognition a priori. By its means we bring into
combination the manifold of intuition on the one side and the condition of the necessary
unity of apperception on the other. Both extremes, namely sensibility and understanding,
must necessarily be connected by means of this transcendental function of the
imagination [transzendentalen Funktion der Einbildungskraft], since otherwise the
former would to be sure yield appearances but no objects of an empirical cognition,
hence there would be no experience.32

What this passage makes clear is that the empirical concepts we employ or the
unconscious associations made by the empirical imagination are grounded in an a priori
synthesis by the faculty of Einbildungskraft. Each empirical association presupposes an a
priori construction.
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See Young (1994), 339.
Kant (1998), 124. Cf. Kant (2007), 287; 7: 177: The word affinity (affinitas) in this passage recalls a
process found in chemistry: intellectual combination is analogous to an interaction of two specifically
different physical substances intimately acting upon each other and striving for unity, where this union
brings about a third entity that has properties which can only be produced by the union of the two
heterogeneous elements. Despite their dissimilarity, understanding and sensibility by themselves form a
close union for bringing about our cognition, as if one had its origin in the other, or both originated from a
common origin; but this cannot be, or at least we cannot conceive how dissimilar things could sprout forth
from one and the same root.
32
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2,3

The Threefold Synthesis

The Subjective Deduction is prefaced with the so-called “propaedeutic” or the “threefold
synthesis.”33 Here we find the beginning of an answer to the possibility of thinking,
which is to say that we find the conditions for the possibility of phenomena.34
In the first synthesis, “On the synthesis of apprehension in the intuition,” Kant
notes the following:
Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be represented as
such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions on one
another; for as contained in one moment no representation can ever be anything other
than absolute unity.35

A few paragraphs prior to this, Kant tells us that if he ascribes a “synopsis to sense,
because it contains a manifold in its intuition, a synthesis must also correspond to this,
and receptivity can make cognitions possible only if combined with spontaneity.”36
Contrary to the British empiricists and German Schulphilosophen who think that a
manifold of sensations and its representation are given,37 Kant’s position is that the
faculty of sensibility as “original receptivity” is the capacity to receive impressions solely
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Kant actually provides three separates discussion of the threefold synthesis in the A-Deduction. First as a
“propaedeutic,” second as an exposition descending from the transcendental unity of apperception to the
sensible intuition, and third as an exposition ascending from the sensible intuition to the transcendental
unity of apperception.
34
In their respective commentaries, Kemp Smith and Longuenesse seem to suggest differing goals of the
Subjective Deduction. Kemp Smith tells us that it uncovers the psychological conditions for consciousness.
Longuenesse argues that it demonstrates the conditions for the possibility of the representation of an object.
Is this difference only nominal? I think so. It seems to me that there may be representations without
consciousness (recall Baumgarten’s realm of darkness), but never consciousness without consciousness of a
representation. As Kant notes in the Stufenleiter: “The genus is representation in general (repraesentatio).
Under it stands the representation with consciousness (perceptio). A perception that refers to the subject as
a modification of its state is a sensation (sensatio),” Kant (1998), A320/B376.
35
Kant (1998), A99.
36
Kant (1998), A97.
37
See, for instance, Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding in Locke (1975), 119–122 and
Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature in Hume (2000), 7–10; 1.1.1.1–2.1.1.1 (All citations to Hume are first
according to the Oxford University Press and followed by the form 1.1.1.1, which is to the Oxford edition
of the Treatise, to Book 1, Part 1, Sect. 1, para. 1). One notable exception here is J.N. Tetens who, in his
1777 Philosophical Essays on Human Nature and its Development, argues that the representation of a
manifold of sensations presupposes the reflection of these sensations as such. See Tetens (1777) 32–3.
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as determinable sensations—an “absolute unity” or synopsis.38 What is given is
undifferentiated totality. In order to have a manifold, then, the mind must differentiate or
“run through” the impressions.39 The synthesis of apprehension thus creates a manifold as
such. And yet, insofar as intuitions are singular representations,40 the mind must also
combine these impressions. Thus Kant writes, “Now in order for unity of intuition to
come from this manifold (as, say, in the representation of space), it is necessary first to
run through and then to take together this manifoldness.”41
In the propaedeutic Kant does not tell us what faculty “runs through” and “takes
together” the manifold. But later in his description of the threefold synthesis ascending
from sensibility to the unity of apperception, he writes,
There is thus an active faculty of the synthesis of this manifold in us, which we call
imagination (Einbildungskraft), and whose action exercised immediately upon
perceptions I call apprehension. For the imagination is to bring the manifold of intuition
into an image (Bild); it must therefore antecedently take up the impressions into its
activity, i.e., apprehend them.42

38

With respect to the term “synopsis,” perhaps the only other place Kant ever mentions this term is at A94:
“There are, however, three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul)…namely, sense,
imagination, and apperception. On these are grounded 1) the synopsis of the manifold a priori through
sense; 2) the synthesis of this manifold through the imagination; finally 3) the unity of this synthesis
through original apperception.” The idea that transcendental reality affects the capacity of receptivity, yet
yields no representational form, would, first, display Kant’s original insight that, contrary to the
psychologists, imagination is a “necessary ingredient of perception itself.” But, second, it would be in
keeping with his claim that Transcendental Idealism is a “formal” idealism, as opposed to the “material”
idealism of Descartes and Berkeley. For a detailed elucidation of the term “synopsis” and a discussion of
Kant’s idealism, see Waxman (1991), 218–25. Makkreel adopts a different interpretation. He takes a
synopsis to be formal in nature. For Makkreel, a synoptic formation is the formation of an Abbild,
combined with Nachbilder and Vorbilder. It is what allows for spatial orientation, among other things. This
seems to me to accord too much activity or spontaneity to a power that is purely receptive, as I think the
name suggests, “original receptivity.” For Makkreel’s interpretation, see Makkreel (1990), 15–9. Finally, in
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger divides the synthetic function into two aspects. Thus he
writes, “Thus pure synthesis acts purely synoptically in pure intuition and at the same time purely
reflectively in pure thinking,” Heidegger (1997), 45; 3: 63. He calls synopsis an “intuiting unifying.”
39
See Kant (1998), A99.
40
See Kant (1992), 589; AA, 9: 91
41
Kant (1998), A99, my emphasis.
42
Kant (1998), A120.
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Kant’s use of the term Bild and its emphasis are telling. It tips us off to the fact that Kant
is referring to an empirical synthesis of apprehension. The point here is that the
imagination, as it “takes up” different impressions, produces a rich, unified image (Einbild).
But Kant’s deeper insight in the synthesis of apprehension is that behind this
empirical synthesis, there also exists an a priori one:
Now this synthesis of apprehension must also be exercised a priori, i.e., in regard to
representations that are not empirical. For without it we could have a priori neither the
representations of space nor of time, since these can be generated only through the
synthesis of the manifold that sensibility in its original receptivity provides.43

The pure forms of space and time are “generated” insofar as the imagination
differentiates and unifies, i.e., insofar as the imagination runs through the synopsis and
takes together the sensations, space and time are simultaneously constructed as pure
unified multiplicities within which we intuit elements of sense.44
Kant’s second synthesis, “On the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination
(Einbildung),”45 like the synthesis of apprehension, has an empirical and transcendental
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Kant (1998), A99–100.
The interpretive issues surrounding the synthesis of apprehension rest on the temporal mode generated
by this a priori synthesis. Heidegger’s position is that the a priori synthesis of apprehension generates the
“present in general,” which corresponds with the action of Abbildung. But as Makkreel points out, “Unlike
the process of Abbildung, the synthesis of apprehension is not to be identified with the present, for this
synthesis is necessary to assure the continuity of the different modalities of time.” See Heidegger (1997a),
126; 3: 180 and Makkreel (1990) 23. To be sure, it is difficult to see how Kant could maintain that a pure
form of intuition such as time contains a unity in differentiation were the a priori synthetic apprehension of
time to generate simply the present as such. But as I see it, the problem with Makkreel’s interpretation is
that it renders the subsequent syntheses superfluous. If the a priori synthesis of apprehension “spans a time
continuum,” this would appear to be a sufficient explanation for the generation of temporality as a
succession in which sensations are distinguished and combined in past, present, and futures modes, which
the threefold synthesis is designed to explain. It is true that for Kant the modes of temporality must be open
to each other, but the presentation of the propaedeutic calls for an abstraction, which would appear to
warrant fixed modes of temporal analysis, as Heidegger reads it, independent from the empirically
experienced flux of time.
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In the 1998 Cambridge edition of the first Critique, Paul Guyer and Allen Wood translate Einbildung as
“imagination.” But this is misleading. Kant’s point is not that there is a synthesis in the power of
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aspect. And again, like the first synthesis, Kant argues that an empirical reproduction
presupposes a transcendental, a priori synthesis. Here is how he puts the point:
It is, to be sure, a merely empirical law in accordance with which representations that
have often followed or accompanied one another are finally associated with each other
and thereby placed in connection in accordance with which, even without the presence of
the object, one of these representations brings about a transition of the mind to the other
in accordance with a certain rule… There must therefore be something that itself makes
possible this reproduction of the appearances by being the a priori ground of a necessary
synthetic unity of them.46

Now the thing to note from the above passage is that the conclusion does not follow from
the facts. Given that objects that frequently succeed each other are finally associated with
each other, it does not follow that there must be an “a priori ground of a necessary
synthetic unity” that makes the latter possible. Indeed, as Hume shows, this experience
can just as well be explained by the subjective disposition of the mind to synthesize
arbitrarily successive events. According to Hume, reproduction can be explained by
subjective “customs” or “habits” of the mind. So, if Kant is not entitled to draw such an
inference, what do we make of the a priori reproductive synthesis in the propaedeutic?
One suggestion is that although Kant is not in a position to make any conclusions
concerning a transcendental reproductive synthesis, he is in a position to make a
“program for explaining these phenomenal regularities.”47 That is, the reproductive
synthesis could be shown to rest on a priori grounds if one could “find a ground for the

imagination (Einbildungskraft). Rather, his claim is that there is a synthesis in the image (Einbildung)
produced by imagination (Einbildungskraft). Longuenesse notes that this conception of Einbildung is
similar to Baumgarten’s phantasmata and Tetens’s use of Einbildungen. See Longuenesse (1998), 35n.
46
Kant (1998), A100–1.
47
As Longuenesse puts it, “The clause ‘there must then be’ should therefore read as meaning ‘let us then
search if there is not,’ for—at least Kant is convinced of this—‘there must be.’” See Longuenesse (1998),
40.
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phenomenal regularities that would relate them to ‘necessary synthetic unities.’”48 Kant’s
attempt to locate such an a priori ground is evident in the following example.
Now it is obvious that if I draw a line in thought, or think of the time from one noon to
the next, or even want to represent a certain number to myself, I must necessarily first
grasp one of these manifold representations after another in my thoughts. But if I were
always to lose the preceding representations (the first parts of the line, the preceding parts
of time, or the successively represented units) from my thoughts and not reproduce them
when I proceed to the following ones, then no whole representation and none of the
previously mentioned thoughts, not even the purest and most fundamental representations
of space and time, could ever arise.49

But in spite of this attempt at an explanation, the problem with Kant’s mathematical
examples is that he provides as an a priori ground another reproduction, although a pure
reproduction of units or parts of a line.50 Moreover, and as Longuenesse suggests, a
mathematical example of pure representations is an insufficient ground to explain the
regularity of events in nature, such as the seasons of the year.51
The idea of reproduction and the examples Kant employs obscure his real
intention in the second of the threefold synthesis.52 For he wants to show that an a priori
“combination of the manifold” makes possible a “thoroughgoing synthesis of
reproduction.”53 That is, he wants to show that in order to recall an image from the past
(Nachbild) from the Imagination (Vorrat der Vorstellungen), a second a priori synthesis
48

Longuenesse (1998), 40.
Kant (1998), A102.
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Heidegger raises the initial perplexity of searching for a reproductive productive imagination: “And yet,
is not the pure power of imagination accepted as essentially productive? How is a reproductive synthesis to
belong to it? Pure reproduction—does this not mean productive reproduction, hence a square circle?” See
Heidegger (1997a), 127; 3: 182. See also Longuenesse (1998), 41.
51
Longuenesse (1998), 41.
52
Longuenesse’s interpretation of the mathematical examples presented in the second synthesis is that they
are designed to illustrate a “totalizing project.” She writes, “The reproduction of past representations
represented as such, and represented as belonging to one and the same series of successively reproduced
elements, occurs only if it is called forth by such a [totalizing] goal,” Longuenesse (1998), 42. But as
Longuenesse sees it, the problem is that these examples fail to ground the “empirically given regularities in
the manifold,” Longuenesse (1998), 43. This failure points to the necessity of the synthesis of recognition,
which is where Kant first presents a ground for the regularity and associability of appearances.
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Kant (1998), A101.
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must be presupposed. Thus what he really wants to demonstrate is that the construction of
an Einbildung by Einbildungskraft is the condition for the possibility of empirical
reproduction as reproduction.54 Here, then, is Kant’s real intention. In order to recall past
images from memory, and thereby make associations, the mind must generate the past as
such. It must generate the specific temporal mode (construct the manifold of time) that
makes this reproduction possible. As Heidegger puts it, “If empirical synthesis in the
mode of reproduction is thereby to become possible, the no-longer-now as such must in
advance and prior to all experience have been brought forth again and unified with the
specific now.”55 Or, put slightly differently, “It opens up in general the horizon of the
possible attending-to, the having-been-ness, and so it ‘forms’ this ‘after’ as such.”56
If this is all Kant can claim at this stage of the propaedeutic, it means he can
account for conjunctions of pure representation, such as a line, in temporal succession,
but he cannot account for the law of association that he thinks Einbildung grounds. That
is, Einbildung cannot explain regularities or the constant conjunction of events in the
course of nature. But there is something else to be drawn from these remarks. These
mathematical examples point to a predisposition of the mind to complete representations
and experience as a whole according to a specific goal or, as Kant would say, a rule.57
This rule presupposes an end guiding the prior synthetic acts of apprehension and
reproduction. If the construction of a representation or a complete experience is
analogous to a mathematical construction, then a rule, occasioned by the affection of
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Just as he wanted to show that the apprehension of a manifold as manifold presupposed the running
through and taking together of sensations.
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Heidegger (1997a), 127; 3: 181.
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Heidegger (1997a), 128; 3: 182.
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Cf. Longuenesse (1998), 42–3.
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sensations, can explain why the reproductive imagination regularly associates cinnabar
with red, and not, say, black. But at this stage Kant has not provided a rule that guides
this natural disposition to represent. All he has done is provided good reasons why there
must be one.
The third and final synthesis Kant calls the “synthesis of recognition in the
concept.” This synthesis, although it emerges last in the propaedeutic, is actually the
condition for the possibility of the first two.58
Kant begins with the following remark:
Without consciousness that that which we think is the very same as what we thought a
moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be in vain. For it
would be a new representation in our current state, which would not belong at all to the
act through which it had been gradually generated, and its manifold would never
constitute a whole, since it would lack the unity that only consciousness can obtain for
it.59

Kant’s intention here seems to be the following. First, consciousness is the condition of
relations within the sensible intuition itself or across representations in experience.
Without consciousness I cannot know that what is being reproduced is the same as what
was earlier apprehended, “for it would be a new representation in our current state.”
Second, relations in the sensible intuition and experience require self-reflexivity, an
essential mark of consciousness. As Kant sees it, consciousness is the capacity to be
aware of itself as numerically identical, one and the same act, through the running
through of a synopsis of sensations or the apprehension and reproduction of
representations. Kant illustrates these two points with another mathematical example. He
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Heidegger says that the third mode of synthesis “exhibits a priority over the other two.” See Heidegger
(1997a), 131; 3:187. And Longuenesse writes that “the ‘associability’ of the empirical given depends on a
transcendental synthesis of the imagination considered not just as a reproductive synthesis whose pure form
is the reproduction of pure spatiotemporal manifolds, but as a synthesis whose act of reproduction, in its
pure form, takes its rules a priori from the categories.” See Longuenesse (1998), 44.
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Kant (1998), A103.
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tells us that in counting, the units that were previously apprehended must be reproduced
and successively added to new units in order to think of a number.60 In the course of
counting, the representation of a present unit is simultaneously combined with
reproduced units, units which were earlier apprehended, each of which is consciously
recognized as belonging to the same act, thereby generating and recognizing a whole (in
this case, a number).61
This synthesis of recognition occurs in the concept, which Kant defines here as
“one consciousness that unifies the manifold that has been successively intuited, and then
also reproduced, into one representation.”62 Now prima facie, this is a very unusual use of
the term “concept.” Those familiar with Kant’s lectures on logic would see that this use
of “concept” is different from the “universal or reflected representation.”63 But if we
attend closely to the following passage we see that Kant is referring, on the one hand, to a
discursive concept, that is, that which is “mediate, by means of a mark, which can be
common to several things,”64 but also to a concept as “consciousness of this unity of the
synthesis.”
The word “concept” itself could already lead us to this remark.65 For it is this one
consciousness that unifies the manifold that has been successively intuited, and then also
reproduced, into one representation. This conscious [i.e., the concept as unity of the
synthesis] may often only be weak, so that we connect it with the generation of the
representation only in the effect, but not in the act itself, i.e., immediately; but regardless
of these differences one consciousness must always be found, even if it lacks conspicuous
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61

29

clarity, and without that concepts [i.e., the concepts as universal or reflected
representations], and with them cognition of objects, would be entirely impossible.66

What is particular about the synthesis in the concept, as opposed to a synthesis in
the intuition and imagination (Einbildung), is the mark of necessity and universality that
accompanies the representation. We know that external objects cannot account for this
necessity and universality, since sensibility, our sole access to the world, affords only a
synopsis of sensations. Accordingly, Kant writes that the
unity that the object makes necessary can be nothing other than the formal unity of the
consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of the representations. Hence we say that
we cognize the object if we have effected synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition. But
this is impossible if the intuition could not have been produced through a function of
synthesis in accordance with a rule that makes the reproduction of the manifold necessary
a priori and a concept in which this manifold is united possible.67

True to the method of the threefold synthesis, Kant again provides a mathematical
example. He notes that we think of a triangle as an object through consciousness of the
composition of three straight lines in accordance with a rule. In all cases of mathematical
composition, the product will be a singular intuition, but the rule that determines this
composition will be universal (a rule for the construction of all triangles) and a necessary
constraint on the act of synthesis.
The argument of the threefold synthesis hangs on the analogy between
mathematical and representational construction. Since there is a natural disposition to
represent and associate present images with past images, and since we find that these
associations often carry with them the mark of necessity,68 then like the construction of a
triangle, there must be a rule that guides or constrains these associations, a rule that
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conditions the universality of the experience.69 Kant’s example here is the representation
of a body: “Thus in the case of the perception of something outside of us the concept of
body makes necessary the representation of extension, and with it that of impenetrability,
of shape, etc.”70 If we receive an external impression, there is an inner force that fills in
this impression with associations, and the rule acts to constrain these associations.
According to the rule, some associations are necessary, such as impenetrability and
shape, some are contingent, such as blue, and some are contradictory, such as spirit.
But Kant’s fundamental point here is that associations through rules only occur if
it is possible to be conscious of the unified act of synthesis.71 The unified act according to
the rule must be capable of being reflected into a concept, that is, recognized as a
universal representation.72 Here then is Kant’s ground of the regularity of empirical
associations. Each successive apprehension and reproduction presupposes the possibility
of the consciousness of the same act of synthesis according to a rule. Empirical
association is therefore grounded in unified, self-reflexive consciousness, i.e., selfconsciousness or the transcendental unity of apperception.73
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Kant provides an example of the way in which concepts guide or orient experience in the Jäsche Logic.
There he writes, “If a savage (Wilder) sees a house from a distance, for example, with whose use he is not
acquainted, he admittedly has before him in his representation the very same object as someone else who is
acquainted with it determinately as a dwelling established for men. But as to form, this cognition of one
and the same object is different in the two. With the one it is mere intuition, with the other it is intuition and
concept at the same time,” Kant (1992), 544–5; AA, 9: 33.
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We make associations all the time, whether we are aware of them or not (animals appear capable of
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As Kant puts it at A107: “This pure, original, unchanging consciousness I will now name
transcendental apperception.” And again at A108: “Thus the original and necessary consciousness of the
identity of oneself is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all
appearances in accordance with concepts, i.e., in accordance with rules that not only make them necessarily
reproducible, but also thereby determine an object for their intuition, i.e., the concept of something in
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Apprehension and reproduction presuppose the synthesis of recognition. For
apprehension and reproduction, although presented in the propaedeutic as synthetic
activities separate from the recognition in a concept, are nonetheless “always already
oriented toward this goal.”74 When Kant tells us that this consciousness “may often only
be weak, so that we connect it with the generation of the representation only in the
effect,” this suggests that the numerical identity is present from the beginning, although
often unconscious. The concept as both rule for the synthesis of representations and
numerical identity of consciousness must be a telos, such that each synthetic act is a
manifestation of a striving toward thinking or empirical experience.75

which they are necessarily connected; for the mind could not possibly think of the identity of itself in the
manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the
identity of its action, which subjects all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental
unity, and first makes possible their connection in accordance with a priori rules.”
74
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Secondary scholarship is divided on the interpretation of the third synthesis. Heidegger takes the third
synthesis to be primary. But he also understands it to be correlated with Vorbildung, and hence the
condition for the possibility of the future as such: “Just as a pure reproduction forms the possibility of a
bringing-forth-again, so correspondingly must pure recognition present the possibility for something like
identifying. But if this pure synthesis reconnoiters [rekognosziert], then at the same time that says: it does
not explore a being which it can hold before itself as selfsame. Rather, it explores the horizon of beingable-to-hold-something-before-us [Vorhaltbarkeit] in general. As pure, its exploring is the original forming
of this preliminary attaching [Vorhaften], i.e., the future” Heidegger (1997a), 130; 3: 186. Yet as Makkreel
sees it, the primacy of the third synthesis cannot rest on a “pre-formative” act or a “projecting of primordial
time.” Rather, it rests on the discovery that the synthesis of recognition in the concept is an act of the
transcendental understanding. Makkreel (1990), 25. Heidegger’s interpretation points to his ultimate
conclusion concerning time and Einbildungskraft, which, he tells us, forms the “original unity and
wholeness of the specific finitude of the human subject,” and from which sprouts the stems of sensibility
and understanding. See Heidegger (1997a), 131; 3: 187. This brings us back to the task of the Subjective
Deduction, since it seeks to establish the conditions for the possibility of thinking. It would seem, then, that
Heidegger is pointing to a more original act, an act prior to and the condition of the power of
understanding, directly in line with Kant’s intentions. But if that is the case, is there really a problem here?
One might make the case that Heidegger is just carrying out the Kantian project; indeed, more clearly than
Kant himself. Cf. Kant (1998), A314/B370: “I note only that when we compare the thoughts that an author
expresses about a subject, in ordinary speech as well as in writings, it is not at all unusual to find that we
understand him even better than he understood himself, since he may not have determined his concept
sufficiently and hence sometimes spoke, or even thought, contrary to his own intention.” Heidegger, as has
been noted, exploits this passage. Cf. Heidegger (1997a), 141; 3: 201–2: “Thus the fundamental intention
of the present interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason was to make visible in this way the decisive
content of this work and thereby to bring out what Kant ‘had wanted to say.’ With this procedure, the
laying-out creates a maxim of its own which Kant himself would have wanted to know had been applied to
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2,4

Heidegger’s Kant

Here is the opportunity to consider Heidegger’s “interpretation” of the 1781 Critique.
This has garnered considerable criticism. Ernst Cassirer, for instance, wrote in his review
of the Kantbuch that “Heidegger speaks no longer as a commentator, but as a usurper,
who as it were enters with force of arms into the Kantian system in order to subjugate it
and make it serve his own problematic.”76 And Karl Löwith wrote in his Heidegger:
Thinker in a Destitute Time that
the self-interpretation in the text of another is explicitly accomplished in Heidegger’s
interpretation of Kant’s ground-laying of metaphysics. This is indeed supposed to help
itself to its own “more original possibility,” but rather in fact Heidegger helps himself to
the questioning of Being and Time in order to confirm historically what Kant perhaps had
wanted to say, and to shove aside all previous understanding of Kant as not original.77

But as others have noted, Heidegger is forthright in his intentions. He thinks that in order
to understand a philosophical text, we must not simply describe and clarify it, but
uncover the grounds of its philosophical insights, which, as in the case of the Kantbuch,
may lead us beyond the letter.78

the interpretation of philosophical investigations… Certainly, in order to wring from what the words say,
what it is they want to say, every interpretation must necessarily use violence. Such violence, however,
cannot be roving arbitrariness. The power of an idea which shines forth must drive and guide the layingout. Only in the power of this idea can an interpretation risk what is always audacious, namely, entrusting
itself to the concealed inner passion of a work in order to be able, through this, to place itself within the
unsaid and force it into speech.”
76
Cassirer (1951), 17.
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Löwith (1960), 78n, translation by Martin Weatherston.
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In the preface to the second edition of the Kantbuch, Heidegger writes, “Readers have taken constant
offense at the violence of my interpretations. Their allegations of violence can indeed be supported by this
text. Philosophicohistorical research is always correctly subject to this charge whenever it is directed
against attempts to set in motion a thoughtful dialogue between thinkers. In contrast to the methods of
historical philology, which has its own agenda, a thoughtful dialogue is bound by other laws—laws which
are more easily violated. In a dialogue the possibility of going astray is more threatening, the shortcomings
are more violent.” For a discussion of Heidegger and the idea of dialogue, see Weatherston (2002), 1–8.
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It is not important for our purposes to provide a full interpretation of Heidegger’s
text and compare this with the letter of the Critique, thereby vindicating or refuting
Heidegger once and for all. It should now be clear that I use Heidegger as a means to my
own ends. His passing remarks suggest a specific concern behind Kant’s theory of
imagination (the first part of my thesis) and an implication (the second part of my thesis)
from the revisions between 1781 and 1787. But for the sake of clarity and curiosity I here
provide a brief exegesis of the Kantbuch and its central claim concerning
Einbildungskraft.
In the Kantbuch Heidegger tells us that the Critique is a “laying of the ground for
metaphysics” (Grundlegung der Metaphysik). If metaphysics is the study of being, which
the medieval theologians divided according to the divine and created—hence into
theology, cosmology, and psychology—and if the Critique is a groundlaying of
metaphysics, then, according to Heidegger, it constitutes the foundation for these specific
metaphysical investigations. The it investigates the being of beings and its relation to
these beings. It is thus a fundamental ontology or metaphysica generalis. This ontology,
Heidegger thinks, shows the a priori presuppositions of metaphysics (metaphysica
specialis) and, by extension, the a priori conditions for the possibility of experience
(science). But most important, as Heidegger sees it, the Critique anticipates the project of
Being and Time. For Heidegger asks there how entities relate to being as such or how
ontic knowledge rests on ontological knowledge.
If the Critique is a fundamental ontology that investigates being, Heidegger
agrees with Kant’s claim that the investigation constitute reason’s investigation of itself:
“The ground for the source (Quellgrund) for laying the ground for metaphysics is human
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pure reason.”79 The self-inquiry of pure reason should then disclose a set of grounds or a
priori concepts, concepts by which we relate and know objects. And this, according to
Heidegger, is what Kant means by transcendental philosophy.
For Kant, there are two modes of human relation to objects—intuitions and
concepts—and, traditionally, concept usage constitutes knowledge. But Heidegger’s
novel interpretation is to remark that intuition “has been appraised much too lightly.”80
Pure reason should be emphasized as finite because intuition rests on the receptivity of
sensation by sensibility. The centrality of finitude and intuition is evident from the first
sentence of the Aesthetic, which Heidegger quotes in full: “In whatever way and through
whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates
immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is
intuition.”81 If reason’s self-inquiry yields a priori concepts, it is imperative that it
determines the relation of them to intuition, since the latter is essential to how we relate
immediately to objects.
The combination of reason’s a priori concepts and intuitions or the determination
of the latter by the former is, as we know, the core question of the Critique. This
combination is what Kant calls a synthetic judgment a priori, the elucidation of which he
suggests will make progress in the field of pure cognition secure and reliable and is the
“real problem of pure reason.”82 The possibility of a priori synthetic judgments depends
on an adequate explanation of the synthesis of a priori concepts and intuitions, which, in
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their turn, form “first and foremost the that-upon-which (das Worauf) and the horizon
within which the being in itself becomes experienceable in the empirical synthesis.”83
The violence that is attributed to Heidegger’s interpretation does not arise from
his interpretation of the Critique’s core question. Rather, Heidegger’s it concerns the
move to posit a ground to explain the possibility of a priori synthetic judgments, a
ground which Kant himself did not appear to think was necessary:
This duality of sources, however, is no mere juxtaposition. Rather, only in the union of
both of them as prescribed by their structure can finite knowledge be what its essence
requires… The unity of their unification is nevertheless not a subsequent result of the
collision of these elements. Rather, what units them, this “synthesis,” must let the
elements in their belonging-together and their oneness spring forth. If finite knowledge,
however, has its essence precisely in the original synthesis of the basic sources
(Grundquellen) and if the laying of the ground for metaphysics must push ahead into the
essential ground of finite knowledge, then it is inescapable that the naming which
indicates the “two basic sources” already suggests an allusion to the ground of their
source (ihren Quellgrund), i.e., to an original unity.84

For Heidegger, unity is not simply a result of synthesis, but a ground as well.85 And he
thinks he finds an allusion to this ground in the Critique’s introduction, where Kant
writes:
All that seems necessary for an introduction or preliminary is that there are two stems
(zwei Stämme) of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a common but to us
unknown root (Wurzel), namely sensibility and understanding, through the first of which
objects are given to us, but through the second of which they are thought.86
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Exploiting this botanical metaphor, Heidegger sees Kant in the Critique as a gardener
cultivating a seed (Keim) from which sprouts (aufkeimen) a robust, healthy crop—finite
pure reason.87
The possibility of ontology rests on the original unity of intuition and a priori
concepts, pure intuition and pure thinking. If Kant’s Critique is successful, Heidegger
thinks, this success must lie in a demonstration of the co-dependence between pure
thinking and pure intuiting, which means that each element of an a priori synthetic
judgment must display “seams (Fugen) which point in advance to a having-been-joined
together (Ineinandergefügtes).”88 This co-dependence will point to the presupposition of
an original unity, which constitutes, for Heidegger, the being from which objects can be
encountered or the condition for the possibility of a “letting-stand-against”
(Gegenstehenlassen)—a horizon of objectivity (Horizont der Gegenständlichkeit). The
“more original” question for Heidegger is therefore the nature of this original unity, the
root of the two stems of knowledge.
In the “Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding,” Kant tells us that
the schemata are “mediating” representations between a priori concepts and intuitions.89
If a priori concepts and intuitions are analogous to major and minor terms of a syllogism,
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This cultivation is how Heidegger understands the Critique as an “analytic.” Heidegger writes, “For all
that, however, ‘analytic’ does not mean an unknotting and breaking up of finite pure reason into its
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the schema functions as the middle term that licenses the inferential connection. It is thus
central to the question concerning the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. This is
why Heidegger remarks in the preface to the fourth edition that in preparing for his
lecture course on the Critique in the winter semester of 1927/28 his attention was drawn
to the Schematism. It is also why in the main text of the Kantbuch he notes that “the
problem of the Schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding is the question
concerning the innermost essence of ontological knowledge.”90
Now in the same chapter of the Critique Kant writes that “the schema is in itself
always only a product of Einbildungskraft.”91 If, then, the schematism forms the
innermost essence of ontological knowledge, and if Einbildungskraft produces this
schematism, it is no surprise that Heidegger makes the bold claim that “the transcendental
Einbildungskraft is hence the ground upon which the inner possibility of ontological
knowledge, and with it that of Metaphysica Generalis, is built.”92 For Heidegger, the root
of the two stems of knowledge—pure thinking and pure intuiting—is Einbildungskraft.
Heidegger is clear that if Einbildungskraft is a root, it must be such that it “lets the
stems grow out of itself.” What this means for Heidegger is that an analysis of
Einbildungskraft will display the possibility for intuiting and thinking; hence display the
root as both receptivity and spontaneity:
As a faculty of intuition, it is formative (bildend) in the sense of providing the image
(Bild) (or look). As a faculty which is not dependent upon the presence of the intuitable,
it fulfills itself, i.e., it creates and forms the image. This “formative power” (bildende
Kraft) is simultaneously a “forming” which takes things in stride (is receptive) and one
which creates (is spontaneous).93
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This intrinsic ambiguity is crucial. It points to the fact that Einbildungskraft is the
original ground of pure thinking and pure intuiting, what Kant called pure spontaneity
and pure receptivity, respectively.
If pure intuition and pure thinking are rooted in and grow out of Einbildungskraft,
Heidegger thinks we should see traces of this power in these mature stems. What we
should find is a combination of receptivity and spontaneity in each. In the case of
intuitions, Heidegger reminds us that the matter of an intuition is sensation, that which is
received from the object. But according to the Transcendental Aesthetic, the order of the
sensations, space and time, is formal. Space and time are subjective, a priori conditions
for the possibility of an intuition. Accordingly, Heidegger calls the pure intuitions of
space and time an “original, formative giving.”94 His controversial claim is that space and
time are the products of spontaneity; and hence the faculty of sensibility is not simply
receptivity—as Kant said—but spontaneity as well.
If the essence of pure thinking is a “faculty of rules,” then Heidegger suggests that
we consider pure thinking as an “anticipatory pro-posing” (vorgreifenderes Vor-Stellen)
of unities (categories), which guide the unification of representations and experience. For
Heidegger, this implies that pure thinking is a projection of how the representation ought
to be unified. Hence, “if Kant calls the pure, self-orienting, self-relating-to…, ‘our
thought,’ then ‘thinking’ this thought is no longer called judging, but is thinking in the
sense of the free, forming, and projecting (although not arbitrary) ‘conceiving’
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(Sichdenkens) of something.”95 Like sensibility, this free forming is a spontaneity. But it
also resembles sensibility in that it manifests a particular receptivity as well:
The necessity, however, revealed in the standing-against of the horizon of objectivity, is
only possible as encountered “compulsion” insofar as it happened in advance upon a
Being-free for it. Freedom already lies in the essence of pure understanding, i.e., of pure
theoretical reason, insofar as this means placing oneself under a self-given necessity.96

Thinking is receptive insofar as it submits to a rule or is self-binding.
For Heidegger, the faculties of sensibility and understanding as receptivity and
spontaneity presuppose Einbildungskraft as their common root. But as if this were not
radical enough, Heidegger then draws our attention to the threefold synthesis, for what he
thinks the propaedeutic to the A-Deduction shows is that each synthesis as an act of
Einbildungskraft generates a mode of time, including the third synthesis, which, as we
saw above, Kant argued was a product of the transcendental unity of apperception.
Heidegger readily admits in his Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of
Pure Reason that by linking the transcendental apperception with time he goes
way beyond Kant, because now the problem of the common root of both stems of
knowledge becomes more acute. We are concerned with understanding time and the Ithink more radically and in the direction which is certainly visible in Kant, but which is
not taken by him, i.e., in the direction of the synthesis of Einbildungskraft.97

But by this link, Heidegger thinks he can demonstrate the unity of sensibility and
understanding and present a more original ground for finite pure reason.
If Kant’s own premises presuppose a temporal transcendental unity of
apperception, it is no surprise, according to Heidegger, that he shrank back from such a
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conclusion. For if the transcendental apperception is temporal, then the possibility of
freedom, and thus practical reason, appears doomed from the beginning, since Kant held
that spontaneity had to be divorced from time if freedom (and hence morality) was
possible. It appears that Heidegger’s interpretation discloses a more original ground, the
subjectivity of the subject, at the expense of practical reason.
Heidegger thinks the key to a temporal transcendental unity of apperception lies
in Kant’s notion of self-affection. In the 1787 Critique, Kant is explicit that a part of the
self affects itself. But Heidegger suggests that self-affection appears as early as 1781 in
section 10:
Now space and time contain a manifold of pure a priori intuition, but belong nevertheless
among the conditions of the receptivity of our mind, under which alone it can receive
representations of objects, and thus they must always also affect the concept of these
objects.98

For Kant, the pure forms of intuition as mere receptivity must affect or occasion the acts
of the mind—the “concept” or the transcendental unity of apperception. But what might it
mean for space and time to affect the concept? Heidegger wants to begin with an original
unity. How can an original unity affect itself? Does this not presuppose difference?
Heidegger’s explanation of an affection of the concept is unfortunately obscure.
Without argument, he sets aside space and notes that time affects the concept:
The letting-stand-against as such, i.e., as pure turning-one’s-attention-to…, pure
affecting, means: to bring something like an “against it,” the Being-in-opposition, into
opposition to it in general; “to it”—to the pure letting-stand-against of…, but that means
to pure apperception, to the I itself. Time belongs to the inner possibility of this lettingstand-against of… As pure self-affection, it forms in an original way the finite selfhood,
99
so that the self can be something like self-consciousness.”
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The point seems to be that the concept as “the letting-stand-against of” is only possible
by a prior affection, i.e., an original time as the projection of itself “from-out-of-itselftoward-there.” Hence if something is in opposition to itself, this is just to say that original
time is the condition for the possibility of self-reflection, self-consciousness, or the “I
itself.”
Kant’s remark that time affects the concept suggests, for Heidegger, that time is
the ground of subjectivity: “As the ground for the possibility of selfhood, time already
lies within pure apperception, and so it first makes the mind into a mind.”100 What finite
selfhood is, then, is, first, a transcendental self-affection by which the subject first takes
itself as an object and hence forms the dyadic structure of self-consciousness. But second,
insofar as original time is a spontaneous receptivity and Einbildungskraft is a receptive
spontaneity, they are one and the same, the original unity:
If the transcendental power of imagination, as the pure, forming faculty, in itself forms
time—i.e., allows time to spring forth—then we cannot avoid the thesis stated above: the
transcendental power of imagination is original time.101

Heidegger’s idea is that the threefold synthesis explicates the genesis of time as a present,
past, and future. But these modes must be unified if they constitute an experience.
According to Heidegger, they are only unified if Einbildungskraft is original time.
As some commentators have noted,102 there are a few problems with Heidegger’s
interpretation. First, although Heidegger is correct to emphasize that the transcendental
unity of apperception is an act, and, according to the letter of the Critique, a selfaffection, it is not clear that Heidegger is entitled to posit Einbildungskraft as an original
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unity (original time). For self-affection seems to presuppose an original duality. Kant of
course starts from duality, and this starting point lends itself to his subsequent claim that
one stem of knowledge affects another stem. Second, Heidegger’s claim that the
transcendental apperception is temporal not only goes beyond Kant’s own strictures, but
also does not seem necessary to unify the sequences of nows generated in the threefold
synthesis. As Kant shows, the transcendental unity of apperception is an archetypal act of
conceptualizing, a numerically identical and timeless act through its threefold synthesis.
This timeless identity is all Kant needs for the unity of sequential time. Why Heidegger
thinks the transcendental unity must be temporal is rather vague in the Kantbuch.
This is not to suggest that Kant had nothing to fear concerning Einbildungskraft.
Indeed, in what follows I show that Kant had good reason to fear this mental power. A
look at its conceptual history suggests a need to tame it, bind it according to the rules of
the understanding.
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3,

Prometheus Bound: A Conceptual History of Imagination

–Mimetic art, then, is an inferior thing cohabitating with an inferior and engendering inferior
offspring.
–It seems so.
— Plato, Republic, 603b
We drip with sweat, we tremble, we turn pale and turn red at the blows of our imaginations.
—Michel de Montaigne, Of the Power of Imagination, 1:21
Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible: Let us chace our imagination to the
heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves,
nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which have appeared in that
narrow compass. This is the universe of the imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there
produc’d.
—David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 1.2.6.8

3,1

Introductory Remarks

We do not have to agree with Heidegger’s ultimate conclusion in the Kantbuch in order
to explore his claim that Kant shrank back from Einbildungskraft. I think we can
substantiate the claim that Kant was frightened without committing to the conclusion that
Einbildungskraft is the “unknown root” of human cognition. If there is something
frightening about this power, if it reveals aspects of humanity inconsistent with rational
thinking and moral behavior, then all the more reason to revise the Critique, emphasizing
the a priori binding of this power according to transcendental rules. The substantiation of
this fear constitutes the argument for the first part of my thesis. It will require brief
ventures into the Hebraic and Greek conceptions of imagination, as well as medieval and
modern paradigms. The point is to uncover particular arguments that recur throughout the
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philosophical and theological traditions, such that we can then pinpoint Kant’s own
repetitions and bold beginnings.
From this historical exegesis I wish to draw out two conclusions that I believe
underlie Heidegger’s claim that Kant shrank back from Einbildungskraft. First, it will
become clear that the imagination is seen as often inimical to knowledge. Plato, for
instance, develops a highly sophisticated and relentless attack against the image and the
imagination, particularly in his Republic, from which his followers will continue to
develop well into the Middle Ages. Second, a close look at the western tradition reveals
an imagination as a coconspirator in immoral and blasphemous behavior. The
imagination appears time and again as a window into the darker aspects of the human
being and mirror of his lust, greed, and desire for excessive power. Once we present these
historical interpretations of imagination, we can better appreciate the fear that Heidegger
attributes to Kant after 1781.
The upshot to this starting point is twofold. First, wading through various
interpretations of and attitudes toward the imagination should prepare us to see Kant’s
own indebtedness and radical reinterpretation. Second, we begin to get a sense of the
common arguments that I think help situate and explain Kant’s transition from the first to
the second edition of the Critique. We therefore throw light on the imagination from the
common concerns of influential historical paradigms.

3,2

The Hebraic Yetser

If in the beginning was creation, then the power of imagination quickly followed. This is
clear, at least etymologically. For the Hebraic tradition derives “imagination” (yetser)
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from “creation” (yetsirah), “creator” (yotser), and “create” (yatsar). It is therefore no
accident that the terms used in the Torah to describe God’s creation of the world and the
human being’s first transgressive capacity to imitate this act (to imagine) form an allusive
interplay, since “when God ‘created (yatsar) Adam in his own image (tselem) and
likeness (demuth),’ He risked allowing man to emulate Him, to set himself up as His
rival, to supplant Him in the order of creation.”1 From its first appearance in the Torah,
then, the yetser is understood as a natural impulse to imitate divine creation, an impulse
realized when Adam and Eve eat from the Tree of Knowledge. As an inheritance of that
first transgression, the yetser is thus linked from the beginning with ethics—good and
evil, guilt and shame.
A close look at the passages surrounding the primal misdeed reveals a “fallen
imagination,” which enables Adam and Eve to think in terms of opposites—good and
evil, past and future, God and the human being: “Thus bringing about the consciousness
of sin and of time, the fallen imagination exposes man to the experience of division,
discord and contradiction… The First Man feels torn inside, out of joint with himself.”2
The myth, and the yetser contained therein, helps to explain the human experience after
the fall as divided between the present and future, as well as the feeling of shame and
shortcoming: a dissatisfaction with what we are now and a longing for what we might be
or become.3 If the myth tells us we are expelled from the Garden, the rabbinical teachings
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suggest that we are expelled from the present moment (divine reality) and must imagine a
horizon of possibilities. It is precisely in this projection of the future that evil and vice
become possible. The yetser is “fallen” insofar as it projects a plan inconsistent with
God’s way and worships its own idolatrous creations.4
But the imagination is not absolutely evil in the Hebraic tradition. True, the yetser
is frequently termed the yetser hara or evil imagination in rabbinical literature, and some
scholars have noted that it is identified with corporeal nature and, in particular, sexual
desire.5 And associated with the practices of idolatry, the yetser presents a temptation to
“reduce God to our own ‘graven images.’”6 For these reasons rabbinical teachings often
encourage repression of the yetser as an immoral drive or impulse.7 And yet, the yetser is
also termed the yetser hatov or good imagination:
Once re-directed towards the fulfillment of the Divine purpose (yetser), the human yetser
might indeed become an accomplice in the task of historical re-creation: a task which
man now undertakes in dialogue with God.8

The yetser hatov projects the divine plan in accordance with which human beings attain
the goal of creation: the Messianic Kingdom of justice and peace.
There are two concepts that the yetser of the Torah makes possible. First, it
creates a temporal experience. By means of imaginative projection, a future becomes
possible. Outside of Eden, we imagine a horizon of possibilities because a gap opens
between who we are and who we ought to be. And it introduces the past, since the yetser
stands as a painful reminder of a transgression, without which there would be no yetser in
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the first place. It therefore functions as a storehouse of what happened, the primal
misdeed, while also functioning as an indispensable tool to make amends. Second, the
yetser is the condition for ethics. It introduces the dichotomy of good and evil, the two
paths from which we must choose. We can either create idols, according to which we
determine our own way, wandering in the desert, or we can direct our imaginative ideals
in accordance with God’s plan (Torah, meaning literally the direction of God). Time and
ethics are inextricably linked in the Hebraic tradition, since the free choice of action, the
projection of the yetser hatov and yetser hara, opens up the experience of time.

3,3

The Hellenic Eikasía

We find striking parallels in the stories of the Hellenic tradition. In the story of
Prometheus, a myth remarkably similar to its Adamic predecessor, Prometheus steals fire
from the gods and gives it to humans. This Promethean gift allows humans to create a
culture out of nature:
With the use of this stolen fire man was able to invent his own world, creating the various
arts which transmuted the order of nature (the cosmos of blind necessity ordered by
Zeus) into the order of culture (a realm of relative freedom where man could plan and
control his own existence). The stigma of theft was thus attached to imagination,
understood broadly as that Promethean foresight which enabled man to imitate the gods.9

This gift of imagination was experienced as both liberation and curse for the Greeks. It
was the precondition for culture wherein human beings create art and supplement the
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human experience but also a painful reminder of human limitation—recreation, mimesis,
reproduction. Human art is not original like nature but artifice.
That the Greek understanding of the power of imagination connotes limitation is
evident from its etymology. According to M. W. Bundy, “The nearest Greek equivalent
of ‘imagination,’ eikasía, is derived from eikô, ‘to be like,’ or ‘capable of being
compared.’”10 And another close equivalent, phantasía, “derives from phaínô, ‘to
appear,’ ‘to be apparent,’ ‘to come to light.’”11 Bundy suggests that the terms were
unlikely treated as psychological in their earliest uses (it is more likely that they were
used as ‘imagine’ is used today in common parlance, with perhaps even less
sophistication). Rather, each lends itself to the mature notion that phantasies or
imaginings are internal states, derivative to or copies of an external cause. For from the
use of eikô and especially phaínô (as the later indicates no explicit reference to an
original), it is a short step to questions concerning the correspondence of that which is
“capable of being compared” or “that which appears” to its original or cause and hence to
philosophical skepticism concerning truth and falsity, ethics, and aesthetics. Here
phantasía easily leads to the notion of belief (dóxa).12
This movement from the comparison of “that which appears” to the original, what
is a question of truth and correspondence, suggests not only the transition toward
questions of epistemology, but also the close connection between the latter and ethics.
What we see is that questions of recreation and mimesis (imaginative activity), questions
intimately tied with epistemological concerns, also suggest blasphemous activity. The
10
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myth tells us that fire was stolen from the gods, after all. To create, even in its mimetic
form, is to play god. As long as there is a distance between human beings and the gods,
culture and nature, imaginative activity is both epistemological and ethical. Perhaps this
intimate connection is no better displayed than in Plato’s Form of the Good, an ethical
concept that is the source of truth.

3,3,1

Plato

It is Plato who arguably provides the first systematic account of eikasía, an account that
places the imagination firmly at odds with knowledge and ethics. In his Republic, for
instance, echoing the Hebraic tradition, Plato explains the power of images by virtue of
their appeal to our erotic impulses and brute desires. There he condemns eikasía as a
terrible power to corrupt even the best characters, for it leads us into imitating the faults it
represents.13 This helps to explain Plato’s deep concern for the children of the city as they
listen to the stories of Achilles and Odysseus. To empathize with Achilles, Plato seems to
be saying, is to imaginatively reconstruct his immoral pathos in ourselves, feeding our
worst appetites and thereby “Achillizing” our souls, so to speak.14 This also helps to
explain Plato’s apprehension toward poetry in its pedagogical role in the development of
character, since
in regard to the emotions of sex and anger, and all the appetites and pains and pleasures
of the soul which we say accompany all our actions, the effect of poetic imitation is the
same. For it waters and fosters these feelings when what we ought to do is to dry them
up, and it establishes them as our rulers when they ought to be ruled.15

13

Plato (1961), 830–1; 605a–d. All citations to Plato are first according to The Collected Dialogues of
Plato and followed by the Stephanus numbers of the Renaissance edition of Plato’s works.
14
For a full account of the power of myth and images to shape the psyche, see Lear (2006).
15
Plato (1961), 832; 606d.
50

What is particularly novel about the Greek conception of eikasía is its association
with epistemology and ontology. If the Hebraic yetser is explicitly and solely tied to
ethical life, the Greek eikasía was part and parcel of theories of knowledge and being.
Once again, Plato is perhaps the first to provide a full-scale elucidation of eikasía as
linked to inferior accounts of knowledge. In Republic VI, for example, Plato draws his
famous Divided Line where he places knowledge (epistêmê) and reason (nóêsis) in the
highest, intellectual portion and dóxa and eikasía in the lowest, sensible portion. Plato’s
point here is to draw our attention to the power of nóêsis to intuit Ideas (image-less
paradigms for intelligibility) and the inferior quality of eikasía to do no more than imitate
the objects of nature without really knowing what these objects are. This charge against
eikasía becomes clear in Plato’s attack against the artists in Republic X. There he writes,
Then the mimetic art is far removed from truth, and this, it seems, is the reason why it
can produce everything, because it touches or pays hold of only a small part of the object
and that a phantom, as, for example, a painter, we say, will paint us a cobbler, a
carpenter, and other craftsmen, though he himself has no expertness in any of these arts,
but nevertheless if he were a good painter, by exhibiting at a distance his picture of a
carpenter he would deceive children and foolish men, and make them believe it to be a
real carpenter.16

The problem with the artist and his images (eikónes) seems to be their power to persuade
us to take the image as original, to tarry with an illusion (eikasía), as opposed to the
images of nature which point beyond themselves to transcendent Ideas.17 The artist is a
charlatan and, in the final analysis, a liar.
In line with this epistemological attack against eikasía, we find Plato advancing
the argument that eikasía flouts the central principles of western metaphysics—the
16
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principles of identity and contradiction. It introduces conflict and contradiction into our
visions and opinions, he writes in the Republic,18 which is itself a direct transgression
against reason or speech (lógos). In his Dissemination, Derrida suggests that what is so
damning about eikasía is its tendency to displace the lógos and thereby threaten the
Good-Sun-Father as absolute origin, as a self-sufficient identity and unity. According to
Derrida, eikasía is a threat to the Father and his bequeathed lógos, since it replaces each
with its own language—images. Commenting on Derrida, Richard Kearney writes,
The imagination is thus seen by Plato as a disobedient son who threatens to subvert the
patriarchal law of the metaphysical system—a law which safeguards the rights of
inheritance by outlawing the counterfeit claims of imitators, pretenders and imposters.
The imagination is the alien body in the system, the fault-line in the edifice of being, the
Trojan horse in the City of logos.19

On this line of interpretation, Plato’s remark that the mimetic image is a “poor
child of foster parents” suggests that because only the demiurge, the rightful heir of the
Father according to the Timaeus, is sanctioned to create nature, the image must be a
bastard, since it is created by an illegitimate son, eikasía. It follows that if the images of
eikasía are taken for the Ideas themselves, worshipped as originals, this constitutes an act
of subversion, transgression, i.e., patricide. If the distinguishing mark of the image is, as
Derrida puts it, “Sly, slippery, and masked, an intriguer and a card, like Hermes…neither
king nor jack, but rather a sort of joker, a floating signifier, a wild card, one who puts
play into play,”20 this is the precise indeterminacy and contradictoriness that threatens to
displace the paternal lógos of self-identity: “The mimetic activity of imagination
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unleashes an endless play of substitution,—one where artificial re-presentations imitate
and eventually seek to replace the original presence of divine bring to itself.”21
There is an obvious paradox in Plato’s presentation of eikasía. And he himself
bears this out in his use of the drug (phármakon) in the Phaedrus. Τhe phármakon is an
ambiguous term, meaning both medicine and poison. Thus on Derrida’s reading, the
image, as a species of writing, can be understood as both maleficent, as it deceives us into
mistaking the imitation for the original, and beneficial, as it can be used to create
pedagogical allegories such as the famous cave allegory in Republic VII. As Kearney
asks, “Does he [Plato] not employ the figures of myth, simile, metaphor and analogy to
convince us of the very unreliability of these modes of imaginative representation?”22 But
this paradox should come as no surprise, for we have seen it in play in both the Adamic
myth and its Promethean successor. Each myth expresses an ambiguous role of the power
of imagination—its indispensability and roguery.

3,3,2

Aristotle

Aristotle, in contrast to Plato, harbors less suspicion toward images and the power of
imagination (phantasía) due to his advanced psychology. Here phantasía functions not as
an imitator and imposter but as a mediator between the power of sensation and intellect:
it is a type of motion resulting from sense-impressions.23 Phantasía transfers the image of
the impression to the intellect for contemplation. Hence in De Anima, he writes, “No one
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can learn or understanding anything in the absence of sense, and when the mind is
actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along with an image.”24 And from
De Memoria,
The subject of phantasía has been already considered in our work On the Soul. Without
an image thinking is impossible. For there is in such activity an affection identical with
one in geometrical demonstrations. For in the latter case, though we do not make any use
of the fact that the quantity in the triangle is determinate, we nevertheless draw it
determinate in quantity. So likewise when one thinks, although the object may not be
quantitative, one envisages it as quantitative.25

The images, whether they are internal representations of sensory impressions or
geometric shapes, are formed or drawn by phantasía, an internal function of presentation
or imaging as a precondition for thinking.
For Aristotle, phantasía is also operative in ethics. If phantasía is a type of
motion, then it is linked to the appetites, the lower, brute component of the soul. As he
puts it in De Anima, “When imagination (phantasía) originates movement, it necessarily
involves appetite.”26 Accordingly, there may be cases where phantasy is so strong that it
moves us to override our better judgments: “Appetite can originate movement contrary to
calculation, for desire is a form of appetite. Now thought is always right, but appetite and
imagination (phantasía) may be either right or wrong. That is why, though in any case it
is the object of appetite which originates movement, this object may be either real or the
apparent good.”27 Something similar can be said for the higher part of the soul, the
practical intellect (phrónêsis). If thinking requires images, phrónêsis too, in deliberation,
uses images (phantásmata), insofar as it projects possibilities of action: “To the thinking
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soul images (phantásmata) serve as if they were contents of perception (and when it
asserts or denies them to be good or bad it avoids or pursues them).”28

3,4

Early Conclusions

There are a few important points to take away from these ancient views of imagination.
First, the imagination introduces ethical considerations. With the imagination, we begin
to project possibilities for the future, some of which are sanctioned by the divine plan or
rational deliberation and some of which are clear aberrations from it. Second, the
imagination introduces epistemological and ontological questions. With the arrival of
Greek philosophy, the imagination becomes either a peddler of false idols (Plato) or an
indispensable mediator between sensation and intellect (Aristotle). But in both cases, the
ethical and the epistemological/ontological, the imagination is on a short leash, since it
has proved deceptive in the past and is linked with transgression and mimetic activity.
Finally, it should be noted that for both the authors of the Torah and the Greeks,
imagination remains largely a reproductive rather than a productive activity, a servant
rather than a master of meaning, imitation rather than origin.29

3,5

The Onto-Theological Phantasie

The theories of imagination we have looked at thus far may be seen as two sources from
which medieval thinking inherits and develops the concept of imagination. For when we
consider medieval conceptions of imagination, there are two features that are prominent.
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On the one hand, medieval thinking tends to treat the imagination with condemnation
consistent with the Torah’s interpretation of the yetser hara as a “transgression of the
divine order of Creation (i.e., as ethical disorder).” On the other, medieval philosophers
distrust the imagination on the same grounds as Plato, namely, as a “metaphysical
critique of imagination as a counterfeit of the original truth of Being (i.e., as
epistemological disorder).”30 This synthesis of an ethical and epistemological denigration
of imagination, a synthesis of the Hebraic and Greek traditions, is a perfect example of
onto-theological thought. There are a few paradigmatic thinkers who promote these
features of imagination. In what follows, I look at two who are representative of the
medieval mystics and the descriptive psychologists—St. Bonaventure and Thomas
Aquinas, respectively.31

3,5,1

Bonaventure

Bonaventure employs two metaphors to describe the imagination (imagination or
phantasia). His principal metaphor is the mirror. He derives the term imago from
imitando, that is, to imitate or reflect, and argues that all images are a similitude or
simulacrum of the divine creator: “Since we must ascend Jacob’s ladder before we
descend it, let us place our first step in the ascent at the bottom, presenting to ourselves
the whole material world as a mirror through which we may pass over to God, the
supreme Craftsman.”32 This emphasis on the mirror places phantasia in a pedagogical
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role. Located halfway between nature and the intellect, the image may either imitate God,
and hence lead the spectator upward toward truth, or not, plunging us downward toward
the way of idols. Much like Plato before him, Bonaventure argues that if images have a
sanctioned purpose at all, they must lead beyond themselves, ideally summoning us to
higher truths.
The second metaphor Bonaventure employs is the ladder.33 What this suggests is
a power hovering between lower sensations and higher faculties like intellect, conveying
messages from one to the other.34 But the metaphor of a ladder, like a Delphic oracle, is
inherently ambiguous: “Mindful of the cautionary implications of this biblical story
[Jacob’s struggle with the Angel at Bethel left him crippled], Bonaventure declares that
Christ is the only legitimate model for the ladder analogy; and he warns that more often
than not phantasia serves as a hindrance to truth, ‘obscuring the intellect,’ ‘impending the
freedom of the will,’ and thereby leaving us vulnerable to ‘demonic possession.’”35
Indeed, Bonaventure goes so far as to cite Pseudo-Dionysius who warns, “What is evil in
[demons]? It is unreasoning anger, mindless desire, headlong fancy (phantasia
protervas).”36 What we really have here is therefore an auxiliary to truth and goodness
but a potentially dangerous one at that, an unreliable power all too easily inclined to
deception, immorality, and demonic possession.
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In a final instance of the ambiguous function of imagination, Bonaventure
conceives of both a good use of phantasia, an aid in the ascent of the human being
toward God, and a bad use of phantasia as a perverter of rational judgment and
participant in the descent of the mind down the image chain toward evil.37 Given such a
duplicitous power, Bonaventure warns that phantasia must be reigned in or scrutinized
by reason. Through this scrutiny, images become true imitators or a simulacrum of God
and not simply ends in themselves, peddlers of idols:
Idols arise when imagination ceases to recognize images as similitudes which mirror a
higher being and becomes engulfed in images which mirror themselves in an empty play
of non-being.38

3,5,2

Aquinas

When we turn to Thomas Aquinas, what we see is not a grand departure from the work of
Bonaventure. To the contrary, like Bonaventure Thomas suggests that phantasia is a
mimetic faculty of image-making, and its function is to mediate between sensations and
intellect, as well as to store representations in memory. In terms of this intermediary role
of phantasia Thomas combines the Platonic notion of Ideas with the Aristotelian claim
that human beings cannot think without the image. He writes,
Incorporeal things of which there are no phantasms are known to us by comparison with
sensible bodies of which there are phantasms. Therefore when we understand something
about these things, we need to turn to phantasms of bodies, although there are no
phantasms of the things themselves.39

Insofar as the things themselves or the Ideas are incorporeal, phantasia is useless. But
since human beings are finite, we depend on images as analogies between sensible and
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intellectual reality. As we might expect from Thomas, we have here an example of a
synthesis of various strands of the Greek tradition.
Although Thomas synthesizes his interpretation of phantasia from Platonic and
Aristotelian sources, he also clearly diminishes the role of phantasia in keeping with
Medieval Scholasticism. Thus he writes in the Summa Theologiae that phantasia is
simply a “storehouse” of forms:
For the reception of sensible forms the proper and common sense is appointed; but for the
retention and preservation of these forms, the phantasy or imagination (phantasia sive
imaginatio) is appointed, which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is, as it were, a
storehouse of forms received through the senses.40

This metaphor of the storehouse is “perhaps the paradigmatic figure of imagination in
Thomistic philosophy,” and it suggests that Thomas is willing to downplay the artistic
function of phantasia than his predecessors recognize and accept.41 Indeed, for Thomas,
art seems easily dispensable.
This diminished role of phantasia can perhaps be seen as a defense against its
powers, for, like Bonaventure, Thomas is clearly anxious of phantasia’s dangerous
potential. For he tells us that
There are intellectual habits by which a man is prompted rightly to judge of the
presentation of imagination (imaginatio). When he ceases from the use of the intellectual
habit, extraneous imaginations arise, and occasionally some even of a contradictory
tendency, so that unless by the use of the intellectual habit these are cut down or
repressed the man is rendered less fit to form a right judgment.42

Left to its own wanderings, phantasia conjures up images witnessed in dreams, the
images associated with madness and sexuality. Hence Thomas’s exhortation that the
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intellectual habits be present, lest the imagination be left to its own free play, opening the
way not only to immoral and false images, but demonic possession as well:
Demons can work on man’s imagination and even on his corporeal senses, so that
something seems otherwise than it is, as explained above (Q. CXI., AA. 3,4)… In the
same way he can clothe any corporeal thing with any corporeal form, so as to appear
therein. This is what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei XVII., loc. cit.): Man’s imagination,
which, whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of an innumerable number of
things, appears to other men’s senses, as it were embodied in the semblance of some
animal. This is not to be understood as though the imagination itself or the images
formed therein were identified with that which appears embodied to the senses of another
man: but that the demon, who forms an image in man’s imagination, can offer the same
picture to another man’s senses.43

Kearney comments on the foregoing passage: “The medieval suspicion of imagination
could hardly be more clearly stated. As a mimetic faculty of representation and storage,
imagination has its place. But it must be kept in its place. Any departure from its
mandatory subordination to reason and reality, can only lead to error—and, at worst,
satanic pride.”44
What the medieval view of phantasia shares with its Hebraic and Greek
predecessors is the view that phantasia is essentially mimetic. Whether it is a storehouse
of forms or a mediator between sensible appearances and intellectual ideas, phantasia
constructs an image that copies or imitates an original, that is, an Idea or God. But there
is also a suspicion toward phantasia that the medievals inherit. For on the one hand,
phantasia is an indispensable mediator but also the cause of error, falsity, and
immorality, on the other:
For the official thinking of the Middle Ages, truth remained the privileged possession of
a transcendent Other: God or Being. And, this self-identical Other was the unique and
exclusive Origin of all reality. No exceptions were to be admitted. In so far as
imagination was prepared to enter the humble service of this higher Origin and honour it
as the one and only Father of all things, it could be granted probation under the
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jurisdiction of reason. But as soon as imagination sought to surpass this limited role as a
ward of court, it was to be harshly penalized. Leniency in such a case could only lead to
45
idolatry, blasphemy or demonic possession.

This apprehension toward phantasia was the official stance of medieval philosophy, but
to place too much focus on this onto-theological position is to overlook the position of
folk culture and early Renaissance philosophy.

3,6

Renaissance

The values, symbols, and metaphors associated with imagination in the ancient and
medieval philosophical traditions are not so evident, if at all, in the world of folk culture
and art and among the gnostic and mystical thinkers in the early Renaissance. The
imagination there seems to play a different role, one divorced from ethical condemnation
and epistemological skepticism. It is a power celebrated and hence a focus of fascination
and attraction, which, from the standpoint of mainstream onto-theological thinking, had
to be excluded, contained, and confined. If the folk scene of the late Middle Ages and
Renaissance unleashed the imagination, we can begin see just what this power looks like
left to its own devices. We can see just what was so frightening and had to be kept at bay.

3,6,1

The Image

In his History of Madness, Michel Foucault does not directly address the power of
imagination. But what Foucault does discuss with great care and insight is the rise of a
particular attraction toward and fascination with the autonomy of the image.
Traditionally, as we saw above, the image referred or pointed beyond itself. In this
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capacity, it functioned like language, illustrating what words describe. But beginning in
the fifteenth century, the image became “freed from the wisdom and morality it was
intended to transmit…began to gravitate around its own madness.”46
As Foucault explains, before the fifteenth century the image and language
“constantly answer each other and swap roles, now as commentary, now as
illustration.”47 The Narrentanz, for example, was a theme of many popular balls and
theatrical performances of the early Middle Ages, and Erasmus’s Praise of Folly was
structured according to a dance “where the professions and orders file past and form the
eternal round of unreason.” Similarly, Bosch’s Ship of Fools was a correspondence and
illustration of Brant’s Narrenschiff.48 But a century later, painting and the symbolic
image no longer functioned in the same way as, let alone corresponded to, language.
They no longer had the same unique signification, a reference beyond themselves to a
higher truth or moral lesson. Rather, the image became liberated and infused with its own
complex meaning:
Meaning was no longer read in an immediate perception, and accordingly objects ceased
to speak directly: between the knowledge that animated the figures of objects and the
forms they were transformed into, a divide began to appear, opening the way for a
symbolism more often associated with the world of dreams.49

The result is an overinvestment and overdetermination in the image, where images are
associated with more images, and “dreams, senselessness and unreason could slip all too
easily into this excess of meaning.”50
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This world of images, pointing no longer beyond itself to an imageless reality,
becomes an infinitely enigmatic world, a world of fascination rather than instruction.51 As
an example of this transformation, Foucault describes the gryllos:
[The gryllos] originally taught how in men ruled by their desires the soul became a
prisoner of the beast. These grotesque faces found on the bellies of monsters belonged to
the world of the grand platonic metaphor, denouncing the abasement of the spirit in the
madness of sin. But in the fifteenth century, the gryllos, a symbol of human madness,
became a preponderant figure in the innumerable Temptations. The hermit’s tranquility is
assailed not by objects of desire but by demented forms locked into their own secrets,
who have risen up from dream and sit on the surface of a world, silent and furtive. In the
Lisbon Temptation facing Saint Anthony sits one such figure born of madness, its
solicitude, its penitence, and its deprivation: a thin smile spreads across its disembodied
face, the pure presence of worry in the guise of an agile grimace. This nightmarish
silhouette is both the subject and the object of the temptation, captivating the hermit’s
glance: both of them are prisoners of a mirroring interrogative process, where response is
indefinitely suspended, in a silence broken only by the restive growl of the monsters that
surround them. The gryllos no longer recalls, even in a satirical mode, the spiritual
vocation of man forgotten in the madness of desire. The gryllos is madness made
Temptation: all that there is in him of the impossible, fantastical and inhuman, all that
indicates that which goes against nature or the seething mass of a senseless presence
immanent in the earth is the source of his strange power. For men of the fifteenth century,
the fearsome freedom of dreams and the fantasies born of madness held a power of
attraction stronger than the pull of the desires of mortal flesh.52

What Foucault is pointing to is a fascination with the image itself. The image attracts the
attention of the spectator because it reveals something devoid of moral and
epistemological instruction. What is so fascinating about the image, what makes us terry
with it, is its allusion to senselessness or, as Foucault puts it, “the seething mass of a
senseless presence immanent in the earth.”
This attraction to and fascination with the image is an attraction to madness itself,
which Foucault explains from two directions. “First of all, men seemed to discover in
these fantastical figures one of the secret vocations of their nature.”53 What had been
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symbols and signs pointing to moral instruction and purified natures, “took on a
fantastical life of their own.” In the images of the Last Judgment, “man appears in the
hideous nudity of his fallen state [and] has taken on the monstrous face of a delirious
animal.” Foucault writes,
Screech owls with toad-like bodies mingle with the naked bodies of the damned in
Thierry Bouts’ Hell, the work of Stefan Lochner pullulates with winged insects, catheaded butterflies and sphinxes with mayfly wingcases, and birds with handed wings that
instill panic, while in Grünewald’s Temptation there prowls a beast of prey with gnarled,
knotty claws. The animal realm has moved out of range of all domesticating human
symbolism, and while it fascinates mankind with its disorder, its fury and its plethora of
monstrous possibilities, it also serves to reveal the dark rage and sterile folly that lurks in
the heart of mankind.54

But from the other direction, the image and its representation of madness is an attraction
of a particular kind of knowledge. Not knowledge in the Platonic or Thomistic sense, to
be sure, but a knowledge that “predicts both the reign of Satan and the end of the world,
ultimate happiness and supreme punishment, omnipotence on earth and the descent into
hell. The Ship of Fools passes through a landscape of delights where all is offered to
desire, a paradise regained of sorts, as men once more become strangers to necessity and
want, yet without a return to a state of innocence.”55 This is a forbidden knowledge, a
knowledge that unlocked secrets about a grand disorder and a mad, senseless universe, as
well as the depravity of human nature and its lowest desires.
If these two temptations of madness are borne by the image, then we can
sympathesize with the apprehension and anxiety behind the Hebrew, Greek, and
Medieval traditions. At the same time, we can begin to appreciate the boldness of the late
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Medieval and Renaissance art as they unleashed and focused their attention upon the
image, a temerity evident in the works of Grünewald and Dürer, Bosch and Brueghel:
For madness unleashes its fury in the space of pure vision. Fantasies and threats, the
fleeting fragments of dreams and the secret destiny of the world, where madness has a
primitive, prophetic force, revealing that the dream-like is real and that a thin surface of
illusion opens onto bottomless depths, and that the glittering surface of images opens the
way to worrying figures that shine forever in the darkness. The inverse revelation, no less
painful, is that the reality of the world will one day be absorbed in the fantastic Image, at
that delirious moment between being and nothingness which is pure destruction.56

The fears we have seen expressed by Bonaventure and Thomas, a nightmare of the
image, seem realized in these artists’ works. What these works confirm is that the image
is capable of revealing the human being’s animality and the disorder and nonsense in the
world.
If the acts of Adam and Prometheus stood for theft and explained a perduring
feeling of guilt in the Ancient and Medieval world, then the Renaissance marked a
turning point from guilt toward celebration and revelry. What these artists suggest is that
there is a source of meaning independent from an imageless, transcendent reality, i.e.,
God or Idea. And if that leads to the gods’ abandonment, then so be it. These artists
seemed prepared to live with the consequences: a world bound by its own standards,
which, as we know, must have been frightening to Plato or Thomas and thereby had to be
internalized, contained, and tamed:
In Brant, Erasmus and the whole humanist tradition, madness is confined to the universe
of discourse. There it becomes ever more refined, more subtle, and is slowly disarmed. It
changes scale: born in the hearts of men, it rules and disrupts their conduct… It may hold
every man in its control, but its reign is narrow and relative as its mediocre truth is
constantly unmasked by the penetrating gaze of the savant. For such men of science, it
becomes a mere object of ridicule: they tamed it by the act of praising it.57

56
57

Foucault (2006), 26.
Foucault (2006), 27.
65

Recall here Derrida’s psychoanalytic reading of western metaphysics. Along this
Derridean interpretation, this taming of the imagination and its image could be
interpreted as respect for the Good-Sun-Father, that image-less figure of western
metaphysics inaugurated and powerfully illustrated by Plato. For according to the
symbols and myths that we have seen up to this point, Derrida might say that what Brant
and Erasmus feared was retaliation and retribution on the part of the father. Killing the
father demands retribution, after all: a killing of a son.

3,6,2

The Occult Vitus Imaginativa

What artists such as Breughel and Bosch suggested in their work is a force existing
outside the subject, impinging from outside. But there were also Renaissance thinkers
who looked to the imagination and the image not as a force external to the human subject,
immanent “in the earth,” but as a source of human creativity—thinkers such as
Paracelsus, Bruno, and Marsilio Ficino, for example. These were marginal thinkers, to be
sure, though German Romantics such as Friedrich Schelling would give them wider
circulation. Nonetheless, what these Renaissance thinkers introduce to the history of
imagination, what they often called a vitus imaginativa or spiritus phantasticus, was a
transformative imagination that expresses “man’s desire to be the sun, that is, to be
absolutely everything he desires to be.” “What else is imagination,” Paracelsus asks, “if
not the inner sun which moves in its own sphere.”58 Commenting on this passage,
Kearney writes, “The imagination was now hailed as a divine flame within man. The
stigma of the Promethean theft was removed. And this discovery of the human
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imagination as the source of universal light and power, marks one of the earliest attempts
to affirm the primacy of subjectivity.”59
The modern era inherited the Renaissance conception of imagination. For the
moderns, as we shall see, meaning is not derived from a transcendent being, but it is
likewise not out there in the world, unintelligible and uncontrollable, as it was for Bosch
and Breughel. Students of Brant and Erasmus, the moderns confine the imagination under
the constraints of the understanding and its rules. But influenced by the artists and
mystics of the Renaissance, if only indirectly, these moderns see subjectivity as a source
of meaning.60 Analogous to what Freud would call a compromise-formation, the
imagination was allowed greater freedom, an indispensable role in meaning-making, and
yet still a ward of reason’s court.

3,7

Modernity

Let us now consider the transition from the Renaissance conception of imagination and
the madness attached to the image to the uptake and transformation of imagination in
Kant’s transcendental idealism. The transition is not seamless. And it seems Foucault is
right when he notes that the tragic experience attached to the image was forced to go
underground after its brief foray in the 15th century.61
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3,7,1

Descartes

The father of modernity, Descartes famously moves the source of meaning from a
transcendent being to the human mind. His cogito is an expression of the insight that
thinking has the power to disclose objective reality solely through its reflection upon its
own clear and distinct ideas. Here thinking is prior to being; hence the central claim “I
think therefore I am.” But what Descartes fails to appreciate is the power of imagination
as a necessary condition for objectivity. Indeed, he fails to shake off the old prejudices of
his predecessors and continues to adhere to the old Platonic and Scholastic stock phrases
and metaphors for imagination. Here imagination (imagination) is still a mediator
between sensations and understanding, a mimetic faculty, and a corporeal entity; and thus
it, “along with the ideas existing within it,” is “nothing but a real body with a real
extension and shape.”62
For Descartes, imaginatio exemplifies a few key powers, namely, reminiscence
and the imaging of sensory ideas. In the first respect, it possesses the capacity to fix past
figures, forms, or images received from sensation. In this way it is indistinguishable from
memory, a vessel, so to speak, that holds images in place as they wait to be plucked by
higher functions of the mind.63 Here Descartes is clearly indebted to Thomas’s
“storehouse” metaphor. But the power of reminiscence is also essential, inter alia, to an
aesthetic experience. As Descartes puts it in Compendium of Music of 1618, “Our
imaginatio proceeds to the end, where it eventually conceives the entire song as a single
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thing that is constituted from many equal parts.”64 The suggestion here is that imaginatio
is the power by which discreet inputs (in this case, notes), received by the sensory organs,
are reiterated consecutively and form a harmonious whole.
But even though Descartes conceives of imaginatio as a mediator between
sensation and understanding, he, like Plato, seems more than happy to dispense with it at
particular stages of inquiry. Consider these passages, the first of which comes from the
Rules for the Direction of the Mind, the second, the Meditations:
So we can conclude with certainty that when the intellect is concerned with matters in
which there is nothing corporeal or similar to the corporeal, it cannot receive any help
from those faculties; on the contrary, if it is not to be hampered by them, the senses must
be kept back and the imagination (imaginationem) must, as far as possible, be divested of
every distinct impression. If, however, the intellect proposes to examine something which
can be referred to the body, the idea of that thing must be formed as distinctly as possible
in the imagination (imaginatione).65
When I imagine (imaginor) a triangle, for example, I do not merely understand that it is a
figure bounded by three lines, but at the same time I also see the three lines with my
mind’s eye as if they were present before me; and this is what I call imagining
(imaginari). But if I want to think of a chiliagon, although I understand that it is a figure
consisting of a thousand sides just as well as I understand the triangle to be a three-sided
figure, I do not in the same way imagine (imaginor) the thousand sides or see them as if
they were present before me… And in doing this I notice quite clearly that imagination
(imaginandum) requires a peculiar effort of mind which is not required for understanding;
this additional effort of mind clearly shows the difference between imagination
(imaginationem) and pure understanding.66

Here imaginatio is described as at best an assistant to pure understanding but a limited
and, at times, dispensable one at that.67 These passages explain why imaginatio, which
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plays such a crucial role in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind, all but disappears in
the Meditations. Since the Meditations is a metaphysical treatise, dealing with the
concepts of God and the soul, both of which lack corresponding corporeal images, to
harness imaginatio there would be an impediment to abstract thought. On the contrary,
the Rules focuses more on mathematical and natural inquiry, and so imaginatio shines as
an indispensable faculty.
It would be misleading to infer from these remarks that Descartes restricts his
comments on imaginatio completely within his epistemological work. He too suspects
imaginatio as a medium of both ethical and unethical behavior. It is, after all, for
Descartes a matter of will to accept his former beliefs:
I shall consider myself as not having hands or eyes, or flesh, or blood or sense, but as
falsely believing that I have all these things. I shall stubbornly and firmly persist in this
meditation; and, even if it is not in my power to know any truth, I shall at least do what is
in my power, that is, resolutely guard against assenting to any falsehoods.68

Descartes resists error as a matter of will. Suspension of judgment is a choice. And
Foucault notes that madness and illusion are refuted on the very same basis: “Reason is
perpetually threated by the temptation to fall asleep or to give in to illusions, and the
solution is to reiterate constantly the need to fix one’s eyes on the truth.”69 The upshot to
Descartes’s meditations is, among other things, a resolute will against excessive
imaginatio: “The result is that I now have no difficulty in turning my mind away from
imaginable things (rebus imaginabilibus) and towards things which are objects of the
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intellect alone and are totally separate from matter.”70 Thus we might say that to indulge
in imaginatio is the sign of a weak will, a poor character. Put contrarily, a tame
imaginatio is a sign of virtue and resoluteness.
For all of Descartes’s novelties, imaginatio barely makes any progress from his
scholastic predecessors. It is ultimately mimetic, and it is as if his rationalist agenda
precludes a robust power of creativity:
The French philosopher abhorred imagination, the outcome, according to him, of the
agitation of the animal spirits; and though not utterly condemning poetry, he allowed it to
exist only in so far as it was guided by intellect, that being the sole faculty able to save
men from all the caprices of the folle du logis. He tolerated it, but that was all; and went
so far as not to deny it anything ‘qu’un philosophe lui puisse permettre sans offenser sa
conscience’… the mathematical spirit fostered by Descartes forbade all possibility of a
serious consideration of poetry and art.71

This Cartesian hostility toward imaginatio sets the tone for modernity. Even Kant will
approach the imagination cautiously, all too aware of the biases attached to it.

3,7,2

Hume

David Hume sets himself the task to explore human nature. He wants to establish a secure
course for science, what he thought was in a deplorable state and in desperate need of an
overhaul. His method, of course, is the experimental, where every claim or universal
principle is assessed and measured against the tribunal of experience. And yet, what
started out as a promising course soon lead Hume to skepticism and melancholia. For he
came to realize that the imagination was not simply the medium of sensory images but
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the medium of ideas in general and the source of meaning in the world. In this way,
Hume “pushed the ‘mimetic model’ of imagination to its final and unjustifiable limits.”72
Let us begin with an overview of Hume’s conception of the mind. Here is how
James Engell elegantly describes it:
In Hume’s view, the mind is a whole unit with few internal barriers or bridges. Emotions
mingle with ideas and change their intensity or force. A tide of passions, sometimes
“calm” and sometimes “violent,” pounds the shore of reason. This tide both erodes and
builds; it sculpts the entire coastline. Sense impressions, like constant winds, set up more
motion in the area. The breakwater of the understanding partly calms and orders, but not
completely. Real activity of the mind occurs at exactly that spot where the waves break
and all elements converge, a slurry where reason mixes so thoroughly with passion that it
is no longer possible to distinguish the two. Now this slurry forms an undercurrent which
mixes together all the effects of sense impression, reason, understanding, and passion.
This undercurrent flows incessantly and gives one common direction to all these
combined activities of the mind. It is responsible for “the vivacity of our ideas” and
diminishes or augments their hold on the mind. It can either propel thought shoreward or
create an undertow. This shifting, mixing force in the psyche is imagination. It is the
active undercurrent of the mind.73

This description is helpful for the following reason: it emphasizes the fact that for Hume
the imagination is the hegemonikon of the mind. We make faulty inferences on the basis
of imagination, to be sure. For it indiscriminately mixes reason, understanding, desire,
and passion. And yet, this mixture is the life-breath of concepts. Ideas have a powerful
sway over us because the imagination infuses them with passion and desire. Thus we only
make inferences and, more broadly, think on the basis of imagination. If Engell is correct,
if, indeed, for Hume, thinking is a slurry of passions and beliefs, it is not surprising that,
by the end of the first Enquiry, Hume stands at the precipice ready to cast clean, abstract
metaphysical treatises to the flames.74
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For Hume, cognition starts with impressions, on the one hand, which “strike upon
the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness.”75 These sensations are
unreflective, as it were, for we take their impressions as accurate representations of the
world, indeed the world, given their “force and violence.”76 Ideas, on the other hand,
arise out of impressions. They are reflections, reproductions, copies, or images, fainter or
less vivid, and by this difference of degree in force and vivacity we distinguish the former
from the latter.77
The imagination is that power to arrange, organize, fuse, and divide these ideas,
as well as the power to unite the latter with the passions. Noting the latter’s
independence, Hume distinguishes it from memory:
There is another difference betwixt these two kinds of ideas, which is no less evident,
namely that though neither the ideas of the memory nor imagination, neither the lively
nor the faint ideas can make their appearance in the mind, unless their correspondent
impressions have gone before to prepare the way for them, yet the imagination is not
restrain’d to the same order and form with the original impressions; while memory is in
a manner ty’d down in that respect, without any power of variation.78

Hume calls this unrestrained force the “liberty of the imagination to transpose and
change its ideas.”79 Unbound, it is as if, from behind the back of consciousness, the
imagination warps and wefts, creating a fabric according to its own design.
In the Treatise Hume tells us that the imagination is also a completing power:

this indolent belief in the general maxims of the world, I still feel such remains of my former disposition,
that I am ready to throw all my books and papers into the fire, and resolve never more to renounce the
pleasures of life for the sake of reasoning and philosophy.”
75
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’Tis certain nothing more powerfully animates any affection, than to conceal some part of
its object by throwing it into a kind of shade, which at the same time that it shows enough
to pre-possess us in favour of the object, leaves still some work on the imagination.
Besides that obscurity is always attended with a kind of uncertainty; the effort, which the
fancy makes to compleat the idea, rouzes the spirits, and gives an additional force to the
passion.80

Commenting on this passage, Engell writes, “Hume believes absence magnifies strong
passions and kills weak ones in the way that wind fans fire but blows out a match. The
passion suggested may bring hope or fear, pleasure or grief. And, the ‘completing’
inference does not have to be true. When Joseph’s brothers show the bloody coat of many
colors to their father, Jacob imagines that his favorite son has been torn apart by a
beast.”81 The implication being that the imagination is predisposed to deceptive activity
and leads the understanding to false conclusions.
If the imagination is prone to deception, it would make sense to check its
associations against reality, but the problem here, as far as Hume sees it, is that we cannot
get beyond our imagination:
Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible: Let us chace our
imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really
advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those
perceptions, which have appeared in that narrow compass. This is the universe of the
imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there produc’d.82

If thinking is dependent upon imagination, as well as memory and suggestion, it is no
wonder that Hume, at the end of the first book of the Treatise, remarks, “The memory,
senses, and understanding are, therefore, all of them founded on the imagination, or the
vivacity of our ideas.”83
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Hume is indebted to Descartes. For he takes subjectivity to be logically prior to
reality. But at the same time he takes the Cartesian notion of subjectivity and wrenches
from it all certainty and security. All ideas are images and all supposed metaphysical
laws are nothing but psychological regularities of resemblance, contiguity, and causality.
The self consequently loses its identity, and the external world is robbed of its
independence. What we are left with is nothing but the imagination and the mimetic
image, which points to nothing beyond itself. “The only truth we can know,” writes
Kearney, “is that of our image-representations. And this means no truth at all.”84
Hume leaves us in a strange predicament. On the one hand, he seems to pull the
wool from our eyes. He exposes the central concepts of western metaphysics as what they
are—nothing more than images—and hence fraudulent illusions and fictions. But on the
other hand, he does not replace these fictions of imagination with anything real. Rather,
Hume’s conclusion seems to be that these illusions are all that we have. And so we must
“cling to these fictions as if they were real.”85 The implication is startling:
If the populace at large were to be apprised of the fact that the king wears no clothes, that
the principles guiding all our social systems of authority from law and education to
morality, religion and government, have no objective validity, life would become
unlivable. The rational sceptic thus feels himself to be, in Hume’s poignant words, a
‘strange and uncouth monster’… Alienated from the fellowship of ordinary men and
women, and carrying within his breast the intolerable realization that the world is but a
mess of mimetic shadows manipulated by imagination, the philosopher observes a selfimposed silence. To speak out is to endanger the possibility of peaceful coexistence
between mortals.86

Much like Plato, Hume suggests that the world of fictions, “the universe of imagination,”
is consoling and comforting but essentially false. But unlike Plato, Hume leaves no room
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for an ascent out of the cave to the Father-Sun-Good. Having cast out the father, Hume
leaves the philosopher with no direction home, wandering in the desert.
Having found himself in a universe populated solely by images, Hume tells us
that he is about to “launch out into those immense depths of philosophy.” But he suspects
he is
like a man, who having been struck on many shoals, and having narrowly escap’d
shipwreck in passing a small firth, has yet the temerity to put out to sea in the same leaky
weather-beaten vessel, and even carries his ambition so far as to think of compassing the
globe under these disadvantageous circumstances.87

And yet, he cannot remain among his contemporaries, for he feels himself a “strange
uncouth monster” who has been “expell’d all human commerce.”88 The imagery of water,
ships, and monsters is a reminiscent and repetitive theme. We have seen it in the work of
Renaissance artists such as Bosch and Breughel (recall the Ship of Fools), and what it
suggests according to Foucault is a feeling of senselessness. If Hume has discovered that
what western metaphysics has taken for truth is nothing but a fiction, this cannot prevent
him, from the perspective of his contemporaries, from appearing like a senseless
madman. But of course, from his perspective, they too are mad. Thus has he unleashed
the imagination only to find himself in forlorn isolation and bound for the seas.
Hume’s description of his emotional experience parallels a theme Foucault
discusses in the context of madness in the Middle Ages:
Water brought its own dark symbolic charge, carrying away, but purifying too.
Navigation brought man face to face with the uncertainty of destiny, where each is left to
himself and every departure might always be the last. The madman on his crazy boat sets
sail for the other world, and it is from the other world that he comes when he
disembarks.89
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In the Middle Ages water and navigation were representative of purification and
exclusion, and it should not be surprising to see Hume reemploying the same imagery to
capture his experience toward the end of the first book of the Treatise.90 Hume is an
outcast, a monster subsumed by the imagination and its image. He cannot seek asylum
among anyone, for each “keeps at a distance, and dreads that storm, which beats upon me
from every side.”91 He must either set sail into uncharted waters or remain among the
“sane,” with their fictions and lies.
Hume ends his first book of the Treatise with this fateful dilemma:
This deficiency in our ideas is not, indeed, perceiv’d in common life, nor are we sensible,
that in the most usual conjunctions of cause and effect we are as ignorant of the ultimate
principle, which binds them together, as in the most unusual and extraordinary. But this
proceeds merely from an illusion of the imagination; and the question is, how far we
ought to yield to these illusions. This question is very difficult, and reduces us to a very
dangerous dilemma, which-ever way we answer it. For if we assent to every trivial
suggestion of the fancy… they lead us into such errors, absurdities, and obscurities, that
we must at last become asham’d of our credulity… But on the other hand, if the
consideration of these instances makes us take a resolution to reject all the trivial
suggestions of the fancy, and adhere to the understanding… even this resolution, if
steadily executed, wou’d be dangerous, and attended with the most fatal consequences.
For I have already shown, that the understanding… entirely subverts itself, and leaves not
the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common life.92

Hume’s solution is to simply let nature take its course, allowing the mind to relax from its
serious, depressing, philosophical speculations. He dines, plays a game of backgammon,
and converses merrily with friends. In other words, he forgets all about it.
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3,8

Concluding Remarks

The foregoing interpretation of imagination, from the Hebraic tradition to Hume, was
designed to show us just what might have frightened Kant after 1781. As we have seen,
the concept of imagination has a history closely tied to transgression, rebellion, greed,
lust, irrationality, fiction, and madness. For these reasons, it appears plausible that Kant,
according to Heidegger, felt the need to suppress the role of Einbildungskraft. A robust
imagination, conceived as the keystone to the construction of an objective experience,
could only raise suspicion and skepticism among Kant’s contemporaries. And if morality
is sanctioned by a categorical imperative, how could the human being, as intrinsically
imaginative, ground such a universal and necessary law?
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4,

Phantasie Unbound: Reversals of Cognition

I do not find it strange that [l’imagination] brings fevers and death to those who give it a free
hand and encourage it.
—Michel de Montaigne, Of the Power of Imagination, 1: 21
Imagination, a licentious and vagrant faculty, unsusceptible of limitations, and impatient of
restraint, has always endeavored to baffle the logician, to perplex the confines of distinction, and
burst the inclosures of regularity.
—Samuel Johnson, Rambler, 28 May 1751
To this classical way of thinking there was a whole region where morality and mechanics,
freedom and the body, passion and pathology found both their unity and their measure. It is
l’imagination, which is prey to errors, illusions and presumptions, but in which are equally
summed up all the mechanisms of the body.
—Michel Foucault, History of Madness, 198

4,1

1760s: Kant and the Philosophical Zeitgeist

The last chapter was designed to support Heidegger’s claim that Einbildungskraft
frightened Kant. If Kant’s goal is to ground rational thinking and moral action in a priori
laws sanctioned by (pure and practical) reason, but if Kant’s Critique discloses reason
itself as grounded in Einbildungskraft, a coconspirator to irrationality and immorality,
then perhaps Heidegger is right that Kant could not but shrink back from such a
discovery.
What we now know is that the western canon offers ample evidence to support
Heidegger’s claim. But, to be sure, I make no claim that Kant was directly influenced by
any particular work, that he read Plato’s thoughts on eikasía closely, say, or that
Bonaventure’s comments on phantasia moved Kant to suppress Einbildungskraft in the
79

second edition of the Critique. If anything else, these conceptions of imagination, this
leitmotif, are implicit presuppositions that affect Kant both consciously and
unconsciously.
In this chapter I turn to some of Kant’s direct influences1 and his theoretical
position prior to 1781; specifically, I turn to his early thoughts on Bildungsvermögen in
the early anthropological writings. For if Heidegger is correct, if Kant shrank back from
Einbildungskraft as he developed his mature theoretical and practical philosophy, we
should expect early descriptions of an unbound, lawless Bildungsvermögen.2
Manfred Kuehn reminds us in his biography of Kant that 1764 marked a
significant event in Kant’s life. He turned forty.3 In his Anthropology from a pragmatic
point of view, Kant notes that in the fortieth year one acquires prudence, i.e., “using other
human beings for one’s purposes.”4 Moreover, and more importantly, the fortieth year
also marks the acquisition of character:
The human being who is conscious of having character in his way of thinking does not
have it by nature; he must always have acquired it. One may also assume that the
grounding of character is like a kind of rebirth, a certain solemnity of making a vow to
oneself; which makes the resolution and the moment when this transformation took place
unforgettable to him, like the beginning of a new epoch. — Education, examples, and
teaching generally cannot bring about this firmness and persistence in principles
gradually, but only, as it were, by an explosion which happens one time as a result of
weariness at the unstable condition of instinct. Perhaps there are only a few who have
attempted this revolution before the age of thirty, and fewer still who have firmly
established it before they are forty.5
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Here I look at the British empiricists in some detail. In the next chapter, I turn to Baugarten and Tetens.
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Rather, Kant’s study of this power began in the 1760s and 1770s. What Heidegger’s claim suggests, then, is
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discovered Einbildungskraft as the unknown root of cognition that he then shrank back. This does not
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Character is not an innate gift, but an acquisition. It is a creation, and in that sense it falls
into Kant’s definition of pragmatic anthropology: “The investigation of what he as a freeacting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself.”6
In conjunction with his personal life, the 1760s show Kant interested in the
“situation of ethics,”7 as particularly construed by the British empiricists.8 Kant thus took
a philosophical, as well as a personal, interest in ethical theory. But what exactly was his
position during these precritical years?
Kant did not so much have a position (either in metaphysics or in ethics) as much
as he was searching for one. As he put it in his personal copy of the 1764 Observations
on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime,
Everything goes past like a river and the changing taste and the various shapes of men
make the whole game uncertain and delusive. Where do I find fixed points in nature,
which cannot be moved by man, and where I can indicate the markers by the shore to
which I ought to adhere?9

Kant was looking for an Archimedean point. And yet, that he uses the word “nature”
suggests that at this time he thought such a point would be found there, not in reason.10
Kant confirms this in his description of his method in the “Announcement of the
programme of his lectures for the winter semester of 1765–1766”: “In the doctrine of
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virtue I shall always begin by considering historically and philosophically what happens
before specifying what ought to happen. In doing so, I shall make clear what method
ought to be adopted in the study of man.”11 Kant did not have a definitive position by
1764, but he did have a method and an idea for where to look.12
Kant’s appeal to nature as the criterion of truth in the winter semester of 1765–
1766 corresponds with what Erich Adickes has labeled Kant’s “empiricist period.”13 But
this labeling on Adickes’s part is controversial, not least because the term “empiricism” is
vague. As Kuehn remarks, somewhat rhetorically, “Was Berkeley a ‘British empiricist’
or, as has been argued, an ‘Irish Cartesian’? In what sense was Locke an ‘empiricist’?”14
Furthermore, Kant’s students of the 1760s are clear that Kant was not a “follower” in any
sense of the term, neither a follower of empiricist doctrine nor a follow of rationalist
theory. Johann Herder, for instance, notes that he was “indifferent to nothing worth
knowing.”15
Kant was not a Leibnizian or Wolffian or Hutchesonian, but he was sympathetic
to rationalism and empiricism, broadly construed. They were not complete, infallible
systems, but they were amenable to supplementation. This was particularly true of the
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British contributions to ethics, as Kant saw it at this time. As he puts it in the
“Announcement,” “The attempts of Shaftsbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, although
incomplete and defective, have nonetheless penetrated furthest in the search for the
fundamental principles of all morality.”16 In this regard, Kant did not think that the third
earl of Shaftsbury, for example, was correct, but he did think that his position on the
moral sentiments was worth further scrutiny and development. And with respect to
rationalism, Kant was willing to admit that the Wolffian account of metaphysics was
incomplete because it neglected the phenomenon of sensation.17
A remark from Moses Mendelssohn’s review of Edmund Burke’s A Philosophical
Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful captures this German
zeitgeist:
The theory of human sensations and passions has in more recent times made the greatest
progress, since the other parts of philosophy no longer seem to advance very much. Our
neighbors, and especially the English, precede us with philosophical observations of
nature, and we follow them with our rational inferences; and if it were to go on like this,
namely that our neighbors observe and we explain, we may hope that we will achieve in
time a complete theory of sensation.18

Mendelssohn’s remarks point to a widely held position in the 1760s: moral sentiments
were reducible to rational principles. Reason and sensation were expressions of one and
the same mental power. Kuehn writes, “Some emphasized the sensitive part of this
continuum as basic, though most opted for the intellectual one; but, and this is most
important to remember, all accepted what may be called the ‘continuity thesis’
concerning sensation and cognition.”19 Kant was no exception.
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4,2

Sympathy Sans Principle

Kant’s 1764 Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime falls squarely into
this philosophical zeitgeist. At the beginning of this treatise, Kant notes that the
sentiments of gratification and vexation aroused by external objects rest not with objects
but with feelings. He then suggests that “the field of observation of these peculiarities of
human nature is very extensive and still conceals a rich lode for discoveries,”20 a remark
that foreshadows the “Announcement” concerning the observations of Shaftsbury,
Hutcheson, and Hume. As the title suggests, Kant’s method in the Observations is to
provide an empirical account of moral sentiments, which he will then argue are reducible,
at least in theory, to rational principles.21
The principal feeling under investigation here is a “finer feeling” (feinere Gefühl),
what Kant calls the feeling of the sublime and the beautiful, and which he says
“presupposes, so to speak, a susceptibility of the soul which at the same time makes it fit
for virtuous impulses.”22 The idea that there are finer feelings suggests, of course, that
there are less fine feelings, presupposing susceptibilities of the soul to supererogatory or
vicious impulses. Given this distinction in degree, the feeling of the sublime and the
beautiful is of the same kind as these lesser, more base feelings. As Kant himself notes,
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“In human nature there are never to be found praiseworthy qualities that do not at the
same time degenerate through endless gradations into the most extreme imperfection.”23
In the second section of the Observations, “On the Qualities of the Sublime and
the Beautiful in Human Beings in General,” Kant tells us that “among moral qualities,
true virtue alone is sublime,” although, he says, “there are nevertheless good moral
qualities that are lovable and beautiful and, to the extent that they harmonize with virtue,
may also be regarded as noble, even though they cannot genuinely be counted as part of
the virtuous disposition.”24 For example, he notes that tenderheartedness and a feeling of
sympathy is a beautiful and lovely feeling but not sublime and virtuous. For although
sympathy often leads to virtuous deeds, it is often by coincidence and luck, since the
tenderhearted character does not weigh conflicting duties and hence often flouts higher
duties according to the universal principle of justice:
For suppose that this sentiment moves you to help someone in need with your
expenditure, but you are indebted to someone else and by this means you make it
impossible for yourself to fulfill the strict duty of justice.25

In contrast, if general affection towards humankind becomes a universal principle, under
which all actions are subsumed, Kant notes that “your love towards the one in need
remains, but it is now, from a higher standpoint, placed in its proper relationship to your
duty as a whole. This universal affection is a ground for participating in his ill-fortune,
but at the same time it is also a ground of justice, in accordance with whose precept you
must now forbear this action.” That is to say, from principle we pity the indigent but at
the same time act in accordance with greater obligations.
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It is no accident that Kant broaches the topic of sympathy in this early work. For a
prominent theme of mid and late eighteenth-century thought, both in morality and
aesthetics, is the power of sympathy.26 Shaftsbury, in his response to Hobbes, and whom
Leibniz introduced to the German Enlightenment, was perhaps the first to introduce
sympathy to moral philosophy through his 1699 Investigation Concerning Virtue and
Merit. He famously wrote in The Moralists, A Philosophical Rhapsody that “all things are
united” through sympathy. Forty years later, Hume said in the 1739–40 Treatise that “we
naturally sympathize with others in the sentiments they entertain of us.”27 And in his
Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful of
1756, Burke noted that in observing others, “we are moved as they are moved,” and our
“sympathy must be considered as a sort of substitution.”28 Finally, in the 1759 Theory of
Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith placed sympathy at the base of moral thought and action,
the constitution of moral sense, the possibility of which, he argued, is grounded in
imagination:
Though our brother is upon the rack… it is by the imagination only that we can form any
conception of what are his sensations. Neither can that faculty help us to this any other
way, than by representing to us what would be our own, if we were in his case. It is the
impressions of our own senses only, not those of his, which our imaginations copy. By
the imagination we place ourselves in his situation… we enter as it were into his body,
and become in some measure the same person with him.29
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Sympathy allows us to identify with others, reach a fellow-feeling. It recreates and
heightens our sentiments in such a way that we copy the other’s experience as though it
were our own.30
The British concluded by the 1750s that sympathy is essential to, if not
indistinguishable from, moral sentiment. And yet, sympathy was not irreducible as a
mental faculty. It was an expression of a fundamental power—the imagination. It was
James Arbuckle in his Collection of Letters and Essays of 1728 (first published as
Hibernicus’s Letters in 1722) who, thirty years prior to Burke and Smith, made the
“astonishingly original thought that the imagination is responsible not only for artistic
and aesthetic pleasure but also for the ability to put oneself in the place of others.”31 The
imagination, not sympathy, became a direct response to proponents of egoism, for by the
power of imagination the human being emerges from his subjective shell. Moral
sentiment, for the British, was grounded in the power of imagination.
It is no surprise, then, that Kant recognizes sympathy as a source for praiseworthy
action. As he says in the Observations, “Sympathy and complaisance are grounds for
beautiful actions that would perhaps all be suffocated by the preponderance of a cruder
self-interest.”32 Yet Kant ultimately rejects sympathy as the first principle of moral
judgment. According to the Observations, sympathy is “nevertheless weak and is always
blind.”33 Kant calls it an “adopted virtue,” a beautiful disposition of the soul common to
those human beings with a “good heart.”
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Kant’s criticism of sympathy foreshadows his later remark in the first Critique
that intuitions without concepts are “blind,” suggesting the following. First, Kant thinks
that sympathy leads to arbitrary, inconsistent action because it focuses on the particulars.
It is too myopic in its moral scope, for which reason the sympathetic person will forget
his debts, for instance, in rectifying the ill fortune of others. Hence Kant writes,
True virtue can only be grafted upon principles, and it will become the more sublime and
noble the more general they are. These principles are not speculative rules, but the
consciousness of a feeling that lives in every human breast and that extends much further
than to the special grounds of sympathy and complaisance.34

Second, if sympathy is a blind passion, arbitrarily identifying with the ill-fortunes of
others and moving us to aid all those in need, and if sympathy is grounded in
imagination, Kant is stating, albeit indirectly, that the imagination is a naturally blind,
myopic faculty. The feeling of the beautiful may be grounded in imagination. But if the
feeling of the sublime is a universal affection and universal respect for human beings, the
imagination can only achieve such an expansive, encompassing affection, a feeling for
the universal, with the aid of principles.35 In other words, the imagination must be bound,
tamed, cultivated, and uplifted through normative rules.
Kant’s discussion of the temperaments follows his description of the feelings of
the beautiful and the sublime in the Observations. At least since the eleventh and twelfth
centuries, the domination of one temperament was linked to a species of vice, such as
pride, lust, or greed. In the eighteenth century the Germans continued and developed
research on the temperaments, known as Die Kunst, der Menschen Gemüther zu Lesen.
Contributions, for instance, arose from the Popularphilosophen, Lavatar’s physiognomy
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or the Erfahrungsseelenkunde, Christian Crusius in his Anweisung, vernünftig zu leben,
and Ernst Platner’s Anthropologie. So Kant’s contribution to this “art of reading people”
in the Observations falls directly into this lineage. And it is fitting for an anthropological
work, given the fact that knowledge of the temperaments and their behavioral
motivations could be valuable in prudential affairs, i.e., making something of oneself as a
free being and “using other human beings for one’s purposes.”36
Kant first correlates genuine virtue with melancholy, “a gentle and noble
sentiment, to the extent that it is grounded in that dread which a restricted soul feels if,
full of a great project, it sees the dangers that it has to withstand and has before its eyes
the difficult but great triumph of self-overcoming.”37 He then connects adopted virtue
with the sanguine:
Good heartedness, a beauty and fine susceptibility of the heart to be moved by sympathy
or benevolence in individual cases as occasion demands, is very much subject to the
change of circumstances; and since the movement of the soul does not rest upon a general
principle, it readily takes on different shapes as the objects display one aspect or
another.38

Finally, he suggests that the choleric temperament has a close kinship with a simulacrum
of virtue, since it is often interested in the appearance of virtue for the sake of honor:
He whom one means by the choleric constitution of mind has a dominant feeling for that
sort of the sublime which one can call the magnificent. It is really only the gloss of
sublimity (der Schimmer der Erhabenheit) and a strikingly contrasting coloration, which
hides the inner content of the thing or the person, who is perhaps only bad and common,
and which deceives and moves through its appearance (Schein).39
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These three temperaments correlated with the three types of virtue point to Kant’s
teleological speculation (some have even called it Kant’s theodicy)40 that these
temperamental groups unite in nature, unbeknownst to themselves, “in a painting of a
magnificent expression, where in the midst of great variety unity shines forth, and the
whole of moral nature displays beauty and dignity.”41
Kant’s praise of the melancholic as an expression of genuine virtue is peculiar for
a standard commentary on the temperaments in the 1760s, the height of the German
Enlightenment. For as one scholar notes, “Pietism’s appropriation of melancholy was one
reason why… melancholy was the ‘other’ of the Aufklärung, which defined itself against
especially religious enthusiasm, fanaticism and superstition.”42 But Kant’s appropriation
of melancholy is decisively anti-fanatic. Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky and Fritz
Saxl note that Kant’s description of the melancholic as the polar opposite of the
Renaissance depiction as the conduit of rapturous inspiration and madness, the
precondition for art, prophecy, and philosophy, suggests a more autobiographical
interpretation:
Kant was not untouched, perhaps, by the Renaissance view, but it was rather, in all
probability, a deep feeling of sympathy which led him to endow the melancholy
character, limited though its traits were by tradition, with the stamp of the “sublime”, and,
point by point, to interpret every trait of melancholy as the expression of a great moral
consciousness… The “sadness without cause” was based on his possession of a moral
scale which destroyed personal happiness by the merciless revelation of his own and
others’ worthlessness.43
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Kant’s self-diagnosis of melancholy and its predisposition for moral action run parallel,
as we shall see, to his remarks on hypochondria and its disposition for theoretical inquiry.
Kant’s statement that the melancholic has a “feeling for the sublime,” beyond its
seeming self-conceit, points to the importance of rules and the taming of imagination.
Consider his description of the principled melancholic:
The person of a melancholic frame of mind troubles himself little about how others
judge, what they hold to be good or true, and in that regard he relies solely on his own
insight. Since his motivations take on the nature of principles, he is not easily brought to
other conceptions…. Friendship is sublime and hence he has a feeling for it. He can
perhaps lose an inconstant friend, but the latter does not lose him equally quickly. Even
the memory of an extinguished friendship is still worthy of honor for him.44

The principled melancholic maintains a measured restraint in his commerce with others,
i.e., he tames his imaginative power for sympathy.45 For he holds a persistent indifference
toward petty judgments and fleeting fashions but nevertheless recognizes according to
principle how to respect the inner dignity and worth of human beings. Lacking a
principle, however, the melancholic degenerates: “Seriousness inclines to dejection, piety
to zealotry, the fervor for freedom to enthusiasm,” all characteristics of which will be
marks of a wild imagination in Dreams of a Spirit-Seer.46
The sanguine and choleric temperaments are, by definition, unprincipled. But
Kant’s teleological assumption in the Observations suggests that these temperaments can
be prerequisites for a noble heart, he who has a feeling for the sublime. The sanguine
temperament has a natural predisposition to sympathize with the plight (and pleasure) of
others. He has a powerful imagination for reconstructing the emotions of other human
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beings. With the correct normative restraint of the imagination, the adopted virtue of the
sanguine is capable of becoming the genuine virtue of the melancholic. Likewise, we
witness a choleric character naturally predisposed to imaginatively reconstruct the other’s
perceptions of it. In contrast to the sanguine, who imagines everyone in himself, the
choleric imagines himself in everyone else.47 Yet it seems plausible that with the proper
cultivation of the choleric’s imagination, this temperament can begin to develop a feeling
for the beautiful and, ultimately, the sublime.48
Although the Observations makes no explicit reference to Bildungsvermögen, it
would be wrong to cast it aside as an unimportant clue to Kant’s developing standpoint
on Einbildungskraft. As Paul Guyer notes in his introduction to this work, although the
Observations is disappointing insofar as one might expect an early aesthetic theory
anticipating the mature position in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, it nonetheless
succeeds as an early anthropological treatise, since it lays out Kant’s early views on
human psychology and its affects on moral action.49 What we see is Kant’s early position
on “knowledge of the world” (Weltkenntnis). And thus I think we may infer from what he
says here what his early thoughts on Bildungsvermögen might have been: a blind and
myopic faculty, naturally unprincipled, and predisposed toward enthusiasm and zealotry.
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4,3

Psychopathology

The 1764 “Essay on the maladies of the head,” which Kant published in the
Königsbergische Gelehrte und Politische Zeitungen, is written according to the same
method as the Observations. Here again Kant is more concerned to observe and to
present a taxonomy of phenomena—“onomastic of the frailties of the head”—than to
draw any metaphysical conclusions. It is, in this sense, another early anthropological
work. But in another sense, and quite unlike the Observations, the “Essay” describes
mental processes, not, to be sure, transcendental cognition according to the Critique, but
a “deficiency” or “reversal” of empirical cognition. For this reason, the “Essay” is
important as a contrast to the Critique. Moreover, his descriptions of psychopathology are
cloaked in language that allude to, if not directly implicate, the Bildungsvermögen.
Robert Louden tells us in his introduction to the “Essay” that in late 1763 and
early 1764 a Polish religious fanatic by the name of Jan Pawlikowicz Zdomozyrskich
Komarnicki, who traveled with a little boy and a herd of cows, sheep, and goats, took his
sojourn outside of Königsberg and attracted a great deal of attention. After a serious
stomach illness and a visionary experience provoked by twenty days of fasting, the “goat
prophet” revealed his vow to undertake a seven-year pilgrimage, of which two years
remained to be served at the time. Johann Georg Hamann published a report in 1764
about Komarnicki, in which he referred to the goat prophet as an “adventurer”
(Abenteurer) and gave a critical portrayal of the man’s religious behavior. Hamann’s
report was followed by an anonymous assessment:
According to the judgment of a local scholar, the most remarkable thing in the above note
about the inspired faun and his lad, for such eyes as gladly spy out raw nature, which
commonly becomes very unrecognizable under the discipline to which human beings are
subjected, is—the little wild one, who grew up in the woods, has learned to bid defiance
to all hardships of weather with a joyful liveliness and whose face displays no vulgar
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frankness and has nothing about it of the stupid embarrassment which is an effect result
of servitude or of the forced attentiveness of finer education; and, to be brief, who seems
to be (when one takes away that in which a few people have already corrupted him, by
teaching him to ask for money and to enjoy sweets), a perfect child in that understanding
in which an experimental moralist could wish it, one who would be reasonable enough
not to count the words of Herr Rousseau among the beautiful phantoms until he had
tested them.50

As Louden notes, on the basis of Ludwig Ernst Borowski’s early biography of Kant, this
assessment can be attributed to Kant.51 What is interesting about the assessment is Kant’s
focus not on the goat prophet and religious fanaticism but the anthropological and
pedagogical significance of the “perfect child.”52
The anonymous assessment helps to situate the theme of the “Essay.” In spite of
expectations to the contrary, the “Essay” begins not with a list of psychopathologies but
with a discussion of the simplicity of nature: “The simplicity and frugality of nature
demands and forms only common concepts and a clumsy sincerity in human beings.”53
Nature is simple, innocent like the perfect child. But culture, by contrast, is complex and
deceptive: “Artificial constraint and the luxury of a civil constitution hatches punsters and
subtle reasoners, occasionally, however, also fools and swindlers, and gives birth to the
wise or decent semblance by means of which one can dispense with understanding as
well as integrity, if only the beautiful veil which decency spreads over the secret frailties
of the head or the heart is woven close enough.”54 Culture creates a dissembling cloak, a
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complex artwork or image. As culture and the image grow, genuine virtue and moral
principles diminish in importance.55
In the conclusion of the “Essay” Kant returns to the distinction between nature
and culture. He writes,
The human being in the state of nature can only be subject to a few follies and hardly any
foolishness. His needs always keep him close to experience and provide his sound
understanding with such easy occupation that he hardly notices that he needs
understanding for his actions… The means of leavening for all these corruptions can
properly be found in the civil constitution, which, even if it does not produce them,
nevertheless serves to entertain and aggravate them.56

Maladies of the head are, at least in part, social constructions. If not born in society, they
are at least sustained and nurtured therein. Now we saw in chapter three the way the
imagination inaugurated the concept and concretization of culture. This process was
described through the myths of Adam and Prometheus. For his part, Kant is not
presenting a myth, but he is suggesting that culture is a fabrication, a product, at least in
part, of imagination. Although he rarely broaches the topic of Bildungsvermögen in this
early anthropological work, reducing his focus to a few off-handed remarks, might we be
warranted to read Bildungsvermögen as central to this essay? I think so. For Kant,
Bildungsvermögen helps inaugurate culture, as well as frailties of the head.
Kant begins his onomastic by indicating the milder degrees of the maladies of the
head, namely, a “dull head” (der stumpfe Kopf), an “idiot” (der Dummkopf), and a
“simpleton” (Einfaltspinsel). Each malady represents a paralysis of theoretical or
practical understanding. A dull head, for example, lacks the wit to dress up “the thought
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with all kinds of signs of which several fit it most aptly.”57 He grasps and remembers
concepts, but he cannot express them in poetic form or beautiful prose. The idiot, for his
part, is deficient in theoretical concepts. He cannot judge rightly his experiences. And the
simpleton lacks the practical craftiness in the “techniques with which human beings deal
with one another.”58 He naively assumes everyone to be a good person like himself and is
thus tricked by swindlers and rogues.
“Folly” (Torheit) is the manifestation of the Greek akrasia. The passions, often
love, ambition, and greed, deemphasize reasons against good action. He knows that these
pursuits are against his better judgment, but he cannot help himself. “Foolishness”
(Narrheit) is “reversed reason” “if the predominant passion is odious in itself and at the
same time insipid enough to take for the satisfaction of the passion precisely that which is
contrary to the natural intention of the passion.” The fool (Narr) is so blinded that he
takes the satisfaction of the desire to be achieved at the moment that he deprives himself
of it. Kant cites Nero as an example: “Nero exposes himself to public mockery by
reciting wretched verses to obtain the poet’s prize and still says at the end of his life:
quantus artifex morior!”59
At the beginning of the “Essay,” Kant writes, “If everything in general depends
on art, fine cleverness (Schlauigkeit) cannot be dispensed with, but sincerity, which in
such relations is only obstructive, can well be done without.”60 What this suggests is that
propriety and social norms are realized through a crafty, clever imagination. And hence
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what ties together the latter frailties, which Kant says are “despised” and “scoffed at,” is
an uncreative, inartistic imagination. Each frailty points to a failure to navigate culture
successfully by playing the game of artful dissemblance. The pretense that each displays
is seen for what it is, namely, pretense. The images that the dull head projects are
unconvincing or fall short of social expectations and norms. As Kant remarks about the
simpleton,
Since intrigue and false devices have gradually become customary maxims in civil
society and have very much complicated the play of human actions, it is no wonder when
an otherwise sensible and sincere man for whom all this cunning is either too
contemptible to occupy himself with it or who cannot move his honest and benevolent
heart to make himself such a hated concept of human nature were to get caught
everywhere by swindlers and give them much to laugh about.61

In the case of folly, the implication is that strong passions attach themselves to our
practical deliberations. The fool knows his best interests, all things considered, but
passion, attached to an image of a future self-interested satisfaction, overrides moral
action. And the fool is so overwhelmed by the passions of greed and arrogance that his
image of himself blinds him to the judgment of others.
There is a question whether treatment is available for the foregoing maladies of
the head. In the case of a dull head, Kant suggests that a cure may be unnecessary, for it
is not a mark of idiocy. He who is deficient in rhetoric may be a brilliant mathematician,
for instance. His imagination is simply directed toward other ends. The simpleton lacks
the craft of manipulating others for his purposes. Kant’s lectures on pragmatic
anthropology would serve him well.62 And in the case of the folly, Kant notes that he
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could still be made a shrewd man (gescheuter Mann). He at least has insight into his
unreasonable passions. But the fool is helpless, for “a silly phantom reigns that reverses
reason’s principles.”63 The fool resembles a “disturbed mind,” marked by a reversal of
cognitive processes, which Kant suggests are incurable and pitied.64
The “reversals” (Verkehrtheiten) are maladies that “one generally looks upon with
pity,”65 since the patient experiences uncontrollable illusions and lacks insight into his
illness. Kant divides these according to the three mental powers. He notes that the
pathology of “derangement” (Verrückung) is a “reversal of the concepts of experience,”
“dementia” (Wahnsinn) a reversal of the power of judgment, and “insanity” (Wahnwitz) a
reversal of reason.66 “All remaining appearances of the sick brain can be viewed,” Kant
writes, “either as different degrees of the cases mentioned or as an unfortunate coalition
of these ills among one another, or, finally, as the engrafting of these ills on powerful
passions, and can be subordinated under the classes cited.”67
As we saw in chapter two, the Critique argues that intuition is a synthetic act of
imagination. The “Essay” presents a similar position, albeit without the sophisticated
terminology employed by Kant almost twenty years later. In his explanation of
derangement, he writes,
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The soul of every human being is occupied even in the healthiest state with painting all
kinds of images of things that are not present, or with completing some imperfect
resemblance in the representation of present things through one or another chimerical
trait which the creative poetic capacity (schöpferische Dichtungsfähigkeit) draws into the
sensation.68

The creative poetic capacity represents (“draws”) images that resemble past images and
fills in aspects that are presented partially or perspectivally.69
Kant goes on in his description of the healthy soul:
One has no cause at all to believe that in the state of being awake our mind follows other
laws than in sleep. Rather it is to be conjectured that in the former case the lively sensible
impressions only obscure and render unrecognizable the more fragile chimerical images,
while they possess their whole strength in sleep, in which the access to the soul is closed
to all outer impressions. It is therefore no wonder that dreams are held for truthful
experiences of actual things, as long as they last. Since they are then the strongest
representations in the soul, they are in this state exactly what the sensations are in being
awake.70

The act of imagination follows the same laws in both sleep and waking life In waking
life, the force and liveliness of outer impressions “obscure” or “render unrecognizable”
the false images arising from, presumably, inner impressions, impressions which, during
the dream-state, have full affect on the mind. For Kant, in both the anthropological
writings and the Critique, every experience is constituted partially by imaginative
chimera, even the veridical ones. Everyone lives, to some extent, in his own fantastical
world.
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Kant’s presupposition is that the creative poetic capacity is always active,71 its
chimera constantly permeating our experiences. In this regard, Monique David-Ménard
writes,
The interesting aspect of all these fantasts, these daydreamers who let their dreams
markedly color their grasp on reality, is to make us understand that madness is the
inversion, of relative weight, of our perceptions and dreams. For we all have imaginary
and slightly delirious worlds.72

The mad and sane both fill their perception with chimerical images. The distinction rests
on the proper weight given to the internal and external impression.
Kant lists various degrees of the reversals of the concepts of experience. There are
manifestations of reversals in which we can check the fantasy:
When after waking up we lie in an idle and gentle distraction, our imagination
(Einbildung) draws the irregular figures such as those of the bedroom curtains or of
certain spots on a near wall, into human shapes, and this with a seeming correctness that
entertains us in not an unpleasant manner but the illusion (Blendwerk) of which we dispel
the moment we want to.73

In contrast, those who suffer from a greater degree of pathology lose this capacity of
comparison and the power to dispel false images: “If something similar happens in a
higher degree without the attention of the waking person being able to detach the illusion
in the misleading imagination (täuschenden Einbildung), then this reversal lets us
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conjecture a fantast (Phantast).”74 The difference between the daydreamer and the fantast
is subtle but important, for Kant seems to think that the former leads to the latter if we
fail to correct the misleading imagination.
In the 1798 Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Kant writes:
The hypochondriac is a melancholic (visionary) of the most pitiful sort: obstinate, unable
to be talked out of his imaginings, and always running headlong to the physician, who
has no end of trouble with him, and who can calm him only by treating him like a child
(with pills containing bread crumbs instead of medicine). And when this patient, who
despite his perpetual sickliness can never be sick, consults medical books, he becomes
completely unbearable because he believes he feels all the ailments in his body that he
reads about in books.75

Kant warns that attending to or abstracting from “local impressions” has the power to
strengthen or weaken the illusions. If the act of abstraction becomes habitual, the illusion
stays away completely.76 But if the hypochondriac continually focuses on the illusion, he
slips deeper into a world of fantastic visions, no longer able to distinguish the real from
the illusory.77
This failure to check the illusions against reality is the mark of the visionary
(Visionär) or fantast (Schwärmer) whose “ruleless fantasy approaches madness, where
fantasy plays completely with the human being and the unfortunate victim has no control
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at all over the course of his representations.”78 In the “Essay” Kant calls the fantast a
“deranged person with presumed immediate inspiration and a great familiarity with the
powers of the heavens.”79 And in the 1766 Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, he notes that the
visions of the fantast arise from a “fanatical intuition” (fanatischem Anschauen).80 He
suffers from “sensory delusion” (Wahnsinn). Hence, Kant writes, “since the malady of
the fantastical visionary does not really affect the understanding but rather involves the
deception of the senses, the wretched victim cannot banish his illusions by means of
subtle reasoning.”81 A sheer resolution of the mind toward abstraction cannot save the
fantast. He is simply to be pitied.
If we juxtapose the day-dreamer, hypochondriac, and fantast, we see a
progression from a “playful,” “unintentionally mediating” imagination to a progressively
pathological power of intuition. Kant could not have recognized this in the 1760s, but by
the 1798 Anthropology he must have suspected that a “diseased imagination” could
affect—and perhaps permanently damage—intuition, producing a fanatical intuition like
Swedenborg’s.
In derangement sensibility, not understanding, is ill. This is different, however, in
the care of dementia,82 which, Kant says, is an attack on the understanding and “consists
in judging in a completely reversed manner from otherwise correct experience.”83 Cases
of dementia include faulty inferences of intention from behavior: one “ordinarily explains
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the behavior of other human beings through an absurd delusion as referring to himself
and believes that he is able to read out of it who knows what suspicious intentions, which
they never have in mind. Hearing him, one would believe that the whole town is occupied
with him.”84 Thinking back to the Observations, we recall in this context the feeling for
honor, the obsession with the other’s perception of ourselves. Taken to extremes, this
feeling manifests itself as dementia: “An arrogant person is to a certain measure a
demented person who concludes from the conduct of others staring at him in scorn that
they admire him.”85
In insanity, “reason [is] brought into disorder, insofar as it errs in a nonsensical
manner in imagined more subtle judgments concerning universal concepts.”86 Examples
here include “the contrived length of the ocean,” “the interpretation of prophesies,” and
the case in which “there are many underlying correct judgments of experience, except
that, due to the novelty and number of consequences presented to him by his wit, his
sensation is so intoxicated that he no longer pays attention to the correctness of the
connection of these judgments.”87 Insanity is an error of inference. The mind races from
one judgment to the next, failing to note spurious connections. It thus sees syntheses that
do not exist, imagining systematicity and universal and unconditioned grounds.
Kant’s “Essay” appears to be a naïve forerunner of nineteenth-century psychiatry,
and Kant himself playfully invites us to make such an interpretation. But upon closer
inspection, the essay alludes to Kant’s concerns regarding Bildungsvermögen or, as he
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often calls it in the case of madness, Phantasie. Given that we cannot return to a state of
nature, like the goat prophet and his perfect child, the question is how to tame citizens’
imagination. If sensation, ideas, and inferences are all infused with imagination, then the
line drawn between sanity and madness is subtle. If Kant thought his own bout of
hypochondria and melancholia or Rousseau’s moral enthusiasm lay on the brink of
insanity or fanaticism (Schwärmerei), it is no surprise that he would emphasize the
taming of Einbildungskraft in transcendental philosophy, binding it, as we saw in chapter
two, according to universal and necessary rules of the understanding.
Kant’s life testifies to his conviction regarding the power of principles. As Kuehn
notes in his biography, Kant was acutely aware of his hypochondria during this time, and
“felt that to escape hypochondriacal states we should go about our ‘daily business’
(Tagesordnung) and concentrate on the things we must do. Our maxim should be to focus
on other matters and especially on philosophical problems, and this, Kant is sure, will
enable us to overcome the states of anxiety to which we might otherwise fall victim.”88
Kant felt that life in accordance with maxims is not simply a source of virtue and a good
character but source of mental health as well.89 If maxims are rules by which we live, if
they structure character, then it is safe to say that Kant thought at this time that maxims
should regulate Bildungsvermögen; they ought to reign in excessive theoretical
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speculation that leads beyond the Hypochondrist (Kant) to the Schwärmer
(Swedenborg).90

4,4

Fanatical Intuition

The 1766 Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics is a strange
treatise. A polemic against mysticism and Emanuel Swedenborg, a Swedish theologian
and mystic, it is also a polemic against metaphysicians. And thus some have suggested
that, title to the contrary, the treatise really exposes the dreams of metaphysics through
the dreams of a spirit-seer.91 But what is particularly odd about the work is Kant’s tone. It
is at times mocking, at times satirical. Kant came close to apologizing for this to
Mendelssohn, who found nothing funny about metaphysics.92 On April 6, 1766, Kant
wrote to Mendelssohn:
The estrangement you express about the tone of my little work proves to me that you
have formed a good opinion of the sincerity of my character, and your very reluctance to
see that character ambiguously expressed is both precious and pleasing to me. In fact, you
will never have to change this opinion. For, though there may be flaws that even the most
steadfast determination cannot eradicate completely, I shall certainly never become a
fickle or fraudulent person, having, during what must have been the largest part of my
life, learned to do without as well as to scorn most of the things that tend to corrupt one’s
character. The loss of self-respect, which originates from the consciousness of an
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undisguised way of thinking, would thus be the greatest evil that could befall me, but
which most certainly never will befall me. Although I am personally convinced with the
greatest clarity and satisfaction of many things which I will never have the courage to
say, I will never say anything that I do not mean.93

Kant was not rescinding his remarks in Dreams, as much as indirectly apologizing for his
uncouth humor. But Kant, for his part, seemed to anticipate Mendelssohn’s reaction. As
he wrote in the Preamble, “Given its subject-matter, it ought, so the author fondly hopes,
to leave the reader completely satisfied: for the bulk of it he will not understand, parts of
it he will not believe, and as for the rest—he will dismiss it with scornful laughter.”94
Dreams testifies to Kant’s growing concern with religious fanaticism and
metaphysical flights of fancy. Yet it also testifies to his continued commitment to nature
as the ultimate criterion of knowledge, a commitment we saw for the first time in his
remarks in his personal copy of the Observations and then again in the “Announcement.”
For this treatise offers refutations from materialist grounds to mysticism and metaphysics,
to the immateriality and existence of spirits to influences from so-called spiritimpressions from a spirit-world. Here, I think, we have convincing evidence that Kant
knew of the dangers inherent to an unbound Bildungsvermögen by 1766, since Kant
traces illusion, psychopathology, fanaticism (Schwärmerei), and the metaphysical claims
of rational psychology to a rogue Phantasie.
This is not to overlook that Dreams is also a treatise on morality. As Kant brushes
aside and mocks his opponents, he slips in hypotheses on the relation between nature and
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morality, facts and obligations, moral and ignoble sentiments, and individual wills and
the general will. These remarks bring us closer to why Kant revised the Transcendental
Deduction from the first to the second edition of the Critique. For if moral impulses arise
from a “spirit-world” of rational beings, and if pseudo-divine messages emerge from a
spirit-world according to the fantast, and if, finally, Bildungsvermögen is the common
conduit in both occurrences, we begin to see the concern that what constitutes a medium
for morality also constitutes a medium for fanaticism. Bildungsvermögen looks like a
purveyor of morality and madness.95
Although it is unnecessary to delve into the details of Kant’s opening analysis of
the concept of spirit (Geist), there are two remarks of interest, both in footnotes, which I
mention here. In the first case, detailing the method of investigation of a concept, Kant
writes, “By noticing with which cases my concept is compatible and with which it is
inconsistent, I hope to unfold the concealed sense of the concept.”96 He then provides a
footnote, noting that the problem with the concept of spirit is that it is doubtful whether a
spirit actually exists and therefore doubtful whether the concept is derived by abstraction
from experience. The question, then, is how such a concept could arise. Kant writes,
There are many concepts which are the product of covert and obscure inferences made in
the course of experience; these concepts then proceed to propagate themselves by
attaching themselves to other concepts, without there being any awareness of the
experience itself on which they were originally based or of the inference which formed
the concept on the basis of that experience. Such concepts may be called surreptitious
concepts. There is a great number of such concepts; some of them are nothing but
delusions of the imagination (ein Wahn der Einbildung).97

95

As I hope is becoming clear, Kant employs different terms for imagination to designate different actions
of the mind. In the context of Dreams where imagination is unbound, Kant calls the imagination Phantasie.
But in the Critique where the imagination is bound by rules, he calls it Einbildungskraft.
96
Kant (2002a), 308; AA, 2: 320.
97
Kant (2002a), 308; AA, 2: 320n.
107

This psychological explanation of the formation of surreptitious concepts is noteworthy
for two reasons. First, it points to the fact that the activities of Einbildung are often
unconscious. As we know from Hume, there are many concepts formed on the basis of
unconscious associations of imagination, concepts that lack verification. Kant’s point is
that the concept of spirit may be a surreptitious concept of Einbildung. Second,
unchecked inferences of Einbildung are reminiscent of Kant’s description of insanity in
the “Essay,” where reason, unbound and “intoxicated,” no longer checks the validity of
the connections of its judgments. An intoxicated reason is therefore an unbound
Einbildung.
The second remark occurs in footnote a few pages later. Kant writes,
The current opinion of the soul which assigns it to a place in the brain, would seem to
have originated chiefly from the fact that, when one engages in deep thought, one has the
distinct feeling that the nerves in the brain are being strained… The reason which has
persuaded people to think that they feel the reflective soul particularly in the brain is,
perhaps, this: all reflection requires the mediation of signs for the ideas which are to be
awakened, if the ideas, accompanied and supported by the signs, are to attain the required
degree of clarity… Now, if the excitation of these signs, which Descartes called ideas
materiales, is really a stimulation of the nerves producing a motion which is similar to the
motion produced by sensation, then it follows that in reflection the tissue of the brain
will, in particular, be forced to vibrate in harmony with the earlier impression, and, as a
result, to grow fatigued.98

Kant does not here mention Einbildung. But the productions of signs that represent the
ideas of reflection implicate Einbildung as their cause. For no other power of the mind
mimics or imitates the stimulation of the senses in order to reproduce a previous senseimpression. This passage, like the previous footnote above, calls to mind the “Essay.” For
here again Kant is alluding to the creative poetic capacity (schöpferische
Dichtungsfähigkeit), which imitates the force or vivacity of the sense-impressions.
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These two footnotes, seemingly different in intent, converge on Einbildung with
the following implication. If signs are stimulations of nerves that replicate stimulations of
sense-impressions, then signs that are produced with a force and liveliness equal to or
greater than sense-impressions will be treated as derivative from experience. And if these
signs are the product of spurious inferences, then Einbildung will infuse experience with
“hypochondriacal exhalations, old wives’ tales and monastery miracles.”99
Bildungsvermögen thus appears, according to Kant’s oft-repeated expression of the
critical period, as a condition for the possibility of veridical and fanatic experiences.
In the first of part of Dreams, which Kant calls “Dogmatic,” the questions
concern the concept of spirit; what it is; the communication between matter and life,
whether this communication is possible; and an explanation for the visions of the spiritseer, whether it is a mental power or psychopathology. The second and third chapter of
part one are particularly important, for Kant there shows that the immaterial spirit-world
is unintuitable for a human being, endowed as he is with sense organs, and that,
correlatively, the spirit-world is incapable of receiving impressions or influences from
material natures. There may be two worlds, Kant admits, a material and intelligible
world, composed of material and spiritual natures, but they are separate communities.
Here is how Kant puts the matter in relation to the seemingly dual nature of the human
soul:
For the representation which the human soul, using an immaterial intuition, has of itself
as a spirit, in so far as it regards itself as standing in relation to beings of a similar nature,
is quite different from the representations it has when the soul’s consciousness represents
itself as a human being by means of an image drawn from the impression made on the
organs of the body and which can only be represented in relation to material things.100
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Foreshadowing central claims of the transcendental philosophy, Kant speculates that
although the subject is one, its membership in two communities entails that it is dualistic
in nature.
The question, however, is how we become aware of this spirit-world, given the
arguments against any direct influence between spirit and material natures. Kant’s answer
is Phantasie: “For these influences can enter the personal consciousness of man, not, it is
true, directly, but, nonetheless, in such a fashion that they, in accordance with the law of
association of ideas, excite those images which are related to them, and awaken
representations which bear an analogy with our senses. They are not, it is true, the spiritconcept itself, but they are symbols of it.”101 Phantasie associates or links spiritual ideas
with symbolic images, analogously, Kant writes, to the “way in which concepts of
reason, which are fairly close to the spirit-concepts, normally assume, so to speak, a
corporeal cloak.”102 The symbolic representations of Phantasie are the mediating link
between the spirit-world and the material-world:
It is not improbable that spirit-sensations may enter consciousness, if they arouse images
in our imagination (Phantasien) which are akin to them. In this way, ideas which are
communicated by means of spirit-influence would clothe themselves in signs of that
language, which the human being normally uses: the sensed presence of a spirit would be
clothed in the images of a human figure; the order and beauty of the immaterial world
would be clothed in the images of our imagination (Phantasien) which normally delight
our senses in life, and so forth.103

Human beings gifted with the power to associate spiritual influences with
symbolic representations are so-called spirit-seers. They are persons “whose organs are
endowed with an exceptionally high degree of sensitivity for intensifying the images of
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the imagination (Bilder der Phantasie), according to the inner state of the soul, and by
means of harmonious movement, and do so to a greater degree than usually happens, or,
indeed, ought to happen with people of sound constitution.”104 These spirit-seers
experience visions caused by spiritual influences, which Swedenborg claims we are in
touch with although often insensitive to, which influences are revealed to consciousness
analogously by the Bilder der Phantasie.105
There are three problems here as Kant sees it. The first problem with these visions
of the spirit-seer is that the “spirit-impression is of necessity so intimately interwoven
with the illusion of imagination (Hirngespinst der Einbildung), that it cannot be possible
to distinguish the element of truth in such an experience from the crude illusions (groben
Blendwerk) which surround it.”106 Second, “such a state would indicate a genuine
malady, for it presupposes a modification in the balance of the nerves which are set in
unnatural motion even by the merely spiritually sensing soul.”107 And third, “it would not
be at all surprising if the spirit-seer were at the same time a fantastical visionary, at least
in respect of the images accompanying these aspirations of his… for representations well
up and burst forth which are by nature alien and incompatible with the representations
which human beings have in the bodily state.”108 In other words, the spirit-seer is a
propagator of false prophesies, a raving madman.
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Reminiscent of the “Essay,” Kant returns in Dreams to the distinction between the
“waking dreamer” and the fantast, or, as he calls him here, the spirit-seer. The difference
here, however, is that Kant no longer claims that the two are different in degree, the
difference being the vivacity of the chimerical images and the capacity to compare these
to veridical outer impressions. In Dreams Kant now states that “spirit-seers…differ
entirely from waking-dreamers, and they differ not merely in degree but in kind. For
spirit-seers, when they are fully awake and often when their other sensations possess the
highest degree of vividness, refer certain objects to external positions among the other
things which they really perceive around them.”109 As Kant sees it, the unconscious
transference of images of Phantasie outside oneself, the movement of inner-images to
outer-objects, is the mark of a fantast.
According to Dreams, the use of outer-sensation has two necessary conditions,
clarity and place. Place, Kant claims, may not always be exact, but it is necessary in order
to represent things as external to ourselves.
This being the case, it is highly probable that our soul, in its representation, transposes the
object of sensation, locating it at the point at which the various lines, which are caused by
the object and which indicate the direction of the impression, converge, when they are
extended.110

In the case of vision, if we take the lines that indicate the direction of light-rays entering
the eye and extend these backwards, then we call their point of intersection the optical
point or the point of divergence. With respect to the representation, we call the lines
indicating the direction in which the sensation is transmitted when it makes an impression
the point of convergence or the focus imaginarius. This, Kant notes, is the capacity to
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determine place in outer sensations, the capacity to extend vibrations of nerves outward
to the point of convergence or the point of imagination (focus imaginarius).
This reference to Newtonian optics helps to explain the illusory experiences of the
spirit-seer. But it is not sufficient. Kant also refers to Descartes’ ideas materiales:
I refer, namely, to the view that all the representations of the faculty of imagination are
simultaneously accompanied by certain movements in the nerve-tissue or nerve-spirit of
the brain. These movements are called ideas materiales. I am referring, in other words, to
the view that all the representations of the faculty of imagination are, perhaps,
accompanied by the concussion or vibration of the subtle element, which is secreted by
the nerve-tissue or nerve-spirit. This concussion or vibration is similar to the movement
which the sensible impression may make and of which it is the copy.111

The implication here is that the point of convergence between ideas materiales or images
of the imagination from inner impressions and veridical representations from outer
impressions differ. In the former case, the point of convergence is inside the subject and,
in the latter case, outside. Kant writes, “In the case of the clear sensations of waking life,
the focus imaginarius, at which the object is represented, is placed outside me, whereas,
in the case of the images of imagination, which I may entertain at the same time as the
clear sensations of my waking life, the focus imaginarius is located within me.”112 This
distinction, the place of the focus imaginarius, is the touchstone for distinguishing
phantasy from reality.
This, Kant thinks, offers an explanation for disturbances of the mind, from which
the spirit-seer suffers. For if the distinctive feature of this malady is the placing of mere
figments of Phantasie outside oneself, thereby taking these chimeras as real, and if
as a result of some accident or malady, certain organs of the brain are so distorted and
their natural balance so disturbed that the motion of the nerves, which harmoniously
vibrate with certain images of the imagination, moves along the lines indicating the
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direction which, if extended, would intersect outside the brain—if all this is supposed,
then the focus imaginarius is located outside the thinking subject, and the image which is
the product of the mere imagination, is represented as an object present to the outer
senses.113

What the spirit-seer really suffers from is a misdirection of nerve-spirits and a reversed
focus imaginarius.114 And hence no matter the degree of vivacity that accompanies the
internal sensation, the spirit-seer is convinced of its presence outside himself.
Kant’s explanation of the visions of the spirit-seer is a diseased Phantasie. These
impressions from a spirit-world, supposedly translated through Phantasie, are in fact the
result of damaged nerve-tissue or sensory organs. Hence Kant writes that “since the
malady of the fantastical visionary does not really affect the understanding but rather
involves the deception of the senses, the wretched victim cannot banish his illusions by
means of subtle reasoning.”115 A sheer resolution of the mind cannot save the spirit-seer,
like the hypochondriac of the “Essay.” He is to be pitied, for he suffers from a “fevered
brain.” Kant writes, “I do not, therefore, blame the reader at all if, instead of regarding
the spirit-seers as semi-citizens of the other world, he simply dismisses them without
further ado as candidates for the asylum.”116
I noted above that Dreams is not simply a skeptical treatise but a moral one as
well. In chapter two of part one, there is a break in the text, just before which Kant notes
that it would be a fine thing if the systematic constitution of the spirit-world could be
inferred necessarily or even probably from some real, generally accepted observation. He
then writes, “If the reader will bear with me, I shall venture such an attempt here. It will,
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admittedly, take me some distance from my path; it will also be far enough removed from
self-evidence. But, in spite of this, it seems to give rise to conjectures of a kind which are
not disagreeable.”117 What follows is an inchoate moral theory on the relation between
the soul as spiritual and benevolent and the soul as human and self-interested.
Kant’s description of the constitution of a moral spirit-world begins with the
observation that there are two powerful forces that move the human heart, forces which
lie outside and inside the human being. On the one hand, the human being often observes
self-interest as the motive of his actions. His actions are instrumental to the satisfaction of
his private ends. But on the other hand, he is sometimes moved by forces outside of
himself, an altruistic force (Gemeinnützigkeit). These altruistic forces “cause the
tendencies of our impulses to shift the focal point of their union outside ourselves and to
locate it in other rational beings.”118 What we observe, in other words, are two separate
and conflicting points of convergence (focus imaginarius) of practical action.
He continues with his observation: “When we relate external things to our need,
we cannot do so without at the same time feeling ourselves bound and limited by a
certain sensation; this sensation draws our attention to the fact that an alien will, so to
speak, is operative within ourselves, and that our own inclination needs external assent as
its condition.”119 This sensation, according to Kant, is a “secret power” that forces us to
direct our will towards the well-being of others or regulate our will in accordance with
the will of another. Consequently,
the focal point at which the lines which indicate the direction of our drives converge, is
therefore not merely to be found within us; there are, in addition, other forces which
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move us and which are to be found in the will of others outside ourselves. This is the
source from which the moral impulses take their rise… As a result, we recognize that, in
our most secret motives, we are dependent upon the rule of the general will. It is this rule
which confers upon the world of all thinking beings its moral unity and invests it with a
systematic constitution, drawn up in accordance with purely spiritual laws.”120

As moral beings we are constrained by the will of others or a general will, whether we act
according to this feeling or not. That is to say, we feel in ourselves a moral sentiment as
part of a moral community, a will harmonizing with other wills under “purely spiritual
laws.”
Now on the basis of this observation and the inference that the private will exists
in a spirit-world, a moral community regulated by spiritual law, Kant thinks he has an
answer to old anomalies and contradictions between the moral and physical
circumstances of human beings: “All the morality of actions, while never having its full
effect in the corporeal life of man according to the order of nature, may well do so in the
spirit-world.” Furthermore,
Since the moral character of the deed concerns the inner state of the spirit, it follows that
it can only naturally produce an effect, which is consonant with the whole of morality, in
the immediate community of spirits. As a result, it would now happen that man’s soul
would already in this life and according to its moral state have to occupy its place among
the spirit-substances of the universe, just as, in accordance with the laws of motion, the
various types of matter in space adopt an order, consonant with their corporeal powers,
relatively to each other.121

Kant concludes that if the community of the soul in the corporeal world is dissolved by
death, life in the spirit-world is a natural continuation of the connection in which it
already exists. And thus the consequences of moral actions practiced in the corporeal
world would re-appear in the spirit-world as effects. “The present and the future would,
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therefore, be of one piece, so to speak, and constitute a continuous whole, even according
to the order of nature.”122
The latter emendation on the communication between a moral, spirit-world and
the corporeal world is, upon first glance, odd. But in the theoretical conclusion of part
one of Dreams Kant provides his explanation for the power of so-called ghost stories,
which, he says, provides the same explanation for his emendation on the nature of a
moral, spiritual community. He writes,
The scales of the understanding are not, after all, wholly impartial. One of the arms,
which bears the inscription: Hope for the future, has a mechanical advantage; and that
advantage has the effect that even weak reasons, when placed on the appropriate side of
the scales, cause speculations, which are in themselves of greater weight, to rise on the
other side. This is the only defect, and it is one which I cannot easily eliminate. Indeed, it
is a defect which I cannot even wish to eliminate.123

The pronouncements by the fantasts and metaphysicians could not have convincing force
if these pronouncements did not harmonize or lend support to wishes or hopes, such as
the hope for life after death and the hope for a morally perfect world. What drives both
Kant’s and the fantast’s wild inferences are the fundamental notion of hope.
Kant’s practical conclusion at the end of the treatise parallels the theoretical
conclusion before it. But here he draws a greater distinction between his position and the
fantast. He first notes that there perhaps has never been a human being who thought that
after life everything comes to an end and who has not hoped for immortality, but he tells
us that “it seems more consonant with human nature and moral purity to base the
expectation of a future world on the sentiments of a nobly constituted soul than,
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conversely, to base its noble conduct on the hope of another world.”124 This naturalistic
foundation of morality, Kant writes, is “moral faith.” And its maxim is the following,
which Kant quotes from Voltaire’s Candide, “Let us attend to our happiness, and go into
the garden and work!”125
Kant’s concluding remarks on hope and his practical maxim for work in this life
for the sake of a perfect moral community recalls the Hebraic notion of the yetser, a
creative capacity tied to the notions of good and evil and time. What Kant does in this
precritical work is tie Bildungsvermögen to morality and temporality. If hope functions as
the satisfaction of a need or desire to transcend present circumstances, Kant’s suggestion
is that this satisfaction be grounded in character or the moral state of the soul. Since the
proof of the existence of an after-life transcends the limits of human understanding,
which Kant thinks he has demonstrated in the first part of Dreams, rational faith would be
to hope for a future moral community based on present deeds. Even if one’s actions
produce no immediate change, one can reasonably hope for positive consequences in the
future, so long as it remains possible to observe this change in the order of nature.
Like the “Essay,” Dreams comes close to identifying the moral enthusiast with
the religious fantast. In Dreams both the enthusiast and fantast are subject to a great
degree of sensitivity from spiritual influences. Both rely on the medium of
Bildungsvermögen to translate these spiritual influences into symbols. But if this is the
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Kant (2002a), 359; AA, 2: 373.
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case, then the objections Kant raises against the fantast ought equally to apply to the
sensitive feelings of the moral enthusiast. What, then, is to prevent us from sending the
man of moral sentiments to the asylum? Are the words of Hudibras not equally pertinent
here?—“If a hypochondriacal wind should rage in the guts, what matters is the direction
it takes: if downwards, then the result is a f—; if upwards, an apparition or an heavenly
inspiration.”126

4,5

Concluding Remarks

I noted that Kant did not so much have a position during the 1760s as much as he was
searching for one. Yet there are a few conclusions concerning Bildungsvermögen that we
may draw from these three precritical works. First, it is clear that Kant did not hold
Bildungsvermögen in the highest regard during the 1760s. It is a faculty naturally
unbound by principle; it moves us to act arbitrarily, like the good-hearted soul of the
Observations who means well but lacks a firm, steadfast character.127 Second, of all the
faculties, Kant pegs Bildungsvermögen as the medium between nature and spirit. This is
evident from Kant’s treatment of the temperaments in the Observations. What is
traditionally understood to be a mixture and balance of phlegm, yellow and black bile,
and blood, Kant adopts and correlates with behaviors of Bildungsvermögen. Thus the
melancholic, for instance, expands his moral imagination with the help of principles
beyond the particular (beneficence toward the human being) to the universal (beneficence
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Kant (2002a), 336; AA, 2: 348.
Cf. Kant (2007), 35; AA, 2: 222: “The person of a sanguine frame of mind has a dominant feeling for
the beautiful. His joys are therefore laughing and lively. When he is not jolly, he is discontent and he has
little acquaintance with contented silence. Variety is beautiful, and he loves change. He seeks joy in himself
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127

119

for humanity). And in the “Essay” and Dreams Kant locates the cause of a wild
Bildungsvermögen (Phantasie) in nerve imbalances and damaged sensory organs but also
suggests that Bildungsvermögen is the link of communication between nature and a
spiritual (moral) community.
The link between spirit and nature and its inherent lawlessness is one explanation
for the zurückweichen between 1781 and 1787. But then the question is, What explains
his position in the first edition of the Critique? What moves Kant to place
Einbildungskraft in such a prominent role in the first edition of the Transcendental
Deduction? This is the question to which I turn now.
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5,

From Phantasie to Verstandes-Dichtungskraft

A greater faculty of invention can be called FERTILE (fecund); one inclined to chimeras can be
called EXORBITANT (extravagant, rhapsodic); one which avoids these can be called
ARCHITECTONIC.
—Alexander Baumgarten, Metaphysics, §592
These operations belong to Dichtungsvermögen; a creative power that, as it is generally
acknowledged, appears to have a large sphere of efficacy. It is the self-active Phantasie. And
according to the explanation of Herr Girard, without doubt an essential ingredient of genius (in
the larger meaning of the word).
—J. N. Tetens, Philosophical Essays on Human Nature and its Development, 107

5,1

The Transcendental Turn: Theoretical Implications

Looking at Kant’s work from the 1760s, we might find it hard to believe that he could
grant a prominent place to Einbildungskraft in the 1781 Critique. But from the advantage
of hindsight, not to mention the exegesis of chapter two, we know better. We know Kant
situates Einbildungskraft not only within the critical project but also at the center of the
1781 Transcendental Deduction. So the question is, Why? What caused Kant to ignore
the warning signs of the 1760s?
In 1770 Kant submitted and publicly defended his Inaugural Dissertation for the
position of Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Königsberg, the
position he had coveted since at least 1755. Although drafted hastily to satisfy academic
requirements, the Dissertation marks a watershed moment in Kant’s thinking, the
movement from the precritical to the critical philosophy. Kant himself noted this when, in
a letter of 13 October 1797 to Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk, he wrote: “I agree to your
121

proposal to publish a collection of my minor writings, but I would not want you to start
the collection with anything before 1770, that is, my dissertation on the sensible world
and the intelligible world, and so on.”1 What, then, distinguishes the Dissertation from
prior writings?
Here for the first time Kant makes a clear distinction between the faculty of
intellect and the faculty of sensibility. No longer holding the continuity thesis between
sensations and concepts, Kant now claims that “sensibility is the receptivity of a subject
in virtue of which it is possible for the subject’s own representative state to be affected in
a definite way by the presence of some object. Intelligence (rationality) is the faculty of a
subject in virtue of which it has the power to represent things which cannot by their own
quality come before the senses of that subject.”2 According to the Dissertation, sensibility
is a passive function of the mind, the capacity to receive sensations from objects, but
intellect is an active, spontaneous faculty, a power to represent concepts a priori. The
implication is that things represented sensitively are things represented as they appear,
and things represented intellectually are represented as they are. Kant calls the former
phenomena and the latter noumena.
If we compare the 1770 Dissertation to the 1781 Critique, we note that much of
what Kant says about sensibility does not change. Indeed, his commentary on the
elements of sensibility (sensualitas) is repeated verbatim in the Transcendental Aesthetic.
But if Einbildungskraft is intimately connected to the formation of appearances,
according to the Critique, then this suggests that as early as 1770 Kant thought that

1
2

Kant (1967), 239; AA, 13: 463; AA, 12: 207–8.
Kant (2002a), 384; AA, 2: 392.
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Einbildungskraft was a necessary activity for the construction of experience. The
problem, however, is that Kant never explicitly mentions Einbildungskraft in the
Dissertation.
Foreshadowing the Critique, Kant notes that “in a representation of sense there is,
first of all, something which you might call the matter, namely, the sensation, and there is
also something which may be called the form, the aspect (species) namely of sensible
things which arises according as the various things which affect the senses are coordinated by a certain natural law of the mind.”3 Yet if sensibility is the receptivity of
matter, the question is what operates according to this innate law, which supposedly
coordinates the matter into form. Kant emphasizes the law, that is, an “internal principle
of the mind,”4 by which the sensations coalesce into a representational whole. And he
says that in the case of sensible things and phenomena, “that which precedes the logical
use of the understanding is called appearance (apparentia), while the reflective
cognition, which arises when several appearances are compared by the understanding, is
called experience.”5 But this still leaves undetermined the precise faculty behind the form
of appearances.
We might argue that Kant considered the understanding to be the formative
faculty of appearances. But there are a few problems here. In the Dissertation there are
two uses of the understanding, a logical use and a real use. Kant writes,
In so far as that which belongs to the understanding is concerned, it must above all be
carefully noted that the use of the understanding, or the superior faculty of the soul, is
two-fold. By the first of these uses, the concepts themselves, whether of things or
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Kant (2002a), 384; AA, 2: 392–3. Cf. Kant (2002a), 385; AA, 2: 393: “The form… is not an outline or
any kind of schema of the object, but only a certain law, which is inherent in the mind.”
4
Kant (2002a), 385; AA, 2: 393.
5
Kant (2002a), 386; AA, 2: 394.
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relations, are given, and this is the REAL USE. By the second use, the concepts, no
matter whence they are given, are merely subordinated to each other, the lower, namely,
to the higher (common characteristic marks), and compared with one another in
accordance with the principle of contradiction, and this is called the LOGICAL USE.6

What is novel here is not the logical use of the understanding, the power to analyze the
intention of concepts or explicate their extension, rendering clarity and distinctness as
Christian Wolff, for instance, understood it.7 Rather, it is the real use, the claim that there
are concepts “given by the very nature of the pure understanding.”8 Are these given
concepts, then, rules by which the understanding coordinates sensations?
In paragraph eight of section two, Kant distinguishes between a propaedeutic to
metaphysics and metaphysics proper. The Dissertation, he notes, is a propaedeutic, which
teaches the distinction between sensitive cognition and intellectual cognition. He then
writes,
Since, then, empirical principles are not found in metaphysics, the concepts met with in
metaphysics are not to be sought in the senses but in the very nature of the pure
understanding, and that not as innate concepts but as concepts abstracted from the laws
inherent in the mind (by attending to its actions on the occasion of experience), and
therefore as acquired concepts. To this genus belong possibility, existence, necessity,
substance, cause etc., together with their opposites or correlates.9

Now we could argue that understanding follows the “laws inherent in the mind.” But the
problem is that understanding seems to be a derivative activity, an abstraction from the
laws. Appearances thus have form prior to conceptual recognition. As Kant puts it, “But
things which, since they do not touch the senses, contain only the singular form of
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Kant (2002a), 385; AA, 2: 393.
In the Dissertation, Kant calls out Wolff for failing to recognize more than a logical distinction between
sensible cognition and intelligible cognition, namely, the distinction between phenomena and noumena:
“From this one can see that the sensitive is poorly defined as that which is more confusedly cognized, and
that which belongs to the understanding as that which there is a distinct cognition. These are only logical
distinctions which do not touch at all the things given, which underlie every logical comparison.” See Kant
(2002a), 387; AA, 2: 394–5.
8
Kant (2002a), 387; AA, 2: 395.
9
Kant (2002a), 387–88; AA, 2: 395.
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sensibility, belong to pure intuition (that is to say, an intuition devoid of sensation but not
for that reason deriving from the understanding).”10
In order to account for the form of an appearance or a pure intuition, Kant needs a
spontaneous power that is nonetheless independent from the understanding, a power that
coordinates sensations according to innate laws, which laws are preconceptual and
coordinate the sensations such that that they are amenable to reflective cognition (provide
the license according to which a priori concepts are applied to appearances). As readers
of the first Critique know, this is precisely the role of Einbildungskraft by 1781. But
perhaps we can excuse Kant’s omission of Einbildungskraft from the Dissertation. After
all, and as we saw in the last chapter, this power was associated with irrationality and
immorality. It was the wild Phantasie of Swedenborg that was the mark of fanaticism and
sensory delusion (Wahnsinn).
And yet, and perhaps unbeknownst to Kant, those same passages from Dreams of
a Spirit-Seer that denounce Phantasie contain the answer to the problem of the
Dissertation. For in Dreams Kant speculated that “two kinds of representation [namely,
spirit-representation and corporeal-representation] belong to the same subject and they
are linked with each other. The possibility of this being the case can, to a certain extent,
be rendered intelligible if we consider the way in which the higher concepts of reason,
which are fairly close to the spirit-concepts, normally assume, so to speak, a corporeal
cloak in order to represent themselves in a clear light.”11 In 1766 Kant described
Bildungsvermögen as a power to bridge intellectual representations and sensible
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Kant (2002a), 390; AA, 2: 397, my emphasis.
Kant (2002a), 326; AA, 2: 339.
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representations. But perhaps because of its negative associations or, at the very least, its
hasty composition, he left this power out of the Dissertation.
Let us compare Dreams to the Dissertation. In Dreams, Kant suggested an
analogy between the translation of concepts of reason into sensible representations, on
the one hand, and spiritual influences into divinations of the spirit-seer, on the other, both
of which, he said, are possible through Bildungsvermögen.12 In the Dissertation, Kant is
no longer concerned with influences from the spirit-world revealed to the spirit-seer, but
he is suggesting that inherent (spiritual) laws of the mind are revealed in sensible
representations, i.e., a priori forms of sensibility (pure intuition) and a priori concepts of
the understanding. In a sense, he is suggesting that there are spirit-influences, namely,
internal activities of the mind occasioned by the receptivity of sensations. This becomes
clear by the Corollary of part three, “On the principles of the form of the sensible world,”
where he writes,
Finally, the question arises for everyone, as though of its own accord, whether each of the
two concepts [space and time] is innate or acquired. The latter view, indeed, already
seems to have been refuted by what has been demonstrated. The former view, however,
ought not to be rashly admitted, for it paves the way for a philosophy of the lazy, a
philosophy which, by appealing to a first cause, declares any further enquiry futile. But
each of the concepts has, without any doubt, been acquired, not, indeed, by abstracting
from the sensing of objects (for sensation gives the matter and not the form of human
cognition), but from the very action of the mind, which coordinates what is sensed by it,
doing so in accordance with permanent laws. Each of the concepts is like an immutable
image (typus), and, thus, each is to be cognized intuitively. For sensations, while exciting
this action of the mind, do not enter into and become part of the intuition. Nor is there
anything innate here except the law of the mind, according to which it joins together in a
fixed manner the sense-impressions made by the presence of the object.13
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Cf. Kant (2002a), 326; AA, 2: 338–9: “This heterogeneity between spirit-representations and those
which belong to bodily life of man need not, however, be regarded as an impediment serious enough to
prevent all possibility of our becoming aware, from time to time, even during this present life, of the
influences which emanate from the spirit-world. For these influences can enter the personal consciousness
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association of ideas, excite those images which are related to them, and awaken representations which bear
an analogy with our senses. They are not, it is true, the spirit-concept itself, but they are symbols of it.”
13
Kant (2002a), 400; AA, 2: 406.
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Space and time, the forms of sensation, are “acquired concepts” similar to the concepts of
possibility, necessity, causation, etc., which are abstracted from the action of the mind
occasioned by sensation. Given the affection from outside, there is an affection from
inside, a spirit-influence, so to speak, which produces an “immutable image” or pure
intuition.
Now in his elucidation of the concepts of space and time, Kant writes that they are
“pure intuitions,” “originary intuitions,” and the “imaginary.” With respect to time in
particular, he notes, “Now, although time, posited in itself and absolutely, would be an
imaginary being, yet, in so far as it belongs to the immutable law of the sensible things as
such, it is in the highest degree true.”14 In one respect, then, space and time, posited
independent from the sensations they coordinate, are nothing but original products of
Einbildungskraft (though Kant does not say as much here). They are, in this sense, no
different from the sensory delusions of Dreams. And yet, in another respect, space and
time are sensible forms according to inherent laws of the mind, which Kant thinks are
intrinsic to the nature of the human being, and hence in the “highest degree true.” We
might say that they are sensory delusions that everyone shares, madness in numbers.
One final point: Kant told us in Dreams that we distinguish objects of the senses
from objects of Bildungsvermögen by the place of the focus imaginarius. He there
suggested that the distinctive feature of derangement was that “the victim of the
confusion places mere objects of his own Einbildung outside himself, taking them to be
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Kant (2002a), 395; AA, 2: 402.
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things which are actually present before him.”15 Now, in the Dissertation, the implication
is that space and time are objects of Bildungsvermögen, which the human mind places
outside itself. The question, then, is why the mind places space and time, imaginary
beings, as outside the subject. Kant does not answer this question in the Dissertation. But
in Dreams he offers a material explanation: acute damage to the brain causes the motion
of the nerves of an internal influence to imitate the motion of an external impression.
Perhaps something similar is happening in the construction of appearances. The influence
of Bildungsvermögen on the reception of sensations imitates the force and vivacity of
external impressions, thereby projecting space and time as external to the subject in the
course of experience (a transfer of ideality to reality). If this is correct, the only difference
between madness and the construction of experience is the inherent laws or, more to the
point, the source of these laws.16

5,2

The Transcendental Turn: Moral Implications

If Kant presupposes Bildungsvermögen for the construction of experience in 1770 but
was hesitant to say as much, the same can be said with respect to the metaphysics of
morals, the first principle of morality, and its application. The Dissertation tells us that
the dogmatic end of the pure understanding is the positing of a paradigm, measure, or
“noumenal perfection.” This perfection, Kant says, has two senses:
The theoretical sense or in the practical sense. In the former sense, it is the Supreme
Being, GOD; in the latter sense, it is MORAL PERFECTION. Moral philosophy,
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Kant (2002a), 333; AA, 2: 346.
This interpretation is consistent with Kant’s repetitive reference in the Critique to “birth certificates” and
similar metaphors for the source of the pure categories. For an interesting interpretation of Kant’s use of
birth certificates and the pedigree of the categories in the Metaphysical Deduction, see Proops (2003).
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therefore, in so far as it furnishes the first principles of judgment, is only cognized by the
pure understanding and itself belongs to pure philosophy.17

Theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy have parallel ends, perfections as
standards of measure. Given this a priori perfection of practical philosophy, Kant
criticizes Epicurus and Shaftsbury in this same section for reducing moral principles to
the sensation of pleasure and pain. Kant’s point is that there is, like theoretical
metaphysics, a strict dichotomy of a priori and a posteriori judgment in the metaphysics
of morals.
We saw in the last chapter that Kant was a moral sentiment thinker during the
1760s. But I noted there that even as he held this position, he found it untenable, at least
without further supplement, since it grounded moral feeling in the capacity for sympathy
and, ultimately, the imagination—an erratic, unprincipled, and myopic faculty. Kant’s
Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie of the early 1770s testify to his growing dissatisfaction
with moral feeling. For by 1770, he completely jettisons moral feeling as the ground of
moral action. In the Reflexionen, he writes,
The moral feeling is not an original feeling. It rests on a necessary inner law, which itself
is observed and felt from an outer standpoint. Likewise in the personhood of reason: there
one feels universally and feels his individuality as an accidental subject, like looking at
an accident of the universal.18

Moral feeling is now grounded in a necessary inner law, itself independent from
sensation. Moral philosophy is thus based on law or a priori principles.19
Shaftsbury and Smith found morality in a universal feeling of sympathy or
benevolence. According to this system, we might ask how to cultivate this feeling in
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Kant (2002a), 388; AA, 2: 396.
Kant (1900–), AA, 19: 103.
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Cf. Kant (1900–), AA, 19: 108: “Alle moralitaet beruht auf ideen.”
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ourselves in order to acquire the right dispositions. But this is not where Kant wants to
begin. To the contrary,
The first investigation is: which are the first principles of moral judgment (theoretical
rules of judgment), that is, which are the highest maxims of ethical life (Sittlichkeit), and
which is the highest law.20

Kant’s move now is first and foremost to find the supreme law of morality, and only then
to bind sympathy (and hence Bildungsvermögen) by this supreme principle:
2. Which is the rule of application (practical application of judgments) toward an object
of judgment. (sympathy toward another and an impartial observer.)21

Bildungsvermögen comes into play in the second step of morality, namely, application.
It is unclear from the Dissertation how the inherent laws of the mind guide
Bildungsvermögen. All we are told there is that space and time are forms of sensibility,
though also imaginary beings. We have to read between the lines and infer that
Bildungsvermögen is the original producer of space and time. The Reflexionen zur
Moralphilosophie is no different. It throws no direct light on the guidance of
Bildungsvermögen. Consider the following passage.
The a priori concept alone has universal truth and is the principle of rules. In the case of
virtue, a judgment is therefore only possible according to a priori concepts. The
empirical judgment according to intuitions in images or according to experience yields no
laws (which laws call for a concept a priori for the sake of judgment), but rather merely
examples.22

Accordingly,
The highest principles of moral judgment are therefore rational, and yet only formal
principles. They determine no purpose, rather only the moral form of each purpose; thus
according to this form there appears, in concreto, material first principles.23
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On one hand, the supreme principle is universal, formal. It does not determine an action
or purpose but is the form of purpose as such. On the other, empirical intuitions fail to
provide necessary laws but only examples or cases.
But if practical philosophy parallels theoretical philosophy, we should expect
Kant to offer an explanation how the a priori principle of morality becomes concretized.
There ought to be a bridge between the supreme principle of morality and particular
cases. Sure enough, in the Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie, Kant alludes to this
concretization:
All morality rests on ideas, and its image that rests on the human being is always
imperfect. In the divine understanding, the images are self-intuitions and therefore
original images (Urbilder).
The ideal is the representation of the object of the senses that conforms to ideas
and the intellectual perfection in God. Ideals conform only to objects of the
understanding and are only for human beings (and others of the same) fictions. It is a
fiction (Erdichtung), in order to posit as concrete the ideas in intuition.24

For Kant, an ideal is a concretized representation of intellectual perfection (intellectuellen
Vollkommenheit). Of course, since the ideal is not real (empirically verifiable), Kant calls
it a fiction (Erdichtung). Yet this fiction is a powerful motivation for moral action:
The powerful medium, toward which human beings are driven for the sake of the moral
good, is thus the representation of pure virtue (reinen Tugend), in order that they may
highly esteem and clearly see this medium (only such that the human being himself can);
and in so far as one is guided by this medium and can also point to it, this is the only
medium from which others become esteemed and loved.25

If there is a gulf between sensibility and intellect in the Dissertation, which only
Bildungsvermögen could fill, there is a similar gap between ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and
the metaphysics of morals (Moralität), a gap that calls for Bildungsvermögen. In the case
of practical philosophy, Kant is pointing to Bildungsvermögen as the power to project an
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Kant (1900–), AA, 113.
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image of pure virtue, the perfect human being, a powerful medium (kräftiges Mittel), as
Kant puts it, which motivates human beings to act in accordance with the supreme
principle of morality. Hence, although Kant does not say so here explicitly, it follows that
Bildungsvermögen is the bridge between Sittlichkeit and Moralität.
I think we can understand why Kant would be hesitant to point directly to
Bildungsvermögen, given his remarks of the 1760s. But the implications from the
Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie seem as clear as those of the Dissertation. What we are
starting to see is a peculiar power, a power that is constitutive to being human, in its
activities of both rationality and madness and virtue and vice.

5,3

Lectures on Logic

But the new activities of Bildungsvermögen in the early 1770s extend beyond the
construction of experience and ethical life. Kant also found a place for it in logic. The socalled Blomberg Logic, based, as all Kant’s logic lectures were, on Georg Friedrich
Meier’s 1752 Excerpts from the Doctrine of Reason, contains numerous passages on
aesthetic distinctness or the extensive clarity of a concrete whole, the result of which
depends on Bildungsvermögen.26
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In his introduction to Kant’s Lectures on Logic, J. Michael Young claims that the Blomberg Logic is
likely dated from the early 1770s, although certainly not before 1770, given a quotation from the Inaugural
Dissertation as well as references to other works published as late as 1770. The text itself refers to Heinrich
Ulrich Freiherr von Blomberg who completed his studies in Königsberg by 1764. It is therefore clear that
he himself could not have written the manuscript. Its author is unknown, likely a copy of a copy.
Transcripts of Kant’s lectures received wide circulation. At best, we have fair copies, since poorer students
who attended Kant’s lectures often composed the transcripts, made copies, and then sold them to the
wealthier students who made emendations and further copies. See Kant (1992), xxiii–vii.
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The logic lectures repeat time and again that there are particular ways that we
cognize concepts, namely, clearly or obscurely and distinctly or indistinctly. Kant opens
the first part of the Blomberg Logic by saying,
Distinctness can occur
1st in intuiting, when we can distinguish well the mark of that which we intuit. That is
distinctness in intuition
2nd in thinking, when we combine clear concepts and representations with intuiting. Often
one can intuit something distinctly without thereby thinking of something distinctly.27

Kant then elaborates:
Distinctness, furthermore, is a perfection of cognition, and it has the peculiarity of
belonging to logical as well as to aesthetic perfection as a necessary property. An
extensive distinctness, which one encounters in the beautiful understanding, is an
aesthetically pure one [;] intensive distinctness, however, which one finds in the deep
understanding, belongs to logical perfection… Beauty of the understanding rests on the
fact that one has many marks of a thing. Depth of the understanding, however, requires
only that some marks be known clearly, and at the same time distinctly, and that it is easy
to have insight into them.28

The notion of distinctness (Deutlichkeit) extends to both concepts and intuitions. On the
one hand, a clear (conscious) and distinct concept is a representation that “also extends to
the parts.” In accordance with traditional (Wolffian) logic, Kant’s claim is that
distinctness is a result of conceptual analysis.29 That is, distinct representations reveal the
intention of the concept, the partial concepts (Teilbegriffe) or marks (Merkmale) that are
contained therein. To perform and complete such an analysis is to achieve logical
perfection.30 But on the other hand, a clear and distinct intuition is an extension, addition,
or synthesis of marks. Kant calls this an aesthetic perfection. But since this is a perfection
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of an intuition, what Kant calls a singular representation, we might also call it a
“complete determination of the singular.”31
Lecturing on the fifth section of Meier’s Excerpts, “Of the Clarity of Learned
Cognition,” Kant provides further commentary on the notions of intensivity and
extensivity but this time with respect to immediate and mediate marks: “If a thing can be
cognized through a certain mark without the mediation of a mark different from this
mark, then such a mark is immediate. A mediate mark, on the other hand, is a mark of a
mark.”32 Immediate marks are grasped intuitively, through what we might call an
instantaneous apprehension.33 But mediate marks are grasped conceptually. Kant’s
example is that perishability is a mediate mark of the concept man. It is a more general
mark under which another mark falls.
Now what is important here is the relation between mediate marks and the
relation between immediate marks. Mediate marks, Kant tells us, are related by
subordination. Through analysis, we structure our concepts into a subordination of
species and genus relations, relative universality and particularity. But immediate marks
are related through coordination, i.e., placed next to one another. Furthermore,
In a series of subordinate marks, i.e., of marks ordered beneath one another, there is
always a first [,] i.e., the concepts are restricted. In coordination, however, there is no
restriction. There are uncountably many marks that belong to a thing immediately, and
our understanding is not in a position to have insight into all properties and to determine
them exactly.34
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A series of subordinated marks is limited or finite. It is composed of an immediate mark
or nota infima and a series of grounding relations ending in an unground ground or nota
summa. A coordination of marks, however, is unlimited or infinite.35
In both a coordination and subordination of marks, Kant prescribes measure or
perfection. Aesthetic perfection is perfect according to the laws of sensibility, just as
logical perfection is perfect according to the laws of the understanding. Perfection in the
latter sense is expressed by a subordination of marks in a finite series of grounding
relations (a result of reflective analysis according to the laws of non-contradiction and
identity). Kant’s point is that constructing these relations is how the understanding ought
to function.36 But what is perfection in the former sense, according to the laws of
sensibility? We saw in the Dissertation that the laws of sensibility (those inherent laws of
the mind) are represented in experience in spatial and temporal relations. Aesthetic
perfection, then, appears to be a coordination of marks intuitively grasped, at the very
least, in spatial and temporal relations. The coordination must therefore be circumscribed
because an infinite intuition is antithetical to spatiality and temporality, relations
constitutive to human finitude. The poet therefore knows precisely how many
descriptions and characteristics to use in his poem without overwhelming sensible
intuition.37
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As we shall see, these differences between subordination and coordination will be crucial arguments in
the Transcendental Aesthetic of the first Critique for distinguishing concepts from the a priori forms of
space and time.
36
At least in the understanding’s logical use, which is precisely what these lectures are designed to explain
and promote. They are lectures, after all. Kant is teaching his students how to think properly.
37
We shall see below, in our consideration of Baumgarten’s Metaphysics and Aesthetics, that there are far
more criteria to aesthetic perfection than spatial and temporal restrictions.
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(This dissertation will not address Kant’s claims in the Critique of the Power of
Judgment. But I note here that the characteristics Kant uses in these lectures to
distinguish an aesthetic perfection from a logical perfection anticipate claims in the third
Critique:
No one had yet been able accurately to combine, to determine, and to discover the correct
measure of aesthetic perfection with logical perfection. That involves much delicacy.
What promotes life, i.e., what brings our activity into play, as it were, pleases… The
greater art of taste consists in now making sensible what I first expounded dryly, in
clothing it in objects of sensibility, but in such a way that the understanding loses nothing
thereby.38

Aesthetic perfections are lively, stirring, moving, whereas logical perfections seem dry
and dead. Aesthetic perfections are beautiful, whereas logical perfections are devoid of
any aesthetic feeling. Aesthetic perfections are concrete, whereas logical perfections are
abstract. The point is that there is something intrinsically valuable and desirable in an
aesthetic perfection even if we cannot discover the way in which these perfections are
combined, even if, indeed, they often seen mutually exclusive:
When the poet has made for me the best, most stirring, most lively representations of
spring, when he has spoken of lowing, grazing herds, of tenderly rustling zephyrs, of
fragrant meadows, etc., etc., then my cognition is aesthetically perfect. It is beautiful, but
not distinct. I have not thereby attained any distinct insight concerning the ground and
causes of spring.39

In the Blomberg Logic, Kant recognizes and appreciates the separate autonomy of
aesthetic and logical perfection, but he does not know how they come together in a “free
play” of Einbildungskraft, although he also suggests that they must since moral
perfection “rests on logical and aesthetic perfection taken together.”40)
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Kant extends his treatment of the coordination of marks beyond art and aesthetics.
The mathematician too acts synthetically, a fact Kant will exploit as an analogy to the
transcendental philosophy in the first Critique. But in contradistinction to the artist, who
Kant finds disposed to excess, which we often sanction, the mathematician employs
“precision” (Abgemeßenheit) in coordination. Kant writes: “A cognition is precise, then,
when it has not too many marks and not too few.”41 “Precision is thus nothing other than
a rule of economy, which just for that reason has a certain internal beauty; it is to be
found especially in mathematics, geometry, and mechanics.”42
We can see precision in mathematics at work in the consideration of constructing
concepts, that is, when we consider the coordination of mathematical properties through
synthesis:
In synthesis we produce and create a concept, as it were, which simply was not there
before, [one that is] completely new both quoad materiam and also quoad formam [;] and
at the same time we make it distinct. All concepts of the mathematicians are of this kind,
e.g., the concepts of triangle, square, circle, etc.43

Synthesis is the procedure by which we extend our concepts both formally and
materially. A synthetic procedure both adds predicates to a concept, adhering to logical
consistency and thus demonstrating its logical possibility (the form of a concept) and
constitutes the concept into an object, demonstrating its real possibility (the matter of a
concept).44 A paradigm example of such a synthesis can be seen from geometry. The
concept of a triangle is, as Kant puts it in the first Critique, “the composition of three
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straight lines in accordance with a rule.”45 The definition of a triangle expresses both its
logical properties (logical possibility) and how it should be materially constructed in
accordance with a rule (real possibility). The rule, Kant seems to think, will act as a
constraint on the act of synthesis (the coordination of marks), thereby assuring precision
and perfection in the construction and intuition of the triangle.
Like the Dissertation and the Reflexionen zur Moralphilosophie, the question here
is, What mental capacity acts according to the rules of mathematics and aesthetics? What
power of the mind forms material according to mental laws? We know from the
Dissertation that sensibility is merely a passive capacity of the mind to receive
sensations. We also know that the understanding is a faculty of rules. There must, then,
be an active power that shapes or forms, coordinates or synthesizes the material
according to formal rules. This is, of course, Bildungsvermögen, a capacity reaching out
to the infinite in its coordination of marks and yet reined in by the laws of sensibility and
understanding.46 It follows that Bildungsvermögen constructs these mathematical
concepts, as well as poems and orations, in accordance with rules.

5,4

A Confluence of Impressions

These remarks from the foregoing works offer evidence of Kant’s growing reliance on
Bildungsvermögen. Given this new dualism between the intelligible (ideas) and the
sensible (sensations), Kant had to recognize its indispensability: an original power to
create both sensible forms (space and time) according to inherent laws of the mind and
45

Kant (1998), A105. For a fuller elucidation, see Young (1994), 344–8.
Already in the early 1770s can we anticipate much of what Fichte will say in the early Jena
Wissenschaftslehre, according to which Einbildungskraft hovers (schweben) between the finite and the
infinite. See Fichte (1982), 193–5 and Fichte (1988), 284–91.
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maxims according to the supreme principle of morality, not to mention the power to
construct aesthetic and mathematical perfections. Bildungsvermögen is bridging a gap, as
another scholar has put it, between the intelligible realm and the sensible realm.47
Admittedly, though, Kant’s recognition is gradual. The necessity of Bildungsvermögen is
an implication, for Kant does not publicly endorse it until 1781. And yet, by the time he
delivers his lectures on metaphysics in 1777–1780, the so-called Pölitz Lectures,
Bildungsvermögen receives extensive commentary, specifically in the context of
empirical psychology.48 So, what accounts for this newfound interest?
Kant’s interest had two sources. First, it was Alexander Baumgarten’s 1739
Metaphysics, which Kant used repeatedly for his lectures.49 In this important text
Baumgarten devotes considerable time to empirical psychology, itself a division of
metaphysics, where he discusses the lower cognitive faculties and the perfection of
sensory knowledge. As we shall see, Kant interprets Baumgarten’s lower cognitive
faculties as aspects or manifestations of one all-encompassing formative power—
Bildungsvermögen. Second, we know that Kant read Johann Nicolaus Tetens’s 1777
Philosophical Essays on Human Nature and its Development. In this work Tetens
devotes the entire first volume to the “power of representation” (Vorstellungskraft), a
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power which he considers synonymous with the power of imagination. These sources
were the sufficient force to turn Kant’s attention away from the concerns surrounding
Bildungsvermögen in the 1760s. They pushed Kant to see how intellectual concepts were
connected to sensible objects, the insight Kant lacked in 1770.

5,4,1

Baumgarten

Baumgarten established his reputation primarily in aesthetics.50 Indeed, we have him to
thank for the name of this new discipline. But it was his Metaphysics that Kant
continually used for his lectures on metaphysics, dividing these lectures according to the
text: ontology, cosmology, psychology, and rational theology.51 In the text’s section on
psychology, and empirical psychology in particular, Baumgarten separates himself from
his predecessors through his development of sensory knowledge. Like Kant in his
lectures on logic,52 Baumgarten distinguishes intensive clarity (claritas intensive) from
extensive clarity (claritas extensive). The notion of intensive clarity, the distinguishing of
marks or grounding relations within a concept, is the proper subject of logic, what
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Leibniz and Wolff had been stressing for years. But the notion of extensive clarity, notes
Baumgarten, is the subject of aesthetics, a new science of the beautiful.53
Baumgarten’s interest and development of sensory knowledge is original when
we consider the tradition he inherited. Leibniz and Wolff considered the extension of our
concepts to be intrinsically confused knowledge. In his “Meditations on Knowledge,
Truth, and Ideas,” Leibniz described ideas as clear or obscure, clear ideas as confused or
distinct, and distinct ideas as adequate or inadequate. According to the “Meditations,”
clear ideas are distinct when we analyze or enumerate the intrinsic marks (nota) of the
idea, and the distinct idea is adequate when we analyze these marks themselves. To have
a clear, distinct, and adequate idea, then, is to present a complete enumeration of the
grounding relations of the idea, ending, ultimately, in a tautology. In the case of sensory
percepts, however, the extension of the percept yields simple marks from the perspective
of sensation but are, from the perspective of the intellect, infinitely complex (infinitely
extendable), and hence they are always confused. Leibniz called the latter truths of fact
and the former truths of reason. This distinction between these truths is what leads
Baumgarten to argue that analytic truth is bought at a steep price. As we analyze, we
abstract away the richness of our perceptual experience. As Baumgarten puts it, “What is
it to abstract, if not to throw away?” This is precisely why Baumgarten calls intellectual
knowledge dry and perceptual knowledge vivid.54
As Baumgarten sees it, logic is perfection of the intellect, but there is a
completely separate aspect of human nature. The human being is not merely intellect but
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a sentient being as well. This fact calls for a new science, a science of aesthetics, the end
of which is the perfection of sensory knowledge as such, independent from logic
traditionally understood.55 Like the science of logic, which teaches us to develop our
innate propensity for inference by, say, the “law of the third term,” the science of
aesthetics will teach us how to develop our innate propensity for, say, the associations of
ideas, the law of imagination.56 What we will receive from this science is a set of rules to
develop our capacity for sensory knowledge and, in the case of the artist, the construction
of aesthetic perfections. Baumgarten recognizes that we have a natural logic and a natural
aesthetic, both of which will be developed in relation to our environment under favorable
conditions, regardless of formal training. But he also acknowledges the dangers of chance
and the practicality behind the inculcation of logical rules that prevent us from making
faulty inferences and aesthetic rules that prevent us from creating “empty images” (vana
phantasmata), phantasms incommunicable to others through signs.57
Wolff called memory and imagination the “analogues of reason,” attributing these
natural capacities to animals. Following Wolff, Baumgarten calls memory and
imagination the native equipment of the “spirit that is by nature charming and elegant
(ingenium venustum et elegans connatum).”58 But guided by rules of intellect, combined
with an “aesthetic temperament,” these natural dispositions transform into a cultivation
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and appreciation of beauty, a second nature, so to speak.59 In this respect, Baumgarten
lists nine natural dispositions of sensory knowledge that ought to be cultivated according
to an intellectual law: (1) acute sense (acute sentiendi), the power to perceive present
states (sensationes, apparitiones) of the soul or the world, the law of which is to be
sensitively aware of the states of the body and the soul, (2) imagination (phantasia), the
power to reproduce past images (phantasmata). Here Baumgarten presents the law of
imagination as the association of ideas (associatio idearum). The perfection of sensory
knowledge also includes (3) perspicacity (perspicacia), the ability to cognize agreements
and differences between things. Baumgarten tells us that this is also called wit (ingenium
strictius dictum), and its law is the law of identity and difference. Furthermore, sensory
knowledge includes (4) memory (memoria), the power to recognize (recognosco,
recorder) past representations. Its law is to connect present perceptions with perceptions
previously experienced. There is the (5) The poetic faculty (facultas poëtica, facultas
fingendi), which dissolves and combines images, i.e., invents, the law of which is to
construct various parts of a phantasm into a whole (one),60 and there is (6) foresight
(praevisio), the power to imagine a future representation if the sensation and the
phantasm share similarities. Finally, Baumgarten lists (7) judgement (judicium), the
power to cognize perceptions as perfect or imperfect through the cognition of agreement
(consentientibus) or disagreement (dissentientibus), what he calls taste (formandi
gustum), (8) premonition (praesagitio), the law of which is to predict the future through
similarities of the present and the past, and (9) the faculty of characteristics (facultas
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characteristic, facultas signatrix), the capacity to represent (denote) things through signs
or symbols, the law of which is to make these mediums communicable (cognoscendae).61
The cultivation of the foregoing capacities for the perfection of sensory
knowledge are the conditions for aesthetic perfection (beauty), in which we perceive the
distinct qualities of things, measured by their degree of abundance (ubertas, copia,
extensio), magnitude (dignitas, nobilitas, magnitude), exactitude (exacta, exasciata), and
methodical order (acroamaticum, disciplinale), the universal conditions of beauty.62 Now
as I noted above, from a finite perspective there is no end to an extensive series of marks
(in contrast to an intensive series of grounding relations). Were sensory knowledge to be
aesthetically perfect, this would imply an instantaneous perception of an infinitude of
marks. Leibniz called this divine intuition. But if Baumgarten is suggesting that aesthetics
concerns divine intuition as a normative end, it would be inconsistent with his contention
that aesthetics is a human (sentient) science.
What Baumgarten means by sensory knowledge as aesthetic perfection is not a
“luxuriant rhapsody of notes,” but the apprehension of a multiplicity in unity or a rich
abundance of marks that form a whole.63 A sheer abundance of marks in a representation
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is merely “pregnant” (perceptio pregnans), i.e., potentially perfect.64 It is actualized
through a combination of the nine cultivated natural capacities outlined above. Sensory
knowledge will then consist of an acute sensitivity to the marks of the perception,
enriched by memory, wit, and foresight. Moreover, the perception will contain a
combination of clear and obscure marks, an alliance between a “realm of darkness”
(regnum tenebrarum) and a “realm of light” (regnum lucis).65 Since the sensations we
receive occasion the association of further phantasmata according to the law of
imagination, and since we could not intuit an infinitude of marks, the phantasmata in
many cases are intentionally left obscure (unconscious)—left in the “realm of darkness.”
Nevertheless, and precisely by way of their obscurity, these obscure ideas illuminate and
vivify the perception as a whole. They bind the clear ideas together from below the level
of consciousness—for Baumgarten, this dark realm is the “base of the soul” (fundus
animae).66 Lastly, in order to produce unity out of the abundance of marks and their
communication through signs, the facultas fingendi and facultas signatrix are employed.
Only then may the art critic cast his judgment.
There is an important question as to what type of truth an aesthetic perfection
expresses. What is aesthetic, subjective truth? The artist creates fictions, to be sure, but
his creation is an imitation of natural creation. According to Baumgarten, art is mimetic
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insofar as it creates a possible world in accordance with the principles of noncontradiction and sufficient reason. The artist creates a universe with internal laws of
coherence, amplified by the abundance of characteristics in accordance with unity. These
possible worlds are communicable, unlike those other artistic fictions that are internally
inconsistent or self-contradictory, which Baumgarten calls “chimeras.” Here is how Mary
Gregor puts the point:
If the risk the artist takes in producing a heterocosmic fiction pays off, he will “create” a
new world that is aesthetically prefect and therefore pre-eminently true, by virtue of its
conformity with the principles of a most perfect universe. For the sake of his public, he
will embed these heterocosmic fictions in a context of historical fictions; but his
introduction of heterocosmic fictions—which are not compossible with the actual
world—makes it a new world in which aesthetically rewarding but factually impossible
objects and events are possible. Its truth is the verisimilitude achieved through the
compossibility—the ordo plurimum in uno—of the wealth of presentations that is the
artist’s first concern.67

There are a few key points to take away from Baumgarten’s aesthetics. First, the
fundamental claim is that perception is not confused knowledge, as Leibniz and Wolff
had argued. A science of aesthetics can teach us how to develop sense-knowledge.
Second, the fundamental capacity of sensibility is the inventive faculty (facultas
fingendi), the power to dissolve and combine images. All nine capacities of senseknowledge coalesce around this inventive faculty. Third, binding the facultas fingendi to
rules is what separates madness from genius, a chimera from an aesthetic perfection.
From what we have seen in the last chapter, it is no surprise that in the same section in
which Baumgarten discusses the facultas fingendi he warns us of delusion, delirium, and
fanaticism. The rules for aesthetics are designed specifically for communication. The
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genius must produce an artwork with internal consistency, unity, and felicitous signs.
Otherwise, he looks like a madman.

5,4,2

Tetens

On 12 October 1777, Hamann, Kant’s close friend, told Herder, Kant’s former student,
that Kant was “said to be very full of…Tetens.” And again, two years later, he writes to
Herder that Kant was working on his Critique and that “Tetens lies open constantly
before him.” Hamann loved literary gossip, not to mention spreading it. Here he informs
Kant’s former student of what his old teacher is up to, while making a quick jab at Kant’s
originality. Perhaps Hamann was being mischievous, although on 15 October 1780, Kant
himself writes to his publisher Johann Hartknoch that he would prefer the typeset of the
Critique to be different from that of Tetens’s Philosophical Essays, since the latter is
“really tiring” to his eyes.68 Hamann, then, was likely pointing out a fact wrapped in good
humor: Kant was deeply interested in and influenced by Tetens’s work.69
Tetens’s 1777 Philosophical Essays is an empirical examination of the
relationship between the soul and world. Distinguishing himself from his predecessors
(primarily Leibniz and Wolff, “die systematische Seelenlehrer”), Tetens argues that there
is not one fundamental power of the soul (Grundthätigkeit), but rather three separate,
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irreducible powers: a power to receive sensations, form representations, and think.70 It is
to the intermediate power of the soul, the power to form sensations into representations,
that Tetens devotes the first 165 pages of the 1500 page work. He calls this intermediate
power “the power of representation” (Vorstellungskraft) and divides it into three subpowers: Perceptionsvermögen or Fassungskraft, Phantasie or Einbildungskraft, and
Dichtungsvermögen or Dichtkraft. Although we have seen that imagination is often
translated from the German Einbildungskraft, Tetens treats Einbildungskraft as only one
manifestation of Vorstellungskraft, which is “imagination in the broadest and most
encompassing sense of the word.”71
Tetens begins his examination with the claim that the soul is active and passive.
The soul suffers, insofar as it receives impressions from objects foreign to itself. But it is
also active “if it expresses itself in its self-determination, that is, if it exerts its unique
applicative power or activity.”72 There are, then, two sources of affection. On the one
hand, outer objects affect the soul, producing sensations (Empfindungen). On the other,
an internal power affects these internal sensations, creating changes therein (eine
Empfindungsvorstellung oder eine ursprüngliche Vorstellung). For Tetens, what follows
from this fundamental relationship between soul and world is that perceptions are, strictly
speaking, analogies (Analogien) of the behavior and relationships of things in the world:
“The analogical things correspond with one another like signs and images of the denoted
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and illustrated objects.”73 Accordingly, the Perceptionsvermögen (facultas percipiendi),
insofar as it takes up or catches representations in the soul (aufnehmen oder fassen den
ursprünglichen Vorstellungen), represents a likeness.
Tetens recognizes that we also reproduce or reconstruct images that are no longer
present. He calls these Einbildungen or Phantasmata:
If the first modifications, from which such traces in the soul are left behind, are no longer
there, then the soul can produce in itself an accurate after-image, in which it again
produces the remaining impressions and its first subjective states, although in a weaker
and often indiscernible grade, but out of which it nonetheless again remembers and can
present these impressions and states presently.74

This Wiedervorstellungskraft or what Tetens also calls Phantasie and Einbildungskraft is
a power to reproduce or reconstruct former impressions, though in a weaker or often
indeterminate form from their original Empfindungsvorstellung.75
But Phantasie is not simply a function of memory. It also operates according to
the law of association of ideas. Tetens cites Locke and tells us that “Phantasie would
therefore run through again the coexistence of sensations by the mere reproduction of
representations if not still through another ground, which would determine this direction,
namely this: Similar representations follow one another, connecting into one, as it
were.”76 Phantasie reproduces a series (Reihe) of representations that were formerly
connected in the original series of Empfindungsvorstellugen. Moreover, Phantasie
combines simple representations that were not formerly combined in an original, sensible
representation. Tetens uses the example of Pegasus: “The representation of Pegasus is an
image of a winged horse. We have the image of a horse from sensation and the wings
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also. Both are pure phantasms, which are separated from other representations and are
here, in the image of Pegasus, combined with one another.”77
Tetens’s account of Empfindungsvorstellungen as simple representations and
Phantasmata or Einbildungen as complex is reminiscent of Locke’s simple and complex
ideas. But Tetens distinguishes himself from Locke when he writes, “The creative power
(Schaffungskraft) of the soul goes further. It can make representations, which are simple
for our consciousness but nonetheless different from those which we meet in our simplest
Empfindungsvorstellungen.”78 This particular Vorstellungskraft does not reproduce
simple, sensible representations nor does it split (zertheilen) and recombine
(wiederaneinandersetzen) but produces from itself (selbstmachen) simple
representations: “The soul can not only place and order our representations, like the
director of a gallery of images. Rather, it is itself a painter and invents and produces a
new gallery.”79 Tetens calls this power of the soul Dichtungsvermögen.
Dichtungsvermögen fuses or blends images so thoroughly that they appear
natural, not artificial or contrived like a Pegasus or other creatures of mythology.80 In
fact, the products of this power do not resemble images at all. Here is how Tetens
describes the limits and possibilities of Dichtungsvermögen:
Dichtkraft can produce no elements or basic material—out of nothing is nothing made—,
and it is thereby no creative power. It can only separate, dissolve, combine, mix, and yet
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just by this means can it produce new images, which in regard to our capacity of
differentiation are simple representations.81

He then suggests that this power is the power of genius:
One compares the strongest expression of the soul with Dichtkraft in Milton and
Klopstock, who, with inner intensity, hews, dissolves and mixes, separates and connects
Einbildungen, as well as creates new shapes and appearances.82

This power to separate and dissolve, bind and mix, with intensity is what differentiates
the act of Dichtungsvermögen from Phantasie, which separates and recombines but in
such a way that the product looks artificial, as if one could see the seams or stitching.83
Tetens tells us that there are three laws of Dichtkraft. The first is that “more
simple representations, which are similar or indifferent… are united as one through an
activity of the representative power.”84 Dichtkraft produces or shapes into a unity a
simple representation (Ein-Bildung), which itself cannot be analyzed like a complex
concept. In this respect Tetens provides the examples of Swift’s Brobdingnagians and
Lilliputians.85 The second law of Dichtkraft states that simple sensible representations
(nicht völlig einerlei, aber doch Aehnlichkeiten haben) are capable, through
Dichtungsvermögen, of being united into one confused representation (verwirrte
Vorstellung), which to our feeling is nonetheless simple (einfach).86 Finally, the third law
according to Tetens states that closely attached ideas in one consciousness (anklebende
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verschiedene Nebenideen) are dissolvable (auflösbar) through Dichtungsvermögen into
simple representations.87
For Tetens, Dichtungsvermögen fuses or shapes images and ideas more tightly
than a mere reorganization or association of Phantasie.88 Moreover, it infuses this
construction with feeling, a characteristic that Tetens suggests is absent in Phantasie.
Other characteristics that Tetens uses to describe the product of the highest power of
representation are “original” (Von ihr kommt alles Originelle),89 “lively” (lebhaft), and
“self-active” (selbsthätig). In this latter respect in particular, Tetens is clear that the selfactivity of Dichtungsvermögen is what distinguishes it from Phantasie:
Let Phantasie magnify in proportionality, diminish, be made livelier and stronger.
Hereby alone stands no such self-creator of the sensible Vorstellungskraft (as fictions
are). In this perspective are both modes of activity incomparable.90

For Tetens, what sets Dichtungsvermögen apart from other manifestations of
Vorstellungskraft is its self-generating, self-activating power. It is internally purposive,
and in this sense one scholar has suggested that it be characterized as will: it “combines
deliberate planning and effort with spontaneous and free force.”91
Tetens was familiar with Kant, primarily the Dissertation, which Tetens cites in
his 1775 On General Speculative Philosophy. Now we saw in the Disseration that Kant
indicates, albeit indirectly, that Einbildungskraft operates according to rules of the mind,
thereby constructing a priori sensible forms, a transfer of ideality to reality. It would be a
stretch to suggest that Tetens follows Kant’s lead in the Philosophical Essays. Tetens
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likely has in mind Leibniz’s remarks in the New Essays.92 Nevertheless, in the Essays,
Tetens describes the formation of geometric shapes, a transition from the ideal to the real:
Geometric representations of points, lines, circles, spheres, etc. are, in their geometric
determination, strictly speaking, as well as from other grounds, effects of Dichtkraft. I
observe merely the imaginary (Bildliche) in it… We have in our power the representation
of extension, and we can modify this ideal extension as we want. Phantasie therefore
directs the image of the circular line in such a way that each point stands equidistant from
the middle point, around which nothing is the least further removed or brought nearer.
The last state in the sensible image is a state of Dichtkraft, just as there is in all our
ideals.93

Here Dichtkraft is the capacity to concretize ideas or construct formal ideas into the
imaginary (das Bildliche). And it is Dichtkraft, not Phantasie, since it operates according
to a law: in this case, that each point on the circular line be equidistant from the middle
point. This is self-activity with purposiveness.
I noted above that by 1770 Kant implicates Einbildungskraft as the bridge
between the sensible and the intellectual. For all of Tetens groundbreaking insight into
Dichtungsvermögen, he remains pessimistic whether Dichtkraft can truly bridge these
realms:
Between the sensible and the transcendental, between metaphysics and physics, and even
between metaphysics and psychology is a gap, over which nothing is to get away.94

Perhaps this pessimism is due to Tetens’s empiricist commitments. In any case, it would
have to be Kant who would bridge this gap.
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5,5

Lectures on Metaphysics

Kant’s notes on Baumgarten’s Metaphysics and his lectures during the late 1770s are
evidence of his new stance toward Bildungsvermögen. It appears now not simply as a
coconspirator of irrationality but a necessary condition for the construction of a veridical
experience.

5,5,1

Reflexionen zur Anthropologie

In the Reflexionen zur Anthropologie,95 in a section titled “Von der Einbildungskraft,”
Kant opens by discussing various illnesses and illusions of Einbildungskraft, as if a
cautionary warning is in order, and then proceeds to lay out Baumgarten’s capacities of
sensory-knowledge:
Abzubilden: informandi, direct image formation
Einzubilden: fingendi, imaginative formation
Nachzubilden: imaginandi, refingendi, reproductive image formation
Vorzubilden: praefingendi, praevidendi, anticipatory image formation
Auszubilden: perficiendi, completing image formation
Gegenzubilden: symbolum, symbolic image formation96

Kant here places each of these imaginative powers under the general term
Bildungsvermögen.
In these Reflexionen Kant is careful to distinguish three species of
Bildungsvermögen. He calls the first species Bildungskraft, the synthetic power employed
in the coordination of given representations. This synthetic formative power is itself
either natural (unwillkürlich) or intellectual (freie Handlung). In the first, natural sense,
Bildungskraft forms a representation by the law of association. It is an unconscious act
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that apprehends a present object and infuses it with memories and expectations. Kant
breaks this down into Abbildung, Nachbildung, and Vorbildung, each corresponding
roughly to Baumgarten’s notion of acute sensation, phantasy, and foresight.97 Describing
the act of Bildungskraft, Kant says it is a running through (durchlaufen) of the manifold
of sensations and calls its product an appearance (Erscheinung):
That Abbildungsvermögen belongs to the sensible appearance, and radiates through this
connection, pleases us and brightens our perspective. This is because the mind, in which
there are actions (Handlungen), is moved to make images out of impressions as it runs
through the manifold.98

Now in the other, intellectual sense, Kant notes that we reflect upon (mit Bewußtsein) and
compare (vergleichen) representations, noting the representations’ similarities and
differences. He refers to this as wit (Witz) and perspicacity (Scharfsinnigkeit), and
suggests that through the latter we clarify and distinguish perceptions.99
In both its natural and intellectual manifestations, Bildungskraft is dependent
upon given representations. But Einbildungskraft, the second species of
Bildungsvermögen, “makes an image without the presence of an object (admittedly with
the materials of sense), either by invention (fingendo) or by abstraction
(abstrahendo).”100 Einbildungskraft is an original, productive faculty (Ursache der
Vorstellungen).101 And it creates both subjective and objective representations, that is, the
form, but not the matter: “The actions are never concerned with materiality but rather
with form; either from comparison, through which no representations are produced, or of
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the objective genesis or subjective fiction.”102 Like Baumgarten’s facultas fingendi, Kant
notes that through dissolution (Auflösung) and combination (Verknüpfung),
Einbildungskraft as Dichtungskraft produces subjective fictions (Erdichtungen) or
symbols (Gegenbilder). But Einbildungskraft as Ausbildungskraft also produces original
representations, i.e., standards of measure or ideas. He writes, “We must bring something
to the end. Therefore we have certain standards, for example, a dozen… some are ideas,
e.g. the hero, friendship, wisdom.”103
For Kant, Einbildungskraft is a free act. We play with the images, as he puts it.
But he is also careful to warn us that images often play with us. This second species of
Einbildungskraft Kant calls Phantasie:
No state is more dangerous, as when we play around in the world of Einbildungen, until
we confuse ourselves therein and cannot find the way out. Paradise of the mad
(Narren).104

Picking from the Imagination, the storehouse of representations (Vorrath der
Vorstellungen), Phantasie creates its own mad paradise, a solitary, lonely world. The mad
travel in a field of images (im Felde der Einbildungen), speak with themselves (mit sich
selbst), and play the roll of protagonist (Rolle als Hauptperson).105
The problem with the madman is not that he creates a world of lawlessness.106 It
is that his world is incommunicable. What Kant seems to be suggesting here, and what
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we have already seen from the “Essay on the maladies of the head,” is that
Einbildungskraft must be bound by shared concepts, shared rules for artistic creativity
and natural science. This was Baumgarten’s point in the Metaphysics and Aesthetics. In
aesthetics, the artist must create a representation that is communicable through signs. Its
truth must be shared. Otherwise, it is poor art. Kant’s point is the same. The artist must
create a world that everyone can understand and participate in. If he does not, he appears
mad—a lonely, solipsistic dreamer. Not surprisingly, in the Reflexionen Kant refers in
this context to the fantast (Schwärmer).107
(Kant’s division of Bildungsvermögen in the Reflexionen zur Anthropologie is
represented in figure 4-1 below).

of life (of the animal), it finds itself transferred to a faraway place… It is astonishing, however, that the
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Bildungsvermögen

Bildungskraft

natürliche

Abbildung

Einbildungskraft

freie

unwillkürliche

Witz

Phantasie

Nachbildung

Hypochonder

Vorbildung

Schwärmer

158

freie

Dichtungsvermögen

Ausbildungskraft

5,5,2

Pölitz Lectures

Kant’s further treatment of Bildungsvermögen occurs in his lectures on metaphysics,
particularly in the Pölitz Lectures delivered between 1777–1780. Although these lectures
follow the format of Baumgarten’s Metaphysics, the section on empirical psychology
shows Kant’s recent reading of Tetens’s Philosophical Essays. Like Tetens, Kant here
notes that we feel ourselves both active and passive with respect to our higher and lower
faculties, respectively, and then proceeds to describe what belongs to these faculties:
representation (cognition), desire, and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure.
With respect to the faculty of representations (Vermögen der Vorstellungen) or
cognition (Erkenntnißvermögen), Kant repeats his division in the Dissertation and writes,
“The lower faculty of cognition is a power to have representations so far as we are
affected by objects (von Gegenständen afficirt werden). The higher faculty of cognition
is a power to have representations from ourselves (Vorstellungen aus uns selbst zu
haben).”108 And although the lower faculty or sensibility is grounded in experience, Kant
writes,
We differentiate the sensible faculty of cognition into: the faculty of the senses
themselves, and the imitated cognition of the senses… Such sensible cognitions which
arise from the spontaneity of the mind are called: cognitions of the formative power
(Erkenntnisse der bildenden Kraft); and the cognition which arise through the
impressions of the object are called: representations of the senses themselves.”109

The senses are purely receptive. They represent what is impressed upon them or given.
But the bildende Kraft makes representations. As we have seen from the Reflexionen zur
Anthropologie, here again Kant lays out the divisions of the bildende Kraft: there is the
temporally formative power (Bildung), itself divided into the faculty of direct image
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formation (Abbildungskraft), imitation or reproduction (Nachbildungskraft), and
anticipation (Vorbildungskraft), and the faculties of completing (Ausbildung) and
signifying (Gegenbildung).110
Moving beyond the notes of the Reflexionen, the Pölitz Lectures provide an
explanation of the production of a representation. In this context, Kant writes, “My mind
is always busy with forming the image of the manifold while it goes through it
(durchgeht). E.g., when I see a city, the mind then forms an image of the object which it
has before it while it runs through (durchläuft) the manifold.”111 Here is how he describes
this durchlaufen:
Therefore if a human being comes into a room which is piled high with pictures and
decorations, then he can make no image of it, because his mind cannot run through the
manifold. It does not know from which end it should begin in order to illustrate the object
(um sich den Gegenstand abzubilden). So it is reported that when a stranger enters St.
Peter’s church in Rome, he is wholly disconcerted on account of the manifold splendor.
The cause is: his soul cannot go through the manifold in order to illustrate it. This
illustrative faculty (abbildende Vermögen) is the formative faculty of intuition (bildende
Vermögen der Anschauung). The mind must undertake many observations in order to
illustrate an object so that it illustrates the object differently from each side. E.g., a city
appears differently from the east (Morgenseite) than from the west (Abendseite). There
are thus many appearances of a matter according to the various sides and points of view.
The mind must make an illustration from all these appearances by taking them all
together (sie alle zusammen nimmt, sich eine Abbildung machen).112

If we consider this passage carefully, Kant’s use of durchlaufen appears incompatible
with the notion of Abbildungskraft. For an Abbild implies a direct apprehension and not a
running through of any sort. So what does Kant have in mind here?
If we enter a room that is piled high with pictures and decorations or enter St.
Peter’s church in Rome and fail to run through the manifold, the implication is that we
are confused due to a novel experience. Kant seems to be suggesting that we cannot run
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through the manifold because we do not have a past experience of the present situation.
Thus he says, “The mind must undertake many observations in order to illustrate an
object so that it illustrates the object differently from each side.” An Abbild, then,
presupposes Nachbilder. But if we require past experiences to properly intuit a room, say,
then we must have expectations as well. We must always be ahead of ourselves, so to
speak. So an Abbild also presupposes a Vorbild.
When Kant says that the bildende Vermögen der Anschauung is a running through
of the manifold, this means that this faculty ought to be guided by empirical schema or
rule. This running through is not haphazard or arbitrary but purposive. Put differently, we
might say that the impressions occasion the mind to reproduce images (Nachbilder)
according to the law of association. But these associations of marks are bound by a
general rule, which itself guides the bildende Vermögen. The rule functions as a guide for
the construction of the perceptual experience. This motion back and forth, a hovering as
Kant’s successors will put it, is the durchlaufen of the formative faculty. In this way,
Abbilder are thus infused with Nachbilder and Vorbilder. As Kant puts it, “A present
appearance has representations of the past and the following time.”113
This theory of perception and a bildende Vermögen is represented in the work of
Wilfrid Sellars. Like Kant, he notes that perception is an activity, a synthesizing of
various perspectives. This is because perspectives are “point-of-viewish.”114 And yet, we
interpret our limited perspective as something which we do not entirely see. Accordingly,
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aspects of objects (what we have been calling Nachbilder and Vorbilder) that are not seen
are nonetheless experienced as actually present for the perceiver. The synthesis of a
bildende Vermögen unites various possible perspectives together with the immediate
sensible apprehension (Abbild). Sellars writes, “Perceptual consciousness involves the
constructing of sense-image-models of external objects. This construction is the work of
the imagination.”115
J. Michael Young and P. F. Strawson present a similar thesis. When Kant tells us
in the first Critique that the “imagination (Einbildungskraft) is the faculty for
representing an object even without its presence in intuition,”116 Young suggests that
Kant’s idea is that “one ‘sees more than meets the eye,’ taking or treating or construing
what is sensibly present as something other, or something more, than what immediately
appears.”117 The claim is that Einbildungskraft is essentially an interpretative faculty.
Here is how Strawson makes the point: “When I naively report what I see at a moment
(say, as a tree or a dog), my mind or my report certainly ‘looks further’ than something –
not, usually, than ‘what immediately appears to me’ (tree or dog), but certainly further
than the merely subjective side of the event of its immediately appearing to me.”118 As
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Strawson sees it, reports of perceptual experiences are of distinct objects, not of partial or
limited perspectives. I report that I see a dog, in most cases. Not hindquarters.
Here we see a line of interpretation of bildende Kraft that is consistent with the
Pölitz Lectures. Sellars’s “constructing of sense-image-models of external objects” and
Kant’s synthetic procedure pertaining to the “making distinct of objects” describes a
logical operation whereby objects are constructed and thereby conceptually recognized.
Strawson is more metaphorical. He describes perceptual experiences as “irradiated”
“infused” or “soaked” with the concept.119 But his point, nonetheless, is that concepts
“link or combine” different perspectives as perceptions of the same external object.120
But the Pölitz Lectures go beyond perception according to empirical rules. For
here Kant returns to his distinction between empirical and intellectual concepts:
Thus there are sensuous and intellectual concepts. We can therefore say: there is nothing
in the understanding with respect to matter that was not in the senses; but with respect to
form there are cognitions, intellectual ones, which are not an object of the senses at all.

He then asks,
But how do they [intellectual concepts] come into the understanding? One must not
assume them as innate and inborn, for that brings all investigation to a close, and is very
unphilosophical… But concepts have arisen through the understanding, according to its
nature, on the occasion of experience; for on the occasion of experience and the senses
the understanding forms concepts which are not from the senses but rather drawn from
reflection on the senses.121

Given what we have said above, that empirical rules guide bildende Kraft in the
construction of perception, which we know can then be reflected as empirical concepts, is
it reasonable to assume that intellectual rules also guide bildende Kraft in the
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construction of experience, which are then reflected as intellectual concepts or, as Kant
will put it a few years later, a priori categories of experience?
Kant’s answer to the question here is as follows:
We have cognitions of objects of intuition by virtue of the formative power (bildende
Kraft), which is between the understanding and sensibility. If this formative power is in
the abstract <in abstracto>, then it is the understanding. The conditions and actions of the
formative power, taken in the abstract <in abstracto>, are pure concepts of the
understanding and categories of the understanding. E.g., the pure concept of the
understanding of substance and accident comes from the formative power in the
following manner: the formative power must have something permanent underlying it,
besides the manifold that alters, for were there nothing at the foundation of the formative
power, then it also could change nothing. Now the permanent is the pure concept of
substance, and the manifold of accident. All highest principles of the understanding a
priori are general rules which express the conditions of the formative power in all
appearances with which we can determine how appearances are connected among
themselves; for that which makes cognition possible, which is its condition, that is also
the condition of things.122

We saw in the Dissertation a gap appear between the sensible and the intellectual. Kant’s
position was that a gap had to emerge, for the continuity thesis could not account for a
priori principles of morality and metaphysics. But the problem arose as to how this gap
could be bridged. Now, however, we have bildende Kraft, “which is between the
understanding and sensibility.” Kant’s new position is that there are acts of bildende
Kraft, conditioned by rules of the understanding, from which we reflect categories of the
understanding or pure concepts, “abstractions” of these acts. Thus the category of
substance, as Kant says, is an abstraction from the permanence underlying the act of
bildende Kraft, the argument presumably being that in the act of running through the
manifold bildende Kraft is numerically identical through change, which we reflect as the
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pure concept of substance. In the Pölitz Lectures, Kant calls this the poetic power of the
understanding (Verstandes-Dichtungskraft).123
(Kant’s division of bildende Kraft from the Pölitz Lectures is represented in figure 4-2
below).
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Kant (1997), 55: AA, 28: 237.
165

Figure 4-2
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VerstandesDichtungskraft

5,6

Concluding Remarks

A fuller picture of this process will emerge in the next chapter when we move to the 1787
Critique. But we should recall at this stage the route we have taken to get here. In the
1760s Kant described a Bildungsvermögen unbound, a sick mind. It appeared that
Bildungsvermögen was active in a medley of mental illnesses, not to mention fanaticism
and immorality. But by the 1770s, Bildungsvermögen is tasked with an indispensable
role. It must now produce not simply art but also virtuous action and veridical experience.
The implication, then, is that Bildungsvermögen is operative in madness and rationality,
the difference lying in whether it follows normative rules or not; whether it is, in other
words, bound.
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6,

Produktive Einbildungskraft Redux

With the appearance of the second edition of the critique of reason, the promises Kant gave [in
1781] he fulfilled in 1787. Through a more precise definition of judgment, in which the relation
of synthesis to apperception becomes clear, he deduced a new development for the objective
validity of the categories and therefore came to a more precise determination of the concept and
function of self-consciousness.
—Hermann Cohen, Kant’s Theory of Experience, 316
In the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, the transcendental Einbildungskraft as it
came to light in the impassioned course of its first projection was thrust aside and given a new
interpretation—one favoring the understanding.
—Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 3: 161

6,1

Strategy of the B-Deduction

The question of the Subjective Deduction is, “How is the faculty of thinking itself
possible?” The Objective Deduction, however, “refers to the objects of the pure
understanding, and is supposed to demonstrate and make comprehensible the objective
validity of its concepts a priori.”1 Kant had already alluded to the method of the
Objective Deduction in his 1773 Reflexionen zur Metaphysik, in which he said that “the
concepts of the understanding express all the actus of the powers of the mind, insofar as
representations are possible in accordance with their universal laws, and indeed their
possibility a priori.”2 Here he connected the rules for logical subordination (the logical
use of the understanding) with the originally acquired a priori concepts of the
understanding (the real use of the understanding), since the rules for the formation of a
judgment operated simultaneously with the construction of the objects of experience. As

1
2

Kant (1998), Axvi.
Kant (1900–), 17: 622.
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he puts this in the first Critique, “The same function that gives unity to the different
representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different
representations in an intuition.”3
If the strategy of the Objective Deduction is to show that the real use of the
understanding operates simultaneously with the logical use of the understanding, this
strategy begins in section 19, which Kant titles “The logical form of all judgments
consists in the objective unity of apperception of the concepts contained therein.”4 Prior
to this section, Kant reiterates the Subjective Deduction, although in this iteration he says
that the understanding, not Einbildungskraft, is the source of all combination. As should
soon become clear, this is not change in doctrine (à la Heidegger) but a clarification (à la
Cohen).

6,2

Logical Functions of Judgment

In section 19 Kant presents his new definition of judgment: “I find that a judgment is
nothing other than the way to bring given cognition to the objective unity of
apperception.”5 Kant has now explicitly identified the transcendental unity of

3

Kant (1998), A79/B104–5.
I follow Longuenesse here who argues that sections 15–8 are an introduction (review of the Subjective
Deduction) to the Transcendental Deduction proper, beginning at section 19. See Longuenesse (1998), 59–
70. But I note that we can see Kant already alluding to the transcendental unity of apperception as the
source of both logical and real combination in section 15: “Combination is the representation of the
synthetic unity of the manifold. The representation of this unity cannot, therefore, arise from the
combination; rather, by being added to the representation of the manifold, it first makes the concept of
combination possible. This unity, which precedes all concepts of combination a priori, is not the former
category of unity (§10); for all categories are grounded on logical functions in judgments, but in these
combination, thus the unity of given concepts, is already thought. The category therefore already
presupposes combination. We must therefore seek this unity (as qualitative, §12), someplace higher,
namely in that which itself contains the ground of the unity of different concepts in judgments, and hence
of the possibility of the understanding, even in its logical use.”
5
Kant (1998), B141.
4
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apperception with the logical functions of judgment, the functions that he laid out in the
Metaphysical Deduction of sections 9–10. In the threefold synthesis, to be sure, he
alluded to this identity between formal logic and transcendental logic. His use of the term
“concept” (Begriff) evoked a logical act and a synthesis of sensible intuition by a
numerically identical function of unity. But here in section 19 of the B-Deduction this
identity is now made explicit and becomes the keystone to the validity of the categories.
Hence in contrast to the “logicians,” who claim that judgment is merely a relation
between two concepts, Kant claims that to judge is also to reflect the appearances under
concepts, regardless of whether these representations belong together necessarily or
contingently. The reflection of appearances under concepts is to bring them under the
objective unity of apperception.
Longuenesse has suggested that section 19 presupposes familiarity with the
lectures on logic, a presupposition that Kant held for his readers.6 For as it stands alone,
section 19 does not show how logical (discursive) unity of judgment is related to the
transcendental unity of apperception. It simply reiterates the point of the threefold
synthesis: the reflection of synthesized appearances under a concept constitutes
experience. So what is the nature of discursive unity that links it with the transcendental
unity of apperception?
I discussed in chapter five Kant’s notion of logical perfection in the Lectures on
Logic. Recall Kant’s remark from the Jäsche Logic:
Every concept, as partial concept, is contained in the representation of things; as ground
of cognition, i.e., as mark, these things are contained under it. In the former respect every
concept has a content, in the other an extension.7

6
7

Longuenesse (1998), 84–5.
Kant (1992), 593; AA, 9: 95.
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Here we see logical perfection at work in the Critique. Judgment, from the standpoint of
the logical use of the understanding, is the act of subordinating concepts under more
universal concepts. But what is notably different in the Critique is that the concepts are
related to a particular object, an appearance.8 As Kant will later note, these constitute the
sense (Sinn) of the concept.9 Judgment thus consists in the consciousness of various
particular objects (appearances) subsumed under common (universal) representations, the
former of which provide the sense (Sinn), the latter of which the ground (Grund) of
cognition.
In section 19 Kant tells us that
Only in this way does there arise from this relation a judgment, i.e., a relation that is
objectively valid, and that is sufficiently distinguished from the relation of these same
representations in which there would be only subjective validity, e.g., in accordance with
laws of association. In accordance with the latter I could only say “If I carry a body, I feel
a pressure of weight.”10

The important difference between an objectively valid relation of representations and a
subjectively valid relation is that the former consists of the subordination of particular
objects under concepts, which is valid for every empirical consciousness. Subjective
validity, to the contrary, is only valid for a particular consciousness, since it is a
coordination of private sensations—carrying a body and feeling weight. In the latter case,
the imagination runs through the impressions and associates them, which one perceives

8

In the passage cited from the “Logical use of the understanding in general,” Kant writes that the concept
is related to many concepts, and here, in particular, a body, which is in turn related to an appearance.
9
Kant makes this point clear in the third chapter of the Transcendental Power of Judgment, “On the ground
of the distinction of all objects in general into phenomena and noumena.” There he writes, “Hence it is also
requisite for one to make an abstract concept sensible, i.e., to display the object (object) that corresponds
to it in intuition, since without this the concept would remain (as one says) without sense, i.e., without
significance.” See Kant (1998), A240/B299.
10
Kant (1998), B142.
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as an association of sensations (due to repetitive, constant conjunctions, as Hume would
say) without conceptual recognition (endorsement).11
Setting aside the a priori categories of understanding for the moment, we can see
that when Kant writes that judgment is bringing cognitions to the objective unity of
apperception he is implying that there is a normative imperative behind judgment, a
theoretical duty. Judgments of the empirical sort must be subordinations of appearances
under concepts, whereby they can be tested.12 To merely allow Einbildung to associate
impressions by habit, thereby creating associations of sensations or feelings is to refuse to
enter into communication with others, to uncritically accept private perceptions of
sensation as objective truth. Perhaps there are others who share my imaginative
associations, but I will never know.
For Kant, judgments are not only reflections but also inferential. In this respect,
Longuenesse has drawn attention to the Reflexionen, where Kant writes, “A concept,
thanks to its general validity, has the function of a judgment. It applies to other concepts
potentialiter. The actual relation of a concept to others, as a means of cognition, is a
judgment.”13 Since judgments function as subordinations of particular objects or concepts
under concepts of greater universality, judgments are also potential major premises of a
syllogism, in which the premises attribute a genus (predicate-concept) to a species

11

In this context, Longuenesse directs our attention to the 1776–1783 Reflexion 3051, Kant (1900–), 16:
633: “The representation of the manner in which various concepts (as such)* belong to a consciousness**
(in general, not only my own) is judgment.” The asterisks refer to the end of the Reflexion, where Kant
states the following: for “concepts (as such),” he specifies “*in a universally necessary manner (empirically
or a priori).” For “belong to a consciousness,” he says that “**concepts belong to a consciousness only
insofar as they are thought as subordinated, and not as coordinated with one another (like sensations).”
12
Kant contrasts this with “logical egoism.” See Kant (2007), 240–1; AA, 7:128–9.
13
Kant (1900–) 16: 630. See Longuenesse (1998), 90.
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(subject-concept), and thus potentially attributes the genus to all individuals within the
species’s sphere.
In the introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant defines the syllogism as
follows:
In every syllogism I think first a rule (the major) through the understanding. Second, I
subsume a cognition under the condition of the rule (the minor) by means of the power
of judgment. Finally, I determine my cognition through the predicate of the rule (the
conclusio), hence a priori through reason.14

This definition indicates the way in which judgments function as potential major
premises in syllogistic reasoning. Every judgment may function as a rule for the
predication of the major term to the minor term of a syllogism.
If judgments are potential major premises, they reveal rules. But what the
foregoing passage from the Dialectic also tells us is that we are licensed to apply the
predicate of the conclusion only if we are in possession of a condition of the rule, that is,
a middle term that recognizes the particular as an instance of the universal. The condition
of the rule is the reason or license for the inferential connection. It functions as the
possibility for subsumption, a relation between concepts and appearances. Kant’s
example of a condition in the Dialectic is “Caius”:
I can draw the proposition “Caius is mortal” from experience merely through the
understanding. But I seek a concept containing the condition under which the predicate
(the assertion in general) of this judgment is given (i.e., here, the concept “human”), and
after I have subsumed [the predicate] under this condition, taken in its whole domain (“all
humans are mortal”), I determine the cognition of my object according to it (“Caius is
mortal”).15

14
15

Kant (1998), A304/B360–1.
Kant (1998), A322/B378.
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Here “human” functions as a condition because it can be subsumed under a concept of
greater generality, i.e., “mortal.” It thus links or provides the possibility for the claim,
“Caius is mortal.”16
A condition pertains not simply to a categorical judgment but a hypothetical
judgment as well. In the case of a categorical judgment, as we just saw, the condition is
an essential mark of the subject of the conclusion (minor term). In a hypothetical
judgment, however, the condition is separate from, and not necessarily contained in, the
subject. Kant’s example is “If there is perfect justice, then obstinate evil will be
punished.”17 Here the condition or the antecedent is expressed problematically, that is, it
is possible that there is perfect justice. Nonetheless, from the standpoint of the logical use
of the understanding, I could express this condition assertorically (actually), as an added
condition (minor premise) and thereby assert that “Obstinate evil will be punished.” The
difference between this hypothetical judgment and the categorical is that I add a
condition from outside the content of the subject-concept (there is nothing intrinsic to the
concept of our world from which the existence of perfect justice follows, at least nothing
intrinsic that I recognize from my finite perspective).18
We can now understand more precisely the function of rules for Kant. From the
empirical standpoint, rules are derived like concepts, from the comparison of particular

16

Cf. Longuenesse (1998), 94–5.
Kant (1998), A73/B98.
18
In the Jäsche Logic, Kant presents the following example: “There is an essential difference between the
two propositions, All bodies are divisible, and, If all bodies are composite, then they are divisible. In the
former proposition I maintain the thing directly, in the latter only under a condition expressed
problematically,” Kant (1992), 602; AA, 9: 106. See Longuenesse (1998), 101–4. I leave out here the case
of disjunctive judgment, since for Kant such a judgment pertains to already formed concepts and an entire
field of cognition. It thus plays a major role in forming systematic unity, a universal subordination of
genera and species toward which the propensity of reason tends. See Kant (1900–), 9: 106–7. See also
Longuenesse (1998), 104–5.
17
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objects—spruces, willows, lindens—and their reflection and abstraction. These rules,
then, when prompted by external impressions or a manifold of sensations (green, brown,
hard, cylindrical), function as a means of recognition. For if the recognition of a concept
is the same act that unifies sensations in an intuition—if recognition is the reflection of
this synthesis that emphasizes certain sensations, abstracts away from others, and even
fills in sensations that may be absent—then, thinking back to the threefold synthesis, the
concept is a reflection of a synthesis of apprehension and reproduction according to a
rule, a privileging of particular sensations over others (in the case of a linden, I may
abstract away from the knotty outgrowth unique to this particular object and fill in a
back-side that is invisible but that I assume to exist). In other words, the concept is a
reflection of a rule necessitating the synthesis of particular marks. It is the act that
produces appearances as phenomena (according to the Dissertation) or as empirical
objects of representation (according to the Critique).19
In the Jäsche Logic Kant presents the distinction between an appearance reflected
under a concept and an appearance as an undetermined object of an empirical intuition:
If a savage sees a house from a distance, for example, with whose use he is not
acquainted, he admittedly has before him in his representation the very same object as
someone else who is acquainted with it determinately as a dwelling established for men.
But as to form, this cognition of one and the same object is different in the two. With the
one it is mere intuition, with the other it is intuition and concept at the same time.20

This example draws out the function of rules in constructing experiences. What
distinguishes the so-called savage from the civilized is not the sensible intuition. Indeed,
we have seen Kant’s indebtedness to Baumgarten for the position that sensible
perceptions are distinct in kind—entirely heterogeneous and autonomous—from the use

19
20

Cf. Longuenesse (1998), 116–22.
Kant (1992), 544–5; AA, 9: 33.
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of the understanding. The difference is that the savage lacks a rule to privilege particular
sensations and deemphasize others. His associations are not bound by a rule, which
would necessitate the apprehension and reproduction of particular sensations in the
manifold. Such a rule immanent to the appearance could then be reflected as such, i.e., as
a concept—house.21
Rules are reflected as concepts. They are what we recognize in the appearance if
and only if the appearance is constructed for the sake of judgment. Now this is not only
the case in empirical cognition, but a priori cognition as well. Kant makes this clear in
the case of mathematics in the Doctrine of Method, specifically in the chapter titled “The
Discipline of Pure Reason in Dogmatic Use.” There he writes,
Mathematical cognition considers the universal in the particular, indeed even in the
individual, yet nonetheless a priori and by means of reason, so that just as this individual
is determined under certain general conditions of construction, the object of the concept,
to which this individual corresponds only as its schema, must likewise be thought as
universally determined.22

What is important is not so much the unique image or the “individual” of the
construction. Rather, what is important is the general rule or the schema by which the
construction is carried out, for only this “attains the generality of the concept,”23 the
universality and necessity that holds in spite of the particular differences among the
images (size, color, composition).24 Hence Kant’s statement that “the schema of the
triangle can never exist anywhere except in thought, and signifies a rule of the synthesis

21

This is not to suggest that the savage cannot compare his sensations. Such a comparison may be an
association to previous encounters with similar objects. Kant would presumably agree with Baumgarten
that comparison can be independent from reflection. Longuenesse calls this “aesthetic comparison.” See
Longuenesse (1998), 114.
22
Kant (1998), A714/B742
23
Kant (1998), A141/B180.
24
For a helpful explanation in the case of arithmetical construction, see Young (1992), 166. See also
Parsons (1992) and Shabel (2006).
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of the imagination with regard to pure shapes in space.”25 These rules of synthesis are
what we recognize as necessary and universal in the particular sensible intuition,
reflecting, consequently, the schema into a concept.
According to Kant, the logical rules of the understanding (the “permanent laws”
of the Dissertation) are innate and they in turn become prescriptions for the synthesis of
Einbildungskraft.26 Transcendental rules or schemata thus bind the activities of
Einbildungskraft in accordance with the logical functions of the understanding. This is
precisely why Kant notes in the A-Deduction that “we ourselves bring into the
appearances that order and regularity in them that we call nature, and moreover we
would not be able to find it there if we, or the nature of our mind, had not originally put it
there.”27 It is this synthetic activity in accordance with rules that we recognize in the
appearances and hence reflect or judge.28
These innate rules are the logical functions that Kant presents in the Metaphysical
Deduction—judgments of quantity, quality, relation, and modality. In the Jäsche Logic
Kant presents judgments of quantity as claims of inclusion and exclusion:
In the universal judgment, the sphere of one concept is wholly enclosed within the sphere
of another; in the particular, a part of the former is enclosed under the sphere of the

25

Kant (1998), A141/B180.
It is helpful to recall here Kant’s strategy for an analytic of concepts: “We will therefore pursue the pure
concepts into their first seeds and predispositions in the human understanding, where they lie ready, until
with the opportunity of experience they are finally developed and exhibited in their clarity by the very same
understanding, liberated from the empirical conditions attaching to them,” Kant (1998), A66/B91.
27
Kant (1998), A125.
28
This foreshadows a letter to J. S. Beck from 3 July 1792, where Kant writes that the difference between a
connection of representations in a concept and one in a judgment is that “in the first, one thinks of a
concept as determined; in the second, one thinks of the determining activity of this concept.” Kant’s point
to Beck seems to be that when we make a judgment, we bring the synthetic activity of Einbildungskraft (an
initially blind activity) to consciousness and recognize logical functions (rules) in the sensible intuition.
Judgment is therefore a matter of attending to or reflecting this “determining activity” in the appearance.
See Kant (1967), 193; AA, 11: 347–8.
26
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other; and in the singular judgment, finally, a concept that has no sphere at all is
enclosed, merely as part then, under the sphere of another.29

Universal judgments such as “All bodies are divisible” claim that the extension (sphere)
of one concept, “bodies,” is wholly enclosed in the extension (sphere) of another concept,
“divisibility.” Similarly in the cases of particular and singular judgments, the extension of
the subject-concept is either partially enclosed in the extension of the predicate-concept,
“Some bodies are red,” or wholly enclosed as an individual object, “This body is red.”
(What this suggests for transcendental logic is that quantitative judgments are claims of
numerical identity and difference. In the comparison of appearances, we identity and
differentiate them by subsuming them partially or wholly under concepts. We may judge
that “All bodies are divisible,” but we can also differentiate various bodies from each
other: “Some bodies are red,” but “This body is blue.”30)
Kant presents qualitative judgments as a comparison of the intension (content) of
concepts. Although this is not immediately clear from the Jäsche Logic, where he notes
that “in the affirmative judgment the subject is thought under the sphere of a predicate, in
the negative it is posited outside the sphere of the latter, and in the infinite it is posited in
the sphere of a concept that lies outside the sphere of another,”31 his notes from the Logic
suggest that the qualitative subordination of objects under concepts rests on the principle
of non-contradiction. As he says in a note to qualitative judgments in the Logic,
“According to the principle of the excluded middle (exclusi tertii), the sphere of one

29

Kant (1992), 598; AA, 9: 102.
As the appendix to the Transcendental Analytic, “On the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection,”
makes clear, we do not simply differentiate objects through the inclusion and exclusion of conceptual
extensions. Since objects are given to us as sensible intuitions that are irreducible to concepts of the
understanding, pace Leibniz, we also numerical identify and differentiate objects spatially. See Kant
(1998), A260–92/B316–49. See also Longuenesse (1998), 132–5.
31
Kant (1992), 600; AA, 9: 103–4.
30
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concept relative to another is either exclusive or inclusive.”32 Hence in the case of the
judgment “All bodies are divisible” what we are claiming is that there is nothing intrinsic
(no marks) to the concept “body” that contradicts the concept “divisibility.” Negative
judgments are claims that there is something intrinsic to the subject-concept that
contradicts the predicate-concept: “No humans are immortal.” Now infinite judgments
such as “The human soul is non-mortal” indicate only that the intension of the subjectconcept contradicts the negation of the predicate-concept, “mortality.” Infinite judgments
claim that the subject-concept lies outside the sphere of the predicate (here “mortality”),
which sphere Kant says is “really no sphere at all but only a sphere’s sharing of a limit
with the infinite, or the limiting itself.”33
We have already discussed two of the logical function of relation above—
categorical and hypothetical. What Kant means by relation is the application of a
predicate by a condition that is internal to the subject-concept (such as the categorical
judgment “All bodies are divisible”) or the application of a predicate through a condition
external to the predicate-concept (such as the hypothetical judgment “If there is perfect
justice, obstinate evil is punished.” Here we might say, “In this world obstinate evil will
be punished on the condition that there is perfect justice.”). The essential difference
between categorical and hypothetical judgments is the problematic statement of the
antecedent of the hypothetical. For Kant, even if the antecedent is necessarily true, the
logical function of the hypothetical is essentially different, insofar as I add a condition
that is not recognized as internal to the subject of predication. Kant’s example in the
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Kant (1992), 600; AA, 9: 104.
Kant (1992), 600; AA, 9: 104.
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Jäsche Logic is, “If all bodies are composite, then they are divisible.” The point is not
whether the condition “composite” is contained in the subject “body.” The point is that I
nevertheless add it as if it were. The difference is in the mental act.34
Finally, in the fourth title of the table of judgments, Kant lists modality along with
its three moments—problematic, assertoric, and apodictic. Here he tells us that the
modality of judgments “is a quite special function of them, which is distinctive in that it
contributes nothing to the content of the judgment…but rather concerns only the value of
the copula in relation to thinking in general.”35 He then writes that problematic judgments
are possibly the case, assertoric judgments are actual, and apodictic necessary.
Now here Longuenesse has noted the striking difference between Kant’s
understanding of modality and modality traditionally understood.36 Kant does not claim
that problematic judgments are possible because the concepts combined are
noncontradictory (“A is B” is possible if B does not contradict A). Likewise, we are
given no definition of necessity as a contradiction resulting from its negation (“A is B” is
necessary if its negation is contradictory). Rather, Kant tells us that modality concerns the
value of the copula in the “relation of thinking in general.” He then proceeds to provide
examples in which problematic judgments are combined with assertoric judgments:

34

Cf. Longuenesse (1998), 140–7. I omit here again Kant’s account of the disjunctive judgment, since it
operates from a different standpoint from the categorical and hypothetical, namely, the standpoint of
totality. In the first Critique, he writes, “Finally, the disjunctive judgment contains the relation of two or
more propositions to one another, though not the relation of sequence, but rather that of logical opposition,
insofar as the sphere of one judgment excludes that of the other, yet at the same time the relation of
community, insofar as the judgments together exhaust the sphere of cognition proper; it is therefore a
relation of the parts of the sphere of a cognition where the sphere of each part is the complement of that of
the others in the sum total of the divided cognition, e.g., ‘The world exists either through blind chance, or
through inner necessity, or through an external cause,’” Kant (1998), A73–4/B99. Because the disjunctive
judgment is composed of an exhaustive set of propositions, its proper function rests in the Transcendental
Dialectic.
35
Kant (1998), A75/B100.
36
See Longuenesse (1998), 157–61.
180

Thus the two judgments whose relation constitutes the hypothetical judgment (antecedens
and consequens), as well as those in whose reciprocal relation the disjunctive judgment
consists (the members of the division), are all merely problematic. In the above example
the proposition “There is perfect justice” is not said assertorically, but is only thought of
as an arbitrary judgment that it is possible that someone might assume, and only the
implication is assertoric.37

What this suggests is that modality is determined through the judgments position (major
or minor premise) in deductive reasoning—thinking in general.
If the claim of section 19 is that the logical form of all judgments is the discursive
form of the objective unity of apperception and that this unity of apperception confers
necessity and universality, Kant’s claim is that the subsumption of appearances under
concepts rests on the transcendental condition of the numerical identity of the act of
apperception. Section 19 thus makes explicit the fundamental presupposition of the
threefold synthesis, although here he explicitly links the logical table of judgments for the
first time with the transcendental unity of apperception.
Now to be sure, Kant also mentions in this section the “principles of the objective
determination of all representations.”38 These principles presumably refer to the
“Analytic of Principles” following the Schematism chapter where Kant will present the
principles that “All intuitions are extensive magnitudes,” “In all appearances the real,
which is an object of the sensation, has intensive magnitude, i.e., degree,” and “All
alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connection of cause and effect,” etc.
These principles will be shown to express the combination of appearances (a world of
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Kant (1998), A75/B100.
Kant (1998), B142, my emphasis.
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objects perceivable and knowable) under the condition of the transcendental unity of
apperception.39
Section 18 claimed that the intuitive form of the objective unity of apperception
is time. Hence all empirical sensations temporally ordered are subject to the
transcendental unity of apperception. Now given the claim of section 19, that the
discursive form of the objective unity of apperception is the logical form of judgments,
Kant can conclude in section 20 that “all manifold, insofar as it is given in one empirical
intuition, is determined in regard to one of the logical functions for judgment, by means
of which, namely, it is brought to a consciousness in general. But now the categories are
nothing other than these very functions for judging, insofar as the manifold of a given
intuition is determined with regard to them (§13). Thus the manifold in a given intuition
also necessarily stands under categories.”40
The question at this point is how discursive (intellectual) synthesis unites with an
intuitive (sensible) synthesis. This is the task of the second step of the B-Deduction. As
Kant notes in section 21,
In the sequel (§26) it will be shown from the way in which the empirical intuition is
given in sensibility that its unity can be none other than the one the category prescribes to
the manifold of a given intuition in general according to the preceding §20; thus by the
explanation of its a priori validity in regard to all objects of our senses the aim of the
deduction will first be fully attained.41

Kant tells us that in the first step of the Transcendental Deduction he could not abstract
from the fact that the manifold for intuition is given, lest he be seen to suddenly promote
an intellectus archetypi he rejected back in 1772. What he did abstract from was the “way
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See Longuenesse (1998), 181–2.
Kant (1998), B143.
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Kant (1998), B144–5.
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in which the manifold for an empirical intuition is given.”42 For this reason, the
Transcendental Deduction now rests on an explanation of this mode of givenness, a
demonstration that the sensible given is united by the categories.

6,3

Synthesis Speciosa

In the “Schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding,” Kant’s resolution to the
“entirely unhomogeneous” relationship between a discursive synthesis and sensible
synthesis is to argue that there is a “transcendental schema,” a representation, he says, of
a “transcendental time-determination,” which is “homogeneous with the category (which
constitutes its unity) insofar as it is universal and rests on a rule a priori… [and] on the
other hand homogeneous with the appearance insofar as time is contained in every
empirical representation of the manifold.”43 This transcendental schema is Kant’s
ultimate explanation to the “way in which the manifold for an empirical intuition is
given.” This schema or “third thing” functions as a license for the subsumption of a
sensible intuition (sensible synthesis) under categories of the understanding (intellectual
syntheses).
The Schematism follows the Transcendental Deduction proper, but it really offers
nothing new beyond a further explication of the results of the second step of the BDeduction. For the Schematism claims that a time-determination is carried out by rules
(schemata) that are innate to the faculty of understanding, and this is precisely the lesson
of sections 24–6 of the B-Deduction. But to see this, we have to take Kant’s advice. In

42
43

Kant (1998), B144.
Kant (1998), A138–9/B177–8.
183

section 26 he invites us to “see the Transcendental Aesthetic” and then attaches a
footnote with a discussion of the a priori form of space. Moreover, in section 22 he
reminds us that “all intuition that is possible for us is sensible (Aesthetic).” And, finally,
in the emendation to section 24, he refers us back to section six, conclusive remarks on
the a priori forms of space and time. The argument of the second step of the B-Deduction
is that the forms of space and time that we encounter as given in the Aesthetic are in fact
constructions or determinations in accord with laws inherent to the understanding.
If section 19 begins the first step of the B-Deduction, section 24 titled “On the
application of the categories to objects of the senses in general” begins the second.44 Here
Kant returns to the lesson of the first step, namely, that “the pure concepts of the
understanding are related through the mere understanding to objects of intuition in
general,” what he called in section 19 judgment and what he here calls a synthesis
intellectualis. But now, he notes,
Since in us a certain form of sensible intuition a priori is fundamental, which rests on the
receptivity of the capacity for representation (sensibility), the understanding, as
spontaneity, can determine the manifold of given representations in accord with the
synthetic unity of apperception, and thus think a priori synthetic unity of the
apperception of the manifold of sensible intuition, as the condition under which all
objects of our (human) intuition must necessarily stand, through which then the
categories, as mere forms of thought, acquire objective reality.45

Here we have the first intimation, albeit still obscure, of the transcendental schema, “the
condition under which all objects of our (human) intuition must necessarily stand.” It is
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this condition that will link the categories and the sensible intuition, similar to the
categorical syllogism in logic discussed above.46
We saw that schemata were rules for synthesis. In the case of perception, they
guide (necessitate) Einbildungskraft in associating specific sensations, emphasizing some
and deemphasizing others, so that the appearance can be reflected as a concept, i.e.,
judged. In section 24, Kant now moves from empirical associations prior to judgment to a
transcendental figurative synthesis or synthesis speciosa. There he writes, “The figurative
synthesis, if it pertains merely to the original synthetic unity of apperception, i.e., this
transcendental unity, which is thought in the categories, must be called, as distinct from
the merely intellectual combination, the transcendental synthesis of the imagination
(transzendentale Synthesis der Einbildungskraft).”47 Kant then says that this
transcendental synthesis of Einbildungskraft “determine[s] the form of sense a priori”
and is an “effect of the understanding on sensibility and its first application…to objects of
the intuition.”48 The transcendental synthesis of Einbildungskraft or synthesis speciosa is
an inner affection that determines space and time, “the form of sense a priori.” It
therefore seems plausible that the synthesis speciosa determines the form of sensibility
for the sake of the reflection of the pure categories of the understanding.
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What Kant is suggesting in the above passage, which he will flesh out soon after, is very similar to the
claim he gave in section 10: “The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a
judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition, which,
expressed generally, is called the pure concept of the understanding. The same understanding, therefore,
and indeed by means of the very same actions through which it brings the logical form of judgment into
concepts by means of the analytic unity, also brings a transcendental content into its representations by
means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general, on account of which they are called
pure concepts of the understanding that pertain to objects a priori,” Kant (1998), A79/B104–5. The
important difference here is that whereas in section 10 he discusses “the manifold in intuition in general,”
as he does in the first step of the B-Deduction, he now specifies the intuition as a sensible (human)
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If Einbildungskraft or produktive Einbildungskraft49 is an inner affection or selfaffection, this is why Kant finds the need to clarify his doctrine of inner sense in the
emendation to section 24:
Here is now the place to make intelligible the paradox that must have struck everyone in
the form of inner sense (§6): namely how this presents even ourselves to consciousness
only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves, since we intuit ourselves only
as we are internally affected, which seems to be contradictory, since we would relate to
ourselves passively.50

In section six, he told us that time is a subjective condition, the form of inner sense or the
form of the “intuition of our self and our inner state” and the “a priori formal condition
of all appearances in general.”51 The paradox, then, that “must have struck everyone”
consists in the twofold nature of inner sense. How can I as an active subject intuit myself
as a passive object only as I appear to myself and not as I am in myself?
In a footnote to the Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view, Kant clarifies
this paradox and tells us that in logic the I is a subject of thinking, a reflecting I, or a pure
apperception and notes that “there is nothing more to say except that it is a very simple
idea.”52 And in a footnote to section 25 of the B-Deduction he notes that “the I think
expresses the act of determining my existence” and that this representation of spontaneity
indicates nothing more than that I exist as an intelligence—a thinker.53 But the I is also
an object of perception or of inner sense, what he calls empirical apperception. In this
sense, the subject turns toward itself and is aware of its mental states. It brings empirical
49

Kant (1998), B152: “Now insofar as the imagination is spontaneity, I also call it the productive
imagination, and thereby distinguish it from the reproductive imagination, whose synthesis is subject
solely to empirical laws, namely those of association, and that therefore contributes nothing to the
explanation of the possibility of cognition a priori, and on that account belongs not in transcendental
philosophy but in psychology.”
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cognitive content to conscious awareness.54 The importance of the clarification of this
paradox is that the very capacity to observe empirical cognitive content, inner sense, is
possible only if its form (time) is affected or constructed.55 Thus when Kant says that
transcendental philosophy distinguishes inner sense from the faculty of apperception, the
implication is that transcendental philosophy demonstrates the conditions for the
possibility of empirical psychology.
Once we distinguish inner sense from pure apperception, we should see that this
inner affection by Einbildungskraft, in accordance with the synthetic unity of
apperception, is the condition for the possibility of the a priori forms Kant laid out in the
Transcendental Aesthetic. This appears to be Kant’s point in a footnote to section 26:
Space, represented as object (as is really required in geometry), contains more than the
mere form of intuition, namely the comprehension [Zusammenfassung] of the manifold
given in accordance with the form of sensibility in an intuitive representation, so that the
form of intuition merely gives the manifold, but the formal intuition gives unity of the
representation. In the Aesthetic I ascribed this unity merely to sensibility, only in order to
note that it precedes all concepts, though to be sure it presupposes a synthesis, which
does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first
become possible.56

This footnote, following the introduction to the synthesis speciosa, suggests that this
synthesis “precedes all concepts” but is nonetheless the first application of the
understanding on sensibility. If this is so, this means we have to follow Kant’s lead and
work backwards. We have to return to the Aesthetic and reread the notion of form and the
pure intuitions of space and time.
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In the Aesthetic Kant characterized space and time as nondiscursive, singular, and
infinite given magnitudes. But they are also forms of appearances, forms of sensible
intuitions, and pure forms of sensibility, all of which, Kant says, allow “the manifold…to
be intuited as ordered in certain relations.”57 As he puts it there,
Accordingly, the pure form of sensible intuitions in general is to be encountered in the
mind a priori, wherein all the manifold of appearances is intuited in certain relations.
This pure form of sensibility is also called pure intuition. So if I separate from the
representation of a body that which the understanding thinks about it, such as substance,
force, divisibility, etc., as well as that which belongs to sensation, such as
impenetrability, hardness, color, etc., something from this empirical intuition is still left
for me, namely extension and figure.58

Space and time provide order or determine the manifold of sensations in a sensible
intuition, thereby delineating the extension and figure of the objects of intuition. But as
the prior passage notes, they are also themselves intuitions or “pure intuitions” with
extension and figure if we abstract from sensations and the concepts of the
understanding.59
Now in the case of intuition commentators have noted that the term is
ambiguous.60 For the latter might be construed as the intuited (the object of sensation or
the appearance organized by space and time) or as intuiting (the way in which the object
of sensation and appearance are received through sensibility). Thus in the case of “form
of appearances,” we should keep in mind that appearances have a form as the intuited and
that appearances are organized in accordance with the form of intuiting. But what might
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we say about a “pure intuition?” It seems at least to be the form of intuiting.61 Moreover,
it also appears to be an object itself, the intuited, “as is really required in geometry.” And
yet, in the appendix to the Transcendental Analytic titled “Amphiboly of the Concepts of
Reflection” Kant states that “the mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself not
an object, but the merely formal condition of one (as appearance), like pure space and
pure time, which are to be sure something, as the forms for intuiting, but are not in
themselves objects that are intuited (ens imaginarium).”62 What, then, is a pure intuition
if it is not itself an object that is intuited, though to be sure it is an object “as is really
required in geometry?”
In the Dissertation, as we have already seen, Kant raised the question whether
space and time are innate or acquired concepts. Recall that they are neither, at least not
acquired in the sense of an empirical abstraction. Rather, they are acquired by abstraction
of “the very action of the mind, which coordinates what is sensed by it, doing so in
accordance with permanent laws.”63 Kant repeats this claim in his response to Eberhard
in the 1790 On a discovery whereby any new critique of pure reason is to be made
superfluous by an older one, where he again returns to the question of whether space and
time are innate or acquired. There he writes,
The Critique admits absolutely no implanted or innate representations. One and all,
whether they belong to intuition or to concepts of the understanding, it considers them as
acquired. But there is also an original acquisition, (as the teachers of natural right call it),
and thus of that which previously did not yet exist at all, and so did not belong to
anything prior to this act.64
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Like the Dissertation, Kant goes on to suggest that space and time are acquired, though
“originally.” They are acquired, he says, because their ground lies in the subject and its
“mere receptivity peculiar to the mind, when it is affected by something (in sensation), to
receive a representation in accordance with its subjective constitution.”65 This is their
“first formal ground.” But they are original, insofar as there is another affection from
within, the abstraction of which are the pure intuitions of space and time.66
What Kant seems to have in mind in the Amphiboly is that pure intuition, though
not a real object, is an ideal object or “ens imaginarium,” in the precise sense that it is an
abstraction of mental actions in accordance with permanent rules of the mind. If we
return to the B-Deduction, we begin to see that this first application of the understanding
on sensibility or Einbildungskraft—posited independently from sensation and pure
categories—yield the pure intuitions of space and time, ens imaginaria.
This resolves the tension in Kant’s remark in the footnote to section 26 that space
must be represented as an object in geometry. For what Kant means is not that the
geometer takes the image itself as the principal object. Indeed, we know the image is
arbitrary. As Kant puts it, “No image of a triangle would ever be adequate to the concept
of it.”67 Geometry, rather, “hurries immediately to intuition, in which it considers the
concept in concreto, although not empirically, but rather solely as one which it has
exhibited a priori, i.e., constructed, and in which that which follows from the general

65

Kant (2002b), 312; AA, 8: 222.
In the Jäsche Logic, Kant notes the ambiguity in the term “abstraction.” He writes, “The expression
abstraction is not always used correctly in logic. We must not speak of abstracting something (abstrahere
aliquid), but rather of abstracting from something (abstrahere ab aliquo).” In the case of pure intuitions, we
abstract from categorial and sensorial content (that is, we isolate the intuitions from further determinations).
But in the case of the mental acts which arise in accordance with permanent laws, we abstract something
(that is, pure intuition is an abstraction of these mental acts). See Kant (1992), 592; AA, 9: 95.
67
Kant (1998), A141/B180.
66

190

conditions of the construction must also hold generally of the object of the constructed
concept.”68 In the Dissertation, Kant called these “general conditions of the construction”
“permanent laws” of the mind, i.e., necessary and universal rules. In the Critique, they
are schemata. These are the proper objects of geometry.
Importantly, Kant uses similar (mathematical) language to describe the method of
the Transcendental Aesthetic. It is a “metaphysical exposition” of the concepts of space
and time, what is an exhibition (Darstellung) of the concept as given a priori.69 Thus
whatever the particular presentations of space and time are, it seems that we should
consider them as abstractions of mental actions in accordance with rules. Now this
appears to be inconsistent with common readings of the Aesthetic. After all, Kant simply
presents space and time there as if they are always already formed. But again, Kant warns
us in the footnote to section 26 that “in the Aesthetic I ascribed this unity merely to
sensibility, only in order to note that it precedes all concepts, though to be sure it
presupposes a synthesis, which does not belong to the senses but through which all
concepts of space and time first become possible.” If we then heed Kant’s invitation and
return to the Aesthetic, the pure intuitions of space and time look to be in fact
constructions of a prior synthetic act, just as they were described in the Dissertation and
On a discovery.
This brings us to the difference between a “form of intuition” and a “formal
intuition.” Is Kant suggesting that a pure intuition, space and time, is a form of intuition
or a formal intuition? In the footnote to section 26 he tells us that the formal intuition
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“gives unity of the representation” and form of intuition “merely gives the manifold.”
Longuenesse has suggested that this distinction rests in Kant’s “epigenetic” conception of
the conditions of representation.70 As Kant’s remarks to Eberhard in On a discovery
suggest, if the synthesis speciosa constructs space and time of the Aesthetic, there must
be something intrinsic to sensibility, mere receptivity, that allows for spatial and temporal
order. Sensibility, as the process of transforming impressions into sensations, contains the
potentiality for spatial and temporal form. This is what Kant means by a form of
intuition—the potential to be organized or a “first formal ground.” A formal intuition, on
the other hand, is a result of that “law of mind, according to which it joins together in a
fixed manner the sense-impressions made by the presence of an object.”71 The formal
intuition is a result of the synthesis speciosa.72 This formal intuition is the pure intuition
of the Aesthetic, what Kant now says presupposes the first application of the
understanding on sensibility, although, to be sure, it “precedes all concepts.”73
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It is helpful here to return to the first edition, just prior to the Preliminary
Reminder, where Kant tells us that “if therefore I ascribe a synopsis to sense, because it
contains a manifold in its intuition, synthesis must always correspond to this, and
receptivity can make cognitions possible only if combined with spontaneity.”74 What
Kant calls in 1787 a “mere form of intuition” he here called a “synopsis.” Though a
terminological difference, I suggest the doctrine remains the same. For in describing the
first of the threefold synthesis, Kant writes,
Now in order for unity of intuition to come from this manifold (as, say, in the
representation of space), it is necessary first to run through and then take together this
manifoldness, which action I call synthesis of apprehension, since it is aimed directly at
the intuition, which to be sure provides a manifold but can never effect this as such.75

The level of description here is empirical. But he also tells us that this synthesis “aimed
directly at the intuition” is also exercised a priori, without which “we could have a priori
neither the representation of space nor of time, since these can be generated only through
the synthesis of the manifold that sensibility in its original receptivity provides.”76 The
implication, I take it, is that the mere form of intuition as a synopsis of sensations is
affected through a synthesis according to mental laws, yielding formal intuitions, i.e., the
pure intuitions of space and time.
With this interpretative legwork, section 24 and its emendation lose much of their
perplexity. It now looks like Kant is in full possession of the terminology required for the
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theory of self-affection that he lacked in 1781. The meaning of the following passage is
now clear:
[I]nner sense…contains the mere form of intuition, but without combination of the
manifold in it, and thus it does not yet contain any determinate intuition at all, which is
possible only through the consciousness of the determination of the manifold through the
transcendental action of Einbildungskraft (synthetic influence of the understanding on the
inner sense), which I have named the figurative synthesis.77

The novelty here, in comparison with the 1781 edition, is the figurative synthesis
(synthesis speciosa), which is now the designation for that mental act occasioned by a
reception of sensations.
That Kant would choose to designate Einbildungskraft as that specific act that
generates space and time also clarifies the claim that this inner affection “precedes all
concepts.” For as we have seen in the case of empirical apprehension and reproduction,
these schematic constructions presuppose rules but precede empirical concepts. Concepts
are the result of recognition or the reflection of the schema (and thus also the sensible
intuition).78 The synthesis speciosa is, strictly speaking, an intuition, which, according to
the Stufenleiter, is “immediately related to the object and is singular.”79 The theoretical
duty is then to reflect the intuition under a priori concepts, which reflective act, as we
know, is not predetermined, as if “I am so constituted that I cannot think of this
representation otherwise than as so connected.”
Another novelty of the emendation is how Kant explicitly links the generation of
time with space and provides substance to the claim that the “understanding therefore
does not find some sort of combination of the manifold already in inner sense, but
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produces it, by affecting inner sense.”80 What is clear is that as Einbildungskraft runs
through the manifold of outer sensations and organizes them according to the laws of the
mind, it simultaneously generates spatial relations and temporal relations. For since all
outer sensations are inner states from the standpoint of the mind, the affection of the mere
form of outer sense is necessarily an affection of the mere form of inner sense. Hence
every outer-affection is an occasion for self-affection, and thereby the generation of
time.81 As Kant puts it, “Motion, as action of the subject (not as determination of an
object), consequently the synthesis of the manifold in space, if we abstract from this
manifold in space and attend solely to the action in accordance with which we determine
the form of inner sense, first produces the concept of succession at all.”82

Copyright © Robert M. Guerin 2016

80

Kant (1998), B155.
In the officially labeled “Loose Leaf Leningrad 1,” a series of Reflexionen dated from the late 1780s,
Kant opens with this reflection: “Time is the mere subjective form of inner intuition, insofar as we are
affected by ourselves.” See Kant (1987), I.2, Roman numeral, for the page (I for recto, II for verso), and by
Arabic numeral, for the line of the original. For an analysis of this Reflexion, see Zöller (1989b).
82
Kant (1998), B155, my emphasis. Cf. Kant B154: “We cannot think of a line without drawing it in
thought, we cannot think of a circle without describing it, we cannot represent the three dimensions of
space at all without placing three lines perpendicular to each other at the same point, and we cannot even
represent time without, in drawing a straight line (which is to be the external figurative representation of
time), attending merely to the action of the synthesis of the manifold through which we successively
determine the inner sense, and thereby attending to the succession of this determination in inner sense.”
81

195

7,

A Theoretical Imperative

The offences (vitia) of Einbildungskraft are that its inventions are either merely unbridled or entirely
ruleless (effrenis aut perverse). The latter fault is the worst kind.
—Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view, 7: 181
For it is a subjectively necessary touchstone of the correctness of our judgments generally, and
consequently also of the soundness of our understanding, that we also restrain our understanding by the
understanding of others.
—Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view, 7: 219

7,1

A Faculty of Rules

Having shown that Kant’s revisions between 1781 and 1787 constitute neither a change in
doctrine nor a shrinking back (pace Heidegger) but a clarification that Einbildungskraft is bound
by a priori rules inherent to the mind, I now turn to its implications—part two of my thesis. The
a priori categories of the understanding are necessary conditions for the possibility of
experience, but they are not sufficient. I now argue that there is further work to be done at the
empirical level, work that we are to be held accountable for lest we create our own private
fantasies impervious to social discourse and scientific truth. In particular, I explore here the
implications for mental health.
If, as Kant claims in the Critique, experience is conceptual—judgment—the content of
our concepts will determine our perception. One implication is that false conceptual content
alters our experience. We resemble dreamers in waking life, as Kant would say. As we know
from chapter four, this is precisely how Kant describes some forms of mental illness in the
anthropological writings. They are altered experiences driven by false concepts, products of a

“diseased Einbildungskraft.”1 I conclude this dissertation with the argument that Kant’s account
of empirical thinking amounts to a duty to bind the reproductive imagination according to a
common concept (conceptus communis), what Kant sometimes refers to as common sense
(sensus communis). This is what I call the theoretical imperative whose consequences I argue are
both preventive and therapeutic.2
At the conclusion to the A-Deduction Kant tells us that the understanding is a “faculty of
rules.” This, he says, is “more fruitful” and “comes closer to its essence,” for insofar as these
rules “represent existence as necessary” and hence are laws, it is the “legislation (Gesetzgebung)
for nature, i.e., without understanding there would not be any nature at all, i.e., synthetic unity of
the manifold of appearances in accordance with rules.”3 Necessity does not arise from without
but from within. Kant’s insight is that human beings are themselves the bearers of objectivity.
But the thing about rules, as the cliché goes, is that they are made to be broken. As Kant puts it in
the Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view:
To observe the various acts of the representative power in myself, when I summon them, is indeed
worth reflection; it is necessary and useful for logic and metaphysics. — But to wish to eavesdrop
on oneself when they come into the mind unbidden and on their own (this happens through the
play of the Einbildungskraft when it is unintentionally mediating) constitutes a reversal of the
natural order in the faculty of knowledge (eine Verkehrung der natürlichen Ordnung im
Erkenntnisvermögen), because then the principles of thought do not lead the way (as they should),
but rather follow from behind. This eavesdropping on oneself is already a disease of the mind
(melancholy), or leads to one and to the madhouse.4
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If the principles of the understanding, presumably the principles of the Analytic of the Critique,
guide Einbildungskraft, this constitutes the “natural order in the faculty of knowledge.” But
Kant’s point is that there are cases in which Einbildungskraft associates representations without
rules or according to uncommon, private concepts, which he here calls a “disease of the mind” or
a “reversal of the natural order in the faculty of knowledge.”
We have seen cases of reversals. In mental illness or certain temperaments of character,
Phantasie constructs subjective experiences, private worlds. But we have also seen cases of an
objective construction of experience, namely, the threefold synthesis of the 1781 Critique. There
Kant presupposed a rule of the mind that guides the reproductive act of Einbildung.5 Experience
as empirical thinking is a binding of Einbildung in accordance with an empirical concept. Yet
this synthesis of apprehension, reproduction, and recognition presupposes a “concept.” Recall
that Kant’s deeper insight was that insofar as the mind strives toward judgment, a reflection of
the unthematic schema of Einbildungskraft, the mind takes itself as its own object, i.e., the
threefold synthesis presupposes self-consciousness, a numerically identical function of unity
through successive syntheses. Kant’s assumption of the threefold synthesis is that the human
being strives toward thinking, an assumption grounded by the transcendental unity of
apperception.
The threefold synthesis employs, at least in part, a descriptive method. It describes the
genesis of an appearance reflected under both concepts and transcendental apperception. But
since experience (in the thick sense) for Kant is a judgment, the threefold synthesis also presents
a task for its reader: strive to represent the world in accordance with concepts and principles.

5

See footnote 45 in chapter two above.
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We know that representations described in the A-Deduction do not always arise. The
reproductive imagination can order sensations according to habit, as Hume convincingly shows,6
or it can arrange sensations according to temperaments and the private fantasies of the deranged,
demented, and insane. As Kant puts it in the Anthropology,
We often play with obscure representations, and have an interest in throwing them in the shade
before Einbildungskraft, when they are liked or disliked. However, more often we ourselves are a
play of obscure representations, and our understanding is unable to save itself from the
7
absurdities into which they have placed it, even though it recognizes them as illusions.

Left to play, unbound by rules of the understanding, Einbildungskraft associates representations
that we would prefer, often for the sake of social propriety, to repress.
We know Kant holds out little hope for the chronically ill. They merely deserve our pity
as their imaginations uncontrollably weave a private world. And lacking what Kant often calls
“mother-wit” (Mutterwitz),8 the natural gift of seeing the particular instance of a universal rule,
some of us will perpetually fail to reflect (recognize) the universal rule in the particular
appearance. No amount of rules can correct stupidity, according to Kant.9 But if one does not
suffer from a serious psychopathology or mental deficiency, there is a question whether
transcendental judgment (the binding of Einbildungskraft and its subsequent reflection) is a
prescription for empirical judgment and a correction for bad habits.

6

Cf. Kant (2007), 261: AA, 7: 149: “Habit (Angewohnheit) (assuentudo), however, is a physical inner necessitation
to proceed in the same manner that one has proceeded until now… The reason why the habits of another stimulate
the arousal of disgust in us is because here the animal in the human being jumps out far too much, and because here
one is led instinctively by the rule of habituation, exactly like another (non-human) nature, and so runs the risk of
falling into one and the same class with the beast.”
7
Kant (2007), 247; AA, 7: 136. Kant tells us, furthermore, that there are many representations that we are
unconscious of: “The field of sensuous intuitions and sensations of which we are not conscious, even though we can
undoubtedly conclude that we have them; that is, obscure representations in the human being (and thus also in
animals), is immense. Clear representations, on the other hand, contain only infinitely few points of this field which
lie open to consciousness; so that as it were only few places on the vast map of our mind are illuminated.” See Kant
(2007), 247; AA, 7: 135.
8
See Kant (1998), A133/B172 and Kant (2007), 250; AA, 7: 139.
9
See Kant (1998), A133/B172n.
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In the Critique’s “Analytic of Principles” Kant writes,
But now although general logic can give no precepts to the power of judgment, things are quite
different with transcendental logic, so that it even seems that the latter has as its proper business
to correct and secure the power of judgment in the use of the pure understanding through
determinate rules.10

Transcendental logic secures the power of judgment in the pure understanding. But I also think it
offers a model for empirical understanding. Transcendental philosophy is prescriptive,
pedagogical. It tells us how we ought to judge as thinkers. It thus provides something analogous
to the use of examples in empirical judgment, namely, the “leading-strings” or the case to which
the rule ought to be applied. Might it be the leading-string for Einbildung, the empirical power to
associate Abbilder, Nachbilder, and Vorbilder?11

7,2

Freedom of Thought

In section 27 of the B-Deduction, Kant returns once more to the alternatives he sketched for Herz
in 1772 and formulated again in section 14 of the first edition of the Critique.
There are only two ways in which a necessary agreement of experience with the concepts of its
objects can be thought: either the experience makes these concepts possible or these concepts
make the experience possible. The first is not the case with the categories (nor with pure sensible
intuition); for they are a priori concepts, hence independent of experience (the assertion of an
empirical origin would be a sort of generatio aequivoca). Consequently only the second way
remains (as it were a system of the epigenesis of pure reason): namely that the categories contain
the ground of the possibility of all experience in general from the side of the understanding.12

Kant then remarks that if someone still insisted on a middle way, namely, a “preformationsystem,” the following, he says, would be decisive proof against it:
That in such a case the categories would lack the necessity that is essential to their concept. For,
e.g., the concept of cause, which asserts the necessity of a consequent under a presupposed

10

Kant (1998), A135/B174.
To be sure, Kant calls this power Bildung in the Pölitz Lectures. See Figure 4-2 above. But by 1781 he calls the
reproductive power of imagination “Einbildung” in contrast to the productive power of imagination,
“Einbildungskraft.”
12
Kant (1998), B166–7.
11
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condition, would be false if it rested only on a subjective necessity, arbitrarily implanted in us, of
combining certain empirical representations according to such a rule of relation. I would not be
able to say that the effect is combined with the cause in the object (i.e., necessarily), but only that
I am so constituted that I cannot think of this representation otherwise than as so connected;
which is precisely what the skeptic wishes most, for then all of our insight through the supposed
objective validity of our judgments is nothing but sheer illusion.13

This is to say that necessity is not simply a psychological or physiological predetermination—“I
am so constituted that I cannot think of this representation otherwise.” Rather, necessity, what
Kant here calls an “epigenesis of pure reason,” appears to be an organization of representations
according to rules which the subject binds himself to and subsequently endorses as a theoretical
duty.14
For Kant, rules and laws have a hold on us because we can freely choose to endorse them
as a rational human being. In the Critique of Practical Reason, for example, Kant tells us that the
moral law motivates us because in binding ourselves to it we show respect and love for ourselves
and each other as rational persons. This force, whether in its practical or theoretical aspect, is a
constraint (Zwang).15 Now since in our case constraint can manifest itself as self-constraint, this
force is an inner force or compulsion (Nötigung).16 In light of the passage quoted above, we can
now say that necessity is not a feeling of outer constraint but rather an inner compulsion. The
subject, subsequently, must feel a theoretical vocation (Bestimmung) to reflect and endorse the
appearances as so connected. As the passage from the Anthropology suggests and as we have
seen from Hume, the imagination does not always act in accordance with rules of the

13

Kant (1998), B167–8.
Cf. Kant (1998), A128: “But all empirical laws are only particular determinations of the pure laws of the
understanding, under which and in accordance with whose norm they are first possible, and the appearances assume
a lawful form, just as, regardless of the variety of their empirical form, all appearances must nevertheless always be
in accord with the pure form of sensibility,” my emphasis.
15
See, e.g., Kant (1996), 512–3; AA, 6: 379–80. Cf. Kant (1900–), 4: 1333: “Alle Verbindlichkeit stehen unter
Gesetzen, und sind entweder perfectae oder imperfectae. Zu jenen kann ich gezwungen werden, zu diesen nicht.
Zwang ist Einschränkung meiner Freiheit.”
16
Cf. the German for necessity—Nötwendigkeit
14
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understanding. But when it does so act, it manifests “the natural order in the faculty of
knowledge,” which we then freely reflect and take responsibility for. Thinking is thus a free
choice and a theoretical duty.
Now this is not to suggest that the constraint of Einbildungskraft is a manifestation of
practical freedom. For, strictly speaking, Kant thinks that practical freedom is a manifestation of
consciously binding ourselves to rules out of respect for the moral law. Einbildungskraft is an a
priori power, “of which we are seldom even conscious.”17 But perhaps Kant’s deeper insight is
that, analogous to the practical philosophy, we ought to be conscious of this power of the mind,
particularly in its empirical associations, out of respect for ourselves as reasoners.18 There is a
theoretical duty to raise this power to consciousness and endorse (or alter) the rules by which it is
bound.

7,3

A Case Study: Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Revisited

For Kant, psychopathology lies on the same spectrum as rational thinking. The difference is a
matter of degree. Given the ease with which we slide from reason to madness, we can understand
why thinking according to common concepts would be so important. Such thinking offers a
prescription not only against “logical egoism” but psychopathology as well, the slide from daydreaming to fanaticism.

17

Kant (1998), A78/B103. Cf. Fichte (2000), 55: “Ein Akt des Geistes dessen wir uns als eines solchen bewußt
werden, heißt Freiheit. Ein Akt, ohne Bewußtsein des Handelns, bloße Spontaneität.” Fichte often explains intuition
as a self-forgetfulness or an unconscious act: “Ich vegesse mich selbst gänzlich, und verliere mich in der
Anschauung,” Fichte (2000), 69.
18
The claim here is not that everyone has a duty to perform transcendental philosophy—reflect on the a priori
conditions for the possibility of experience—for whether we are conscious of these operations or not we cannot alter
them. The claim is that everyone has a duty to reflect upon the empirical associations of the reproductive
imagination, for these are alterable.
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The Critique’s theoretical imperative is in fact an echo of the 1760s. This imperative was
the maxim of the 1766 Dreams of a Spirit-Seer. In the first chapter of part one, “A tangled
metaphysical knot, which can be either untied or cut as one pleases,” Kant asks for the sense and
ground of a spirit-being. He wants to know whether this concept is objectively valid. It is, he
says, only if the concept arises from an abstraction from experience.
The problem in the case of a spirit-being, of course, is that it is debatable whether it can
be found in experience. Hence to the question how such a concept arises, Kant writes the
following in a lengthy footnote:
There are many concepts which are the product of covert and obscure inferences made in the
course of experience; these concepts then proceed to propagate themselves by attaching
themselves to other concepts, without there being any awareness of the experience itself on which
they were originally based or of the inference which formed the concept on the basis of that
experience. Such concepts may be called surreptitious concepts. There are a great number of such
concepts; some of them are nothing but delusions of the imagination (ein Wahn der
Einbildung)…19

This footnote highlights the imperative to check the essential marks we hold concepts to contain
against experience, as well as the understanding of others, since too often concepts contain
erroneous marks, slipped in unwittingly by associations of Einbildung.
This imperative is all the more important when we consider that if associations give rise
to surreptitious concepts and that concepts as rules, according to the Critique, are in turn
guidelines for further constructions of experience, then, as the anthropological writings warn, we
are liable to not only construct slightly delusional worlds but fail to recognize them as such.
In Dreams Kant presents a material explanation for the supposed visions of the fanatic or
spirit-seer. He argues that his visions are due to damaged nerve-tissue whose vibrations produce
images that imitate the affects of outer impressions. The spirit-seer consequently interprets the

19

Kant (2002a), 308n; AA, 2: 321n.
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force and vivacity of the inner impression as an outer impression, interpreting the delusion as
real.20 But by the publication of the 1798 Anthropology, Kant abandons this explanation. He
suggests that mental illness is the sole concern of the philosophical faculty, since “physicians and
physiologists in general are still not advanced enough to see deeply into the mechanical element
in the human being so that they could explain, in terms of it, the attack that led to the atrocity.”21
For Kant, psychopathology, and the diagnosis of derangement or fanaticism in particular,
is a philosophical matter. For what the philosopher looks for is the employment of “logical
private sense” (sensus privatus) in the construction of the patient’s experience. To be sure, there
are some instances of psychopathology that lack even the slightest coherence, no concepts or
rules. But most cases, such as fanaticism and vesania (Aberwitz), are characterized by a ruleguided Einbildungskraft, although the rules themselves are of “a totally different standpoint into
which the soul is transferred, so to speak, and from which it sees all objects differently.”22 In the
case of vesania, what we might call deranged systematizing, Kant calls this “positive unreason”
and notes that “unreason (which is something positive, not mere lack of reason) is, just like
reason, a mere form into which objects can be fitted, and both reason and unreason are therefore
dependent on the universal.”23
In 1766 Kant does not juxtapose the hypochondriac and the fanatic. Here he substitutes
the metaphysician for the former, who, in this insightful and rhetorical essay, often appears only
nominally different. In his explanation of the concept of spirit-beings, Kant suggests that these
metaphysicians have grounded their concept in the ambiguous shades of the night, whose forms

20

See Kant (2002a), 331–3; AA, 2: 344–5.
Kant (2007), 319; AA, 7: 214.
22
Kant (2007), 321; AA, 7: 216, my emphasis.
23
Kant (2007), 323; AA, 7: 218.
21

204

harmonize with their hopes and dreams. These concepts then affect their subsequent intuitions
and perceptions: they perpetually find confirmation all around for their deepest desires. But
given what we have seen from Kant’s remarks in the Critique concerning intuition—that it is a
product of Einbildungskraft—we can offer an explanation that Kant might have provided in
retrospect from his work in the 1780s. What characterizes the experience of the metaphysician is
a hope that guides his imaginative construction of experience. He uncritically shapes his
sensations according to a private concept and thereby creates a dream-state in waking life. It
seems plausible, given Kant’s repeated warnings about unchecked illusory experiences—in the
case hypochondria—that this metaphysician could soon show symptoms of a fanatical intuition.
The metaphysician’s behavior looks dangerously similar to the fantast, whose experience,
from his perspective, makes perfect sense. The rules that guide Einbildung are consistent with
other concepts he holds. His experience is thus grounded in reasons, although reasons no one
else shares: there is method to his madness. Lest he construct and thereby wander through a
dream, one internally coherent and impervious to the understanding of others, the philosopher,
no less than the hypochondriac, must reflect upon his experience and analyze the concepts that
underlie his perceptions.
But as I think I have shown, for Kant this is not just a problem for metaphysics. All
flights of fancy lie on the same spectrum as raving madness. Since it is not the case that I cannot
but create objective experiences, I must make my concepts explicit for critique—make a
judgment. This is the theoretical imperative, one product of which is a healthy understanding—
gesunder Menschenverstand.

Copyright © Robert M. Guerin 2016
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PRESENTATIONS
Peer-Reviewed Talks
“Aesthetic Perfections and Euclidean Constructions: Kant’s Productive Imagination”
Leuven Kant Conference, Catholic University, Leuven, Belgium, 29 May 2014
“Kants Produktive Einbildungskraft”
Research Colloquium, University of Munich, Munich, Germany, 20 May 2014
“Seeking Solutions to Unconscious Conflicts: Reflections on Kant’s Imagination”
Southeast Philosophy Congress, Clayton State University, 16 February 2013
“Presuppositions and Grounds: Maimon and Fichte on the Quid Facti of the Transcendental
Deduction”
Kentucky Philosophical Association, Centre College, 28 April 2012
“Eros and Subjectivity: A Commentary on Hans Loewald and Jonathan Lear”
The Association for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society, Rutgers University,
4 November 2011
“Keeping Your Cool: A Psychoanalytic Explanation of Affect-Regulation”
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Tennessee Philosophical Association, Vanderbilt University, 13 November 2010
Conference Comments
Christopher Hill’s “Agency, Social Structure, and Reflexivity in Hegel’s Dialectic”
University of Kentucky 16th Annual Philosophy Graduate Student Conference, 6 April
2013
Jane Kneller’s “Sign, Symbol, and Symphilosophie: The Social Dimension of the Beautiful in
Kant and the Jena Romantics”
Perspectives in the Philosophy of Art, University of Kentucky, 31 March 2012
Kurt Blankschaen’s “The Moral Lie”
University of Kentucky 15th Annual Philosophy Graduate Student Conference, 24 March
2012
Jasper van Buuren’s “Phenomenal Space and Physical Space”
University of Kentucky 14th Annual Philosophy Graduate Student Conference, 25 March
2011
INTERNSHIPS
Clinical Ethics Consultation
University of Kentucky, Program for Bioethics

2015

WORKSHOPS
American Association of Philosophy Teachers: Teaching Philosophy
American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, San Diego, CA, 20 April 2014
The Toronto Seminar: J. G. Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right
Toronto, Canada, 14–19 June 2010
COURSES (SELECTED)
Kant’s Naturrecht Feyerabend (Audit) — Günter Zöller
Kant and Self-Consciousness (Audit) — Günter Zöller

Summer 2014
Winter 2013–2014

Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Audit) — Daniel Breazeale

Spring 2013

Hegel’s Objective Spirit — Italo Testa

Spring 2012
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Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment — Stefan Bird-Pollan

Spring 2012

System and Foundation Between Kant and Hegel — Daniel Breazeale

Spring 2012

Merleau-Ponty — Ronald Bruzina

Fall 2011

Symbolic Logic II — Timothy Sundell

Spring 2011

Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit — Daniel Breazeale

Spring 2011

Plotinus’s Enneads — David Bradshaw

Fall 2010

Becoming Kant: From Leibniz to Kant’s Dissertation — Brandon Look

Fall 2010

Perception: Merleau-Ponty and Analytic Philosophy — Ronald Bruzina

Spring 2010

Plato’s Late Ontology — Eric Sanday

Fall 2009

Marx and the History of Western Marxism — Arnold Farr

Fall 2009

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
University of Kentucky

2009–2016

Courses in Philosophy
Death, Dying, and the Quality of Life
Fall 2015
Health Care Ethics
Spring 2013, Fall 2014, Spring 2015
Business Ethics
Fall 2012
Introduction to Logic
Winter 2010, Spring 2012
Introduction to Philosophy: Morality and Society
Spring 2011, Fall 2011
Courses in Medicine
Introduction to Clinical Medicine II, Ethics Portion

Spring 2015, Spring 2016

ACADEMIC SERVICE
Member, Hospital Ethics Committee, University of Kentucky

2015–2016

President of the Philosophy Graduate Student Association
University of Kentucky

2012–2013

Proofreading and Reference Editor

2012
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Daniel Breazeale’s book Thinking Through the Wissenschaftslehre
Indexing and Reference Editor
Patrick Miller’s book Becoming God

2009–2010

President of the Undergraduate Philosophy Society
Duquesne University

2007–2008

Hosted and coordinated the conference Existentialism
Duquesne University

2007

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS
American Philosophical Association

North American Kant Society

American Association of Philosophy
Teachers

Society for Phenomenology and Existential
Philosophy
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University of Kentucky
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University of Kentucky
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University of Kentucky
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